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ABSTRACT 
The twin concerns of the thesis are (a) to develop a labour process 
analysis that is able to account for professional work and (b) in so 
doing to explain the reasons for hospital doctors various responses to 
the introduction of computer systems into medical work. 
This thesis constitutes a study of hospital doctors (clinicians) use 
of information technology in their clinic work. The first part reviews 
the literature and general developments in medical computing in relation 
to a theoretical analysis of the organisation and control of the 
clinic/medical labour process. The second part consists of an 
ethnographic study of the introduction of computer-based medical 
information systems into three hospitals; two being case studies of 
renal units and associated clinics and the third a study of an 
outpatients' department at a small acute hospital. The computer systems 
involved either replaced or supplemented the traditional form of the 
medical records and for this reason it was possible to focus on the role 
of these organisational records in the maintenance and reproduction of 
dominance and subordination within the labour process of clinic/medical 
work. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis provides a detailed examination of the process and 
consequences of the introduction of information technology into hospital 
clinics. Beyond the immediate ethnographic objective of charting the social 
relations and experiences involved in such change the thesis is concerned 
to utilise and develop a labour process approach. This approach has not 
been straightforwardly adopted, because in addition to the fact that labour 
process analyses have become increasingly diverse and eclectic (Littler and 
Salaman, 1982 j Wood, 1983) it is also the case tha t it has only rarely been 
applied to employment in the state sector. This has largely been the 
result of the problems the non-market sector has presented for the 
unreconstructed labour process model. Nevertheless, I would argue that the 
concern with the con trol of work processes which is cen tral to labour 
process theory is a critically important one and it is my wish here to, 
(a) explore, and demonstrate, the relevance of this central concern 
of labour process theory within the NHS hospital service, 
(b) seek to reassess and elaborate the theory in order to be able 
to clarify and specify the applicability of the approach in two 
hospital settings. 
In this context, the concentration on the substantive issue of 
computerisation served two primary purposes, 
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(a) as a specific form of technical change which introduces a fresh 
dynamic into the pre-existing pattern of work within hospitals, 
(b) as a putative process of rationalisation which exposes the 
forces of control. 
The dynamic of the computerisation process provided the conditions within 
which the theoretical model could be assessed under circumstances in which 
the elements of labour process control would necessarily have to come into 
play. Such control related to, 
(i) the decision to computerise 
(ii) the resourcing of the computer systems and 
(iii) the consequential effects on the clinic work processes, both 
among doctors and within the wider division of labour, including 
nurses, other professional occupations (e.g. social workers) and 
administrators. 
My basic argument is that a revised labour process analysis, one which 
emphasises process as well as structure, provides an effective way of 
social theorising about medical, and clinic, work. The model developed here 
(Chapter Three) enables one to identify the crucial elements of the 
technical and social work processes and the division of labour (i.e. how 
the work is done and what persons, in terms of occupational groups, carry 
out what component of the work). These crucial elements are those most 
likely to facilitate outcomes that maintain (reproduce) the existing 
pa t tern of rela tions within the hospi tal clinics, commonly characterised 
among sociologists as medical dominance <Freidson, 1971a), even under 
conditions of innovation and change (as can occur with the introduction of 
new computer systems). With this focus the theory can be utilised to 
analyse the details of particular work processes, including the patterns of 
domination and subordination within them. It should also be able to relate 
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this specific account to a sociological analysis of the wider social 
structures within which the processes are embedded though it has not been 
possible to develop this second aspect of the theory very far within this 
thesis given that the main concern here has been with the specifics of 
computerisa tion and innovation within hospital clinics. 
The plan of the thesis 
The thesis is in two parts. In Part I the theoretical model is 
developed within a broader discussion, (i) of the historical and contextual 
factors relating to the development of computing within the NHS and 
hospital clinics and (ii) the literature relevant to the issue of the 
doctors' responses to the introduction and development of information 
technology <IT) and the organisation of medical work. In Part II the 
elaborated theoretical model underpins the accounts of the introduction 
and consequences of the implementation of two clinical information 
systems, one a renal patient-data system, the other a medical record 
system for use in outpatients' clinics. The renal system related to one 
medical specialty within a wider division of clinic labour while the 
outpatients' system was designed primarily for use by hospital doctors of 
different specialties. The first system was a commercially available 
computer 'package' designed for use in renal units, while the other was 
in troduced on an experimental basis by one of the hospital consultan ts. 
The two systems, however, were similar in terms of the facilities they 
provided, even though one was implemented in the largely standardised 
environment of the renal units while the other was implemented in the 
more complex setting of a multi-specialty outpatients' department. 
I will now provide a more detailed summary of the contents of each 
chapter, and their relationship to the central arguments of the thesis. In 
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Chapter Two it is the examination of the development of computing and 
computing policy within the NHS that is the main concern. This is in order 
that the different types of computer systems can be clearly identified in 
terms both of their function(s) and user group(s). The central argument 
developed in this chapter is that healthcare computing developed, at least 
in the NHS, not as a managerial strategy to rationalise the organisation 
and delivery of healthcare, but as the outcome of the interplay of 
economic, political and professional interests both within and outside the 
NHS. The point here is that a Sravermanesque labour process analysis would 
have failed to account for this apparently irrational mode of implementing 
computers, the technOlogy of rationalisation, in hospitals. 
This point is then taken up in Chapter Three which aims to critically 
evaluate the existing literature and theorisation of medical work and 
healthcare computerisation, thereby clearing the ground for a discussion 
and evalua tion of labour process analysis in its various guises. Ou t of 
this discussion certain lacunae are identified leading to an elaboration of 
a more pluralistic social choice version of the theory (cf. Wilkinson, 
1983), Within this elaborated model the professional autonomy of hospital 
consultants is identified as the outcome of the Institutional Control of 
the organised medical profession (SMA and the Royal Colleges) rather than 
the O~anisational Control of the state and NHS. In the case of the medical 
profession, the concern has been with issues surrounding the organisation 
and control of hospital clinics whereas the longterm objective of the state 
(insofar as one can refer to this entity as a monolith) has been with the 
broader context of limited resources and changing healthcare priorities. 
The analysis does not, however, assume that doctors possess, or are able 
to exercise, absolute Institutional Control within the hospital servicej 
only that they, the doctors, are not wholly subordinated to the 
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Organisational Control of the state and the management of the NHS. To 
disentangle the intertwining of these types of control necessitates both 
an historical analysis of developments within the NHS and a more detailed 
sociological examination of the clinic work of hospital doctors, and they 
provide the subjects of Chapter Four. 
This fourth chapter, entitled, 'Hospital Doctors, Professional Autonomy 
and Control of Medicine' develops the theoretical argument further. Firstly, 
it examines how the analysis of clinical work processes might be 
satisfactorily integrated within the broader labour process model, for 
unless this is done the model will be unable to account for clinic work, in 
particular the medical encounter, and unable to tie together the processual 
and structural elements of the theory. At the same time it is important to 
delineate the way in which, historically, elements of Institutional and 
Orgtmisational control were interwoven in defining the autonomy of the 
doctor working within the hospital clinic. These issues are examined here 
through a discussion of medical audit, which, to a greater or lesser 
extent, is about the control of medical work and the initiatives and 
responses of the medical profession to developments on the part of the 
state. This is the last chapter in Part I and brings to the fore such 
critical questions as: how is Institutional control actually maintained at 
the hospital clinic level, how does it manifest itself and what effect does 
its presence have on the implementation of new computer-based information 
systems? 
In Part I these questions were addressed in the wider theoretical and 
historical contexts, but in Part II the focus shifts to specific examples 
of hospital clinics in order to gain more detailed information on the 
reali ty of day to day medical and clinic work and the nuances of the work 
processes and division of labour. 
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Part II starts with a chapter on my research methodology and thus 
forms a precursor to the substantive chapters. The chapter (Chapter Five) 
includes a discussion of the issues of research access and sponsorship, 
which were particularly pertinent to this project for they created 
constraints and tensions as well as facilitating the research. The 
fieldwork chapters themselves are three in number. Chapter Six ('The 
Politics of Innovation and Professionalism') deals with the decision-making 
processes relating to the introduction and clinical use of both of the 
computer systems mentioned earlier. This chapter, in drawing on the 
fieldwork data and descriptions, demonstrates that these doctors' adoption 
or rejection of computer systems was related to political as much, if not 
more than, technical reasons. The consultants were found to be sensitive to 
changes in work processes brought about by the adoption of these systems, 
leading some of them to be overtly critical of the systems or even to 
refuse to use them. This was the context in which the sponsors of the two 
computer systems (both consultants) found themselves. Each adopted a 
different strategy to avoid, or minimise, the degree to which their 
colleagues rejected, or openly criticised, the systems. One employed a 
strategy of establishing coalitions with members of the administration and 
with the computer specialists in order to improve the chances for greater 
technical and financial resources being made available; the other 
concentrated on a strategy of collegiate solidarity. The chapter 
demonstrates that the freedom of these sponsoring consultants to choose 
their strategy was very limited, while the consequences were markedly 
different. 
Chapters Seven and Eight each deal with one of the computer systems, 
its implementation, usage and ultimate acceptance or rejection. In the 
first of the two chapters, the impact of the renal computer system is 
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analysed in terms of the effect on the clinic division of labour. The 
system was designed as a collator, calculator and presenter of numerical 
data, a task previously carried out by the nursing staff largely, but not 
entirely, for the benefit of the medical staff. The renal system was 
intended to be used as a supplement to the case notes and not as a 
replacement and in this key respect was far less ambitious in its design 
than the outpatients' system. The medical record system, in contrast, did 
rely on the doctors to capture the data for entry onto the computer's 
data-base and they were intended to make routine use of the system's 
outputs (reports and charts> instead of the traditional medical records. 
The two case studies are sequenced such that the theme of the 
medical labour process could be explored in detail, looking at the less 
complex organisation of the renal units (numerical data/single specialty> 
before moving onto the more complex organisation of the outpatients' 
department (computerised case notes/multi-specialty>. This approach made it 
possible for the day to day interaction within the clinics to be theorised 
in terms of a sociological model that could directly link the concrete work 
processes and relations to the wider structures within capitalist society. 
This point is developed through the two chapters and underpins the general 
conclusions laid out in Chapter Nine . 
... 
PART ONE 
CHAPTER TWO 
DOCTORS. HOSPITAL ORGANISATION AND 
COMPUTERS IN THE NATIONAL HEALTH 
SERVICE 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to present details of the development 
of computer policy and systems, particularly medical computing, within the 
NHS. This is intended to contextualise both the case studies reported in 
part II and the theoretical discussion and analyses that are set out in 
the following two chapters. 
My basic argument within this chapter will be that computerisation in 
hospitals has developed not as part of a managerial strategy to 
rationalise (cf. Child, 1985) but as the outcome of the interplay of 
in teres ts of the British compu ter indus try, cen tral governmen t and 
computer interests internal to the NHS. This latter grouping included 
compu ter and sys tems personnel and manage men t services as well as a 
number of hospital consultants some of whom were to play an influential 
role in the development of computer systems within the service (1). The 
interplay of these various forces led to a greater emphasis being given to 
research, rather than the development of standard systems that could be 
easily implemented in order to improve organisa tional efficiencies or the 
quality of patient care (or both). 
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The development of computing and computer policy within the NHS and 
the role played by members of the medical profession are described in the 
central section of this chapter. In order to set this discussion in its 
context it is preceded by two sections containing brief accounts of the 
historical development of the hospital system and the institutional 
relationship between the medical profession and the state in Britain. Only 
after consideration of these broader issues, including the introduction of 
healthcare computing 
computing be dealt 
generally, will the specific subject of 
with. Medical computing has developed 
medical 
largely 
separately from the general developments of hospital computing and the 
reasons for this will need to be explained. I will then go on to identify 
the main types of automated medical information systems, distinguishing 
between da ta-base and knowledge-base systems, before briefly reviewing the 
present level of diffusion of these systems and indicating the likely 
reasons for what appears to be a general lack of enthusiasm by clinicians 
concerning the use of these systems in their clinics. 
The NHS hospital service 
There are two points crucial to the understanding of the NHS hospital 
service. The first relates to the organisational structure of the hospitals, 
the second to the ascendancy the hospital consultants possess within that 
structure. The basic structure of the hospital is characterised by 
polyarchy, with the medical, nursing and administrative hierarchies being 
organised separately from each other <Davies and Francis, 1976, pp. 120-
127>. Attempts have been made to integrate these hospital hierarchies both 
the 'Cogwheel' reports (1967a and 1967b) and the 1974 NHS reorganisation 
were intended achieve this (Klein,1983, p.95; Ham,1985, 2nd edition, p.28) 
while the most recent initiative was contained in the Griffiths Report 
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(1983). This process of integration, however, has not been completed and 
one can be sceptical as to the outcome given the sustained opposition of 
the medical profession during the previous reorganisations which had the 
aim of preventing any general erosion of their autonomy or the taking on 
of new responsibilities (see Chapter Four). Moreover, even in those 
capitalist countries (notably the USA) that have attempted to develop an 
integrated management structure earlier than in Britain, senior doctors 
have been able to exercise considerable autonomy from management control 
(Freidson,1975 , pp. 249-252). This power to say 'no' reflects the ascendancy 
that hospital consultants have enjoyed within the hospital service and is 
part of the reason for their autonomy which is, in turn, legitimated by 
reference to the technical right of doctors to clinical freedom (Godber, 
1975, p.87>. The explanation for the autonomy and dominance of the hospital 
consultants is to be found in 
(a) the institutional development of hospitals, 
(b) the organisation of the profession within the health service 
(c) the role of the British state. 
I will now discuss each of these factors and their interrelationship. 
(a) The development of the hospital 
The modern hospital service grew out of a pre-existing network of 
voluntary hospitals and workhouse infirmaries (Abel Smith, 1964). The 
voluntary hospitals began to take a modern form in the eighteenth century; 
a process which continued at an accelerated pace during the following 
century. The key attribute of the modern form was that the hospital 
manifested a division of labour subordinated to the priorities, not of 
patient care, but of medical knowledge (Abel Smith, 1964, pp.16-31; 
Waddington, 1973; Larson, 1977, pp.40-47>. The consultants within the 
voluntary sector enjoyed high status but this was not the case for the 
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doctors employed to provide medical care for the patients in the workhouse 
hospitals. Here the doctors were the servants of public authority in a very 
real sense and medical care frequently had to be delivered within the 
constraints of absolutely minimal budgets (Abel-Smith, op cit.; Cartwright, 
1977, pp.158-161). It is against this historical background that the 
concerns and priorities of hospital doctors are to be understood, namely 
having a high regard for medical research and an aversion to bureaucra tic 
and budgetary controls. There is, of course, considerable variation between 
the views of individual doctors but the point remains that this is the 
general view as articulated through the organised profession (see Chapter 
Four). 
With the establishment of the NHS the hospitals became the 
organisationally ascendant institutions within the service, attracting most 
of the healthcare resources. Initially this was not the outcome of any 
considered policy (Klein, 1983, pp.36-37) but became so with the 
implementation of the Hospital Plan of 1962, which re-orientated the 
service around large district general hospitals (DGH) and away from the 
small, local, cottage hospitals <ibid., pp.72-79). The Hospital Plan reflected 
the then growing faith in planning within the NHS and DHSS <ibid., p.74). 
The planners optimism was, in the event, not fully justified. The non-
standard nature of clinical medicine and the inadequacy of bed occupancy 
6S a formal measure of healthcare efficiency both contributed to the 
system's fundamental limitations (ibid, pp.77-78). Nevertheless, the Hospital 
Plan has continued to underpin the thinking behind the organisational 
reforms introduced since 1962 even if there is no longer the commitment 
to large 800 bed hospitals, as was initially the case (Ham,1985, 2nd 
edition, pp.56-58). 
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(b) The ~rofession of medicine and the state organisation of healthcare 
The medical profession has a particularly long history. The Royal 
COllege of Physicians can trace their origins back to 1518 (Berlant, 1975, 
p.134), while the surgeons' professional history goes back to the 18th 
cen tury when the Royal College was es tablished in 1797 (ibid,p .143 j Larson, 
1977 p.87> (2). The establishment of the Provincial Medical Surgical 
Association in 1832 (which changed it's name to the British Medical 
Association in 1855) and the passing of the Medical Registration Act in 
1858 marked the official beginning of a reorganised and essentially modern 
medical profession (Forsyth, 1973, p.5j Berlant, 1975, pp.153-167j Larson, 
1977, p.95j Parry and Parry, 1977, pp.826-828j Cartwright, 1977, pp.55-57>. 
It was the es tablishmen t of the NHS in 1948 tha t en trenched the 
profession's power and hence its ascendancy within the health service. The 
setting up of the NHS became more a rationalisation of the organisation of 
healthcare provision rather than a socialisation of medicine, in Eckstein's 
words the NHS was "a 'doctor's measure' much more than a 'patient's 
measure'" <1958, p.3)' This was a 'battle', to borrow Klein's analogy <1983, 
pp.27-28), in which the doctors did not lose, but "obtained the monopoly of 
legi timacy among the health service providers" <ibid.), which gave them a 
strategic position within the organisation, enabling them to obstruct any 
initiatives from government they collectively did not agree with <ibid.) 
(c) The role of the state 
It was not, therefore, just the effectiveness of the organisation of 
the profession that ensured its ascendancy within the hospital service. The 
success of the modern medical profession lay, despite antagonisms, with its 
collaboration with the state and its historically evolved responsibility for 
the health of the citizenry (see above). Since the mid-nineteenth century 
the state in Britain has protected the interests of hospital doctors, and 
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the profession generally, from the domination of insurance companies, 
friendly societies and trade unions while a t the same time insula ted them 
from patients' inability to pay for treatment. The National Health 
Insurance Act of 1911 can be viewed in this light as can the 1948 
na tiona lisa tion of the health service. A t the same time the British s ta te 
did not, or was not able to, develop its own effective system of controls 
over the medical profession and was, and is, faced with a medical 
profession that exercises a suzerain power that enables it to reasonably 
effectively counter any policy objectives of the state judged by the 
organised profession to be against their interests. 
The one factor that may cause a fundamental change in the 
professional autonomy and dominance of the medical profession is that of 
escalating public expenditure. The time has come when the economic costs 
of the NHS (and the Welfare State generally) have proven to be politically 
too great for any government in Britain to remain inactive. The public 
debate relating to this issue has, however, been as much about ideology as 
it is about economic analysis (Gough, 1979, pp.128-146j Klein, 1984, pp.82-
109j Mishra, 1984, pp. xii-xiv and 18-25). 
These general arguments and issues are relevant here because they 
relate directly to the question of medical dominance within the NHS 
Hospital Service, which will be a continuing theme in this thesis. However, 
more particularly, they provide a critical context far any consideration of, 
(a) the potential development of computer-based health 
information systems to reinforce any system of medical 
accountability and 
(b) the implications, if any, in relation to the nature of 
innovation in information technology within hospitals. 
These issues, of information technology and its potential role as a system 
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of control and the historical diffusion of the technology in hospital 
medicine are the subjects for the remainder of this chapter. The 
theoretical analysis of these issues are developed in the next chapter and 
are elaborated further within the case studies presented in Part II. 
The development of computing and computer policy within the NHS 
It is generally agreed that computer-based information systems offer 
the management of any work organisation the prospect of extending its 
control by providing a more repid end comprehensive information feedback. 
As a result it is less necessary to delegate powers to other managers and 
profeSSionals within the organisation. Furthermore, the development and 
implementation of information technology can have the effect of stabilising 
and simplifying the complexity of large scale organisa tions (Whisler, 1967, 
pp.304-317j Whisler, 1970, pp.53-69 and 81-82j Blau et aI, 1976, pp 34-38j 
Crompton, 1979, pp.415-417j Bjorn Anderson and Rasmussen,1980, pp.l05-108j 
Tomeski and Lazarus, 1975, pp.109-114; Pfeffer and Leblebici, 1977, p.247; 
Child, 1984, pp.215-216). Whether the introduction of any particular 
computer-based information system will actually have this rationalising 
effect will depend on factors in addition to the technological (Child ibid. 
p. 221). This part of the chapter is concerned with these matters as they 
relate to the development of hospital computing since the mid 'sixties. 
First, however, it will be useful to make some distinctions as between the 
different types of computer systems available within hospitals, 
particularly as they relate to medicine. 
Types of hospi tal compu ting 
In a general introductory textbook 'Computers and their Societal 
Impact' (Holoien,1977> there is a chapter on hospital computing in which 
the author makes the useful, if unsurprising, distinction between 
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Bdm1nis tra tive and clinical sys tems. The firs t kind of sys tem deals with 
such matters as payroll, patient admissions, supplies and any other matters 
that lie in the province of the administration. The clinical systems, on the 
other hand, deal with medical, nursing and technical and scientific 
services. Under this heading are also included the medical records which 
are, in practice, 'clinical' wi th regard to their con ten t, bu t 
'administrative' in terms of their storage and retrieval and their legal 
status <Lindop, 1978, p.69). It is the medical records which are of 
particular interest because they constitute the medical information system 
within hospitals and thereby play a crucial role in the organisation and 
delivery of medical care. 
Holoien's systems dichotomy is a useful one, for it clearly 
identifies the activities to be found or located within either the 
administrative or clinical spheres of activities. However, it does fail to 
identify the occupational groups or services within the hospital 
organisation which predominantly use the data involved. Medical information 
systems, for instance, primarily contain clinical information and data for 
use by doctors (See 'Computers as an aid to clinical work' in this chapter). 
Whereas the technical and scientific staff within a hospital will typically 
have access to computer support systems for their work. As an example, a 
hospital laboratory will be equipped with computer system designed to 
assay biochemical and haematological samples. The laboratory investigation 
'results' being printed (or written) and delivered (manually or 
electronically) to the clinics where they will be filed in the medical 
record folder and become part of the medical information system. The case 
of nursing care information/record systems (whether paper or computer 
based) is different again; the information and data relates solely to 
nursing work and is not primarily intended for inclusion in the medical 
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records <DHSS 1977 ,pp.84-97; DHSS 1982,p.9). 
In other words, one can categorise hospital computer systems into 
four groups according to who will predominantly use the system concerned, 
(1) administrative systems; 
(2) medical information systems; 
(3) technical, professional and scientific support systems; 
(4) nursing care systems. 
Furthermore, this categorisation permits the question of organisational 
control to be addressed directly. 
are clinical in their orienta tion 
While three of these categories (2-4) 
(and thereby reducible to Holoien's 
distinction) the degree of autonomy each occupational grouping associated 
with these types of systems has from (a) administrative and (b) medical 
control varies, and this is reflected in the design and operation of the 
developing computer systems. Interestingly, the question of organisational 
control and the development of hospital information systems was, in fact, 
addressed in the 1974- 'Cogwheel' report in which resources (including 
information and data) were identified and categorised as being either 
controlled, or used but not controlled, by doctors (Goldsmith and 
Mason,l 974, p.1 74). 
The NHS computer experiment 
In Britain the first attempts to develop an integrated policy on the 
development and implementation of all types of computer systems within the 
National Health Service arose when the DHSS invited those hospitals where 
computer systems were already being developed to participate in the 
Experimental Computer Programme. This officially started in 1968 with the 
se t ting up of the NHS Experimen tal Compu ter Programme (3) (Gedrych, 1970, 
p.345; Lamb, 1973, p.29; DHSS, 1977, para.6.l.) Computer systems for both 
administrative and medical purposes had been developed, and in some cases 
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implemented at a local level several years prior to that (cf. Barber and 
Abbott, 1972, pp.3-5 and 89-91>. Yet it is only since 1981, with the 
official ending of the NHS Experimental Computer Programme and with it the 
DHSS funding (DHSS, 1982 Foreword), that the computer-based patient 
administration systems developed within the Programme have begun to be 
made generally available. 
The first data processing facilities within the NHS, as with other 
public service organisations, were to be found in the accounts departments 
in the mid and late 'fifties when punchcard systems were introduced (Lamb, 
1973, p.37j Barber and Abbott, 1972, p.3). Only later did computing become 
the responsibility of the management services division and coordinated at 
regional level of the NHS (Birmingham RHB., 1966, p.1 77, para 520 and 
pp.179-181, para 525-530; Barber and Abbott, 1972 pp. 4-5). This parallels 
the development of computing in commercial and industrial work 
organisations (Mumford and Banks, 1967, pp 175j Gibson and Nolan, 1974, 
p.77). 
By 1968 there had been established fifteen main computer projects 
<later to become fourteen) (see Figure 2.1> plus some smaller scientific 
and clinical ones within the overall DHSS Programme (Gedrych, 1970; DHSS, 
1972 i Scrivens, 1985, p.6). The programme was almost solely concerned with 
hospital systems. The one exception was the GP-hospital Community Health 
Services System developed and implemented at Exeter (DHSS., 1977, p.11, 
115-126j Bolden, 1985, 116-120). The computer projects covered all areas of 
hospital activities although particular interest was initially shown in 
the development of computer based medical records which were to function 
as the integrating point of the hospital system (Gedrych, 1970 p.347>. 
Initially the experimental programme was to have been completed about 
1974, but it was not. The programme also became very costly - being 
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more than double the original estimates - and in 1976 had come under the 
critical scrutiny of the Public Accounts Committee (Laurance, 1981, p.23; 
Scrivens, 1985, pp. 10-11 ). Several of the projects were severely 
criticised on grounds of high and escalating costs (Scrivens, 1985, pp. lO-
11). The basic problem was that the experimental programme was an 
TABLE 2.1 
HOSPITAL SYSTEMS INCLl.JOEO IN THE NHS EXF'ERIMENTAL COMPUTER PROGRAMME (4) 
4. 1-1"."'l=u::.I01 Royal In.,irm1ry 
Eo. Nor-tt ... st.·'''ordah1l'''e Ho_pital Centre 
(Stoke CI" Trent) 
B. Ox~ord Medical Compu~r 
Centre 
'3. QU".n Elizabeth Medical 
Centre <B:l.rm 1ngham;' 
10. St .:ram_. Hospital <L •• de) 
Project 
11. at Thom_.' HO_l=tital 
(London) 
13, Sunderland Are. Ho_pitals 
14. Un:lv.r-.1ty Coll_g_ 
Ho_p1~1 (London) 
In -.dd1tion 7 Laboratory System. and 12 S.c:L.n"ti'f:lc and Clin:Lc:al Syat.ms 
_r .. Ii_ted 
inappropriate means of developing and evaluating computing for the health 
services, in part because the rationale for the programme had been 
inadequately thought out (a point elaborated in more detail below) and 
because the technology was evolving at a faster rate than the pace of the 
programme (cf • Scrivens, 1985, P .11>. One effect was that, while the 
minori ty of hospitals where the compu ter sys tems were being developed had 
access to powerful computer facilities and the services of computer 
- 19-
specialists, the majority of hospitals within the NHS remained without any 
computer support of any significance until the 1980s - and in the case of 
clinical computing this remains the case today. The criticism of the Public 
Accounts Committee did not, however, mark the end of the experimental 
computer programme in the NHS - this did not happen until 1981 - but it 
did cause those responsible to rethink their overall strategy and methods 
of systems evaluation. 
Doctors, the medical record and the NHS experimen tal 
computer programme 
Given the concern of the thesis it is necessary to point out the 
limits of the involvement of hospital doctors in the experimental 
programme. This section is concerned with the issue of medical records, for 
this is the one activity tha t can directly involve the clinicians because 
it is they for whom the con ten ts of the records are principally provided. 
Possibly the best known initiative in this general area was that of 
Professor John Anderson to install a computer-held clinical record system 
on two general wards at Kings College Hospital. This was during the late 
sixties and early seventies, and it was one of the projects which attracted 
the attention of the Public Accounts Committee because of its high costs 
(Laurance, 1981, p.23j The Times, 5th October,1982, p.13>. The doctors on 
the wards found it difficult to adjust to the requirements of the system, 
in particular the need to input and access data directly from VDU 
terminals on the wards (Anderson, 1984., p.109) and the system was 
eventually abandoned largely on the grounds that the medical information 
generated on the wards was too complex to maintain on a real time system 
reliant on doctors for updating (Opit and Woodruffe BMJ., 1970, pp. 80-82). 
Only one other hospital within NHS Experimental Programme was to 
have developed a comprehensive automated patient medical record system 
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<DHSS.,l977, p.lll). This would have directly involved the doctors 
(clinicians), but not necessarily in entering and accessing computer-held 
data which would have been done by secretarial or clerical workers, 
"(t)he prime objective (was) to improve the patient record 
by presenting a legible, clearly structured document as and 
when required" (ibid.). 
There were delays in the start of this particular project (related to 
industrial relations problems) and by the time the project was ready to 
have started the DHSS funding was no longer available. But even had that 
not been the case there were major problems rela ting to the design of a 
"data collection" sheet. The consultants and their medical staff were to 
use this document instead of the case notes. This was to involve using 
'freetext' structured within certain headings and the information/data 
would then be post-coded and entered on the computer system. The doctors 
would then receive an updated 'cumulative medical record' at the next 
attendance of the patient. All this confronted those involved with major 
problems for it proved impossible to agree a format which the consultants 
would use and the computer system could cope with <DA.l, Int. July, 1981, 
Side III, 330-410; DHSS.,1977, p.lll). As will be seen there are some 
similarities with the fate of the CORES system reported in Chapter Eight. 
There were other attempts within the Experimental Programme to develop at 
least a computerised summary of the patient record <DHSS, 1977, pp.109 -
111), but in the final official evaluation of medical records projects 
within the programme no mention was made of these projects (North East 
Thames RHA/ DHSS, March, 1981 cf. para. 22; DHSS, January, 1982 cf. p.8). 
Clearly, the computerisation of medical records (in particular the 
case notes) has proven to be more problematic than originally anticipated. 
As a result the strategy of using the medical record as the kernel of an 
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integrated hospital system gave way to a more pragmatic approach in which 
the various hospital activities were treated independently. Laboratory 
analysis, for example, would be computerised, but the results would still 
be printed or written on paper slips and delivered by hand to the relevant 
ward or clinic. Similarly with pharmacy and radiology. The one area were 
the medical records remained the integrating concept was that of patient 
administration systems, but even here it was not the patient record but 
the patient as a uniquely identifiable medical record number contained 
within an index of all patients that was the integrating component of the 
system. On this basis patient registration, admissions, discharges, 
appointments can all be recorded and referred to throughout the hospital 
on the one computer system. 
The rationale of the experimental programme 
The overt rationale for the computer programme was to develop and 
evaluate computer systems that could be implemented throughout the NHS, 
saving, it was believed by those involved, much duplication of resources 
and effort. The Programme was coordinated by three DHSS/NHS liaison 
comm i t tees, 
a) Computer Policy Committee (CPC) 
b) Computer Research and Development (R & D) Committee, 
c) Compu ter Technical Commi t tee (CTC). 
Both the Research and Development and the Computer Technical Committees 
were phased out in the early 'eighties (MSC., Int.4c., May, 1981, side I, 
210, side II, 99). The CPC, however, survived and is now part of the Centre 
for Information Technology (BJHC., Vol. 2 NO.4, September, 1985, p.8) (see 
also Scrivens, May, 1985, pp. 13-29). The policy (CPO committee was 
concerned with overall strategy, while the R&D committee had the 
responsibility for assessing computer projects submitted for funding. The 
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remaining committee, the CTC, had the task of devising and coordinating the 
evaluation of the systems. Following the criticisms of the Public Accounts 
Committee (see above) the experimental programme became more conservative 
to what it had been. One result of this was that it became more difficult 
to set up new projects and in 1980 nearly half of the R&D committee 
resigned because of their inability to agree with what they saw as the 
inflexibility of the DHSS. In particular, its unswerving commitment to (a) 
ICL systems and (b) centrally coordinating all computer developments 
through the regions (Laurance op citj Scrivens, 1985, p.19. The experimental 
computer programme was in any case seriously flawed in its design right 
from its inception, for it lacked any clear objectives. It was assumed 
naively that computers somehow would be good for the NHS (cf. Caddick and 
Lee, 1974 pp.39-44j Hanby, 1974, pp.79-83). This naivety may well have 
sprung from a more general concern of the government of the day, for it 
has been suggested that there was a desire to protect and nurture the 
British computer industry. In the words of one member of the DHSS Research 
and Development Committee, "The Americans had the space programme. Britain 
had no space programme but we had the NHS ... " (Mike Healey, London School 
of Hygiene, quoted in Laurance, 1981, p.25). This covert aspect of the NHS 
Experimental Computer Programme had important ramifications for how 
hospital computing subsequently developed. There was specifically the 
decision to standardise on ICL mainframe computers <in 1971> (Caddick,P.T. 
and Lee,D.T. 1974, p.43): the formal agreement applied only to the regional 
level of the NHS but this was sufficient to ensure that the computer 
systems developed within the experimental programme would be standardised 
on ICL equipment. This did not mean all the systems were of ICL 
manufacture - the computer equipment at the Queen Elizabeth Medical 
Centre (Birmingham), for example, remained Univac right up to the end of 
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the official programme (1.e. 1981). Furthermore, the single tender policy 
also did not relate to machines other than the mainframes, specifically the 
1900 and later 2000 series. Finally, since 1981 the agreement with ICL is 
no longer applicable following an EEC/GATT ruling that it is in restraint 
of trade (Hills, 1984, p.15). Nevertheless, while there are several 
exceptions, many regions have continued to standardise on ICL at least 
with regard to their corporate systems (1.e. patient administration, 
accounts and finance, works and supplies, etc.), for these are the systems 
that most DHSS and NHS management and computer staff are familiar with. 
The evalua tion 
The DHSS were, right from the beginning, very concerned to evaluate 
the computer systems developed within the NHS Experimental Computer 
Programme. Initially the projects were assessed in terms of Improvement 
objectives measured 'before' and ' after' implementation. The problem they 
were then confronted with was how to disentangle what changes were to be 
directly attributable to computerisation, what were not, and whether the 
improvements could have been gained as efficiently by alternative means. 
There were also other, more prosaic, problems such as delays, and the fact 
that many of the evaluation staff were new to the NHS and therefore 
unfamiliar with its organisation and activities <DHSS, 1977, pp.129-20j 
1982, p.3). Out of the recognition of these methodological difficulties 
developed an alternative approach. This was known as Performance Criteria 
Measuremen t. The criteria were devised by asking a 'panel' of nearly 1,000 
staff within the NHS to rank order the desired improvements in performance 
they wished to see resulting from compu terisa tion. The 'panel' of 
respondents was divided up into seven occupational or status groups: 
doctors and nurses constituted four groups, administrators and 'decision-
makers', two groups and profeSSional and technical staff, one group. By 
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this method the success or failure of a computer system was to be 
determined. The approach did create a basis for independent systems 
evaluation (OHSS, March, 1978), but the new methodology failed to change 
the underlying criticism of the whole experimental programme: the 
programme was prohibitively 
1985, pp. 10-11). 
expensive (Laurance, 1981, p.23; Scrivens, 
The adoption of the Performance Criteria Measuremen t methodology did, 
however, highligh t the cen tral problem with the whole exercise, and tha t 
was the impossibility of identifying any fundamental improvements derived 
from the experimental programme. An important part of the explanation lies 
in the fact that there was little in the way of an overall and effective 
policy relating to the organisation and presentation of the information 
captured within the computer systems. In the absence of any coherent 
na tiona 1 criteria or con trol over this ma t ter the da ta con ten t of sys tems 
was largely determined locally. It can be argued, as Scrivens has, that 
such an objective (data standardisation) within the health service would 
have been premature because insufficient was known "abou t how the NHS 
actually functions" (1985, p.51>. The result would be to impose "rigidity 
in operational and management decision-making .. " <ibid. p.50). Despite this 
danger of rigidity the priority within the NHS is now for greater 
accountability, currently characterised by the national policy to implement 
the recommendations of the Health Services Information Steering Group 
(KBrner: chair) <ibid, p.52). This group was set up by the minister in 1980 
following criticisms in the Royal Commission (1979) regarding the then 
inadequacies in relation to the arrangements for the collection of 
statistical and other information within the NHS (Scrivens, 1985, pp. 27-29; 
North East Thames RHA/DHSS, March, 1981, para. 22; DHSS, January, 1982, p.8). 
The implemen ta tion of the 'KBrner' recommenda t ions necess ita ted tha t the 
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information systems be computer-based ('Kckner' First Report, 1982, p. 50, 
para. 4). 
A postscript on the experimental programme 
In 1981 the DHSS Experimental Project officially came to an end and 
the financial support from the DHSS ended (DHSS, 1982, p.l>. Since 1985 
computer policy has been incorpora ted within an In forma tion Advisory Group 
which reports to the new NHS Management Board (Griffiths Report p.3, 
para.1 i Ham,1985, 2nd edition, p. 33) which then decides the policy and 
translates it into a programme of work for the Information Management 
Group (which subsumes the Computer Policy Group under the new name of 
'Centre for Information Technology' and 'Corporate Data Administration'). The 
Information Advisory Group is intended to advise on the development of a 
national information and information technology policy while the 
Information Management Group is broadly involved in the technical aspects 
of establishing common standards required for implementing the information 
technology required to sustain the information policies (BJHC Vo1.2 No. 4 
September, 1985, p. 8) (see also Scrivens, May, 1985, pp. 13-29 for a 
similar but more detailed account). What this means is that, in future, 
computer developments within the health service will serve the information 
requirements of the NHS and DHSS rather than the health service being the 
'test bench' for the British computer industry. 
The development of computing for doctors 
The development of computers for doctors has occurred almost wholly 
separate from other computer systems developments within hospitals and 
the health service. This separate development results from, 
(a) doctors having different priorities from those embodied in 
the NHS Experimental Programme (see above) 
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(b) the lack of sustained interest in medical computer systems 
among the profession as a whole. 
(c) the reluctance of many hospital doctors to learn to use 
the technology 
In discussing these issues the opportunity will be taken to present an 
account of the main types of medical computing available, or being 
developed, at least insofar as they concern us here. 
Types of medical computing 
Doctors, when they have been interested at all, were generally 
concerned with developing computer systems for research purposes. This 
research orientation tended to take two forms: either a computer system 
was used to support the data processing requirements of a project, or the 
computer system itself was the object of the research. The use of 
computers as a research tool is not my concern here - medical computing 
in this sense is little different to other forms of academic research. 
Research and development work by members of the medical profession into 
ways of using computers in medicine, however, is precisely the concern of 
this thesis. Currently there exist a number of sophisticated knowledge-
based systems, probably the best known of which are MYCIN and INTERNIST. 
Both these systems were developed in the USA, while in Britain the one 
system that has claimed international recognition is MEDICL a system 
developed by Timothy de Dombal and designed to aid the diagnosis of 
patients presenting with acute abdominal pain (Wardle and Wardle, 1978 
pp.15-28j Young, 1982, p.1334.). A number of medical information and medical 
records (data-base) systems (6) has also been developed for and by 
clinicians, notably PROMIS and COSTAR, which have been designed to provide 
a clinical data-base for use by doctors as aids to training, diagnosis and 
treatment 6S well 6S clinical research. Before continuing it will be useful 
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to present first a brief description of the five systems cited. 
1> MYClN is a knowledge-based system known as a decision support 
system, and is designed to assist doctors select appropriate 
antibiotic drugs for patients with serious infectious diseases. An 
important characteristic of the system is that it will give the 
reason for its decision (see Figure 2.2), The sys tem was developed at 
**HOW OlD VOU DECIDE T..-T ORGANXSM-l H XGHT BE E .coL.X? 
1 USED RUL.E 021 TO CONCLUDE THAT THE IDENTITY OF 
ORGAN ISM - 1 lS E .COL 1: • 
THIS G~\VE A CUI'1ULATIVE CF OF 0,47, 
THEN I USED f~~'LE 064 TO CONCLUDE THAT THE IDENT ITY 
CII:r CIRGJAN ISM - 1 IS E .COL I • 
TH IS GAVE A CUI'1~'LAT IVE CF' OF ° ,66 . 
FINALLY I U5;ED RULE C>O:EI TO CONCLUDE THAT THE 
;[DENT lTV CIF CIRGANISM'- 1 IS E ,COLI, 
THIS G~\VE A CUMULAT IVE CF OF C> ,74, 
(Fr'orn O.v1.~ lEIuc:ha,., .. n aH~d Shol",tcl:i"".~1977 quot.d in Fitter and 
Sirn. ~ 1 'li''''ao ~ p ,S"7 . C:F- :1. .. m .... u)~_ 01" con" id.l-"'::_ (;.1' -U-•• 
c:clnclutlloion being val:1d) 
Stanford University between 1972 and 1978 and the programme was 
called MYCIN after the suffix used in the names of many common 
antimicrobial agents. The system is an experimental one (Shortcliffe, 
1983, p.222) which has attracted much attention outside medical 
computing as a particularly good example of a rule based (8) expert 
system (Fitter and Sime, 1980; Taylor, 1983; Simons, 1984; Shortcliffe, 
1983 pp.209-237>. The rules on which the system is based were 
initially acquired from collaborating clinical experts at the Stanford 
Medical Center. The system also has the capability to acquire new 
rules directly through interaction with a clinical expert (Shortcliffe, 
1983, p.222). 
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11) IHTERNISf is similar in concept to the MYCIN system. Its knowledge 
base reflects in particular the 4.0 years personal clinical experience 
of one of the initiators of the system, Dr Jack D. Myers at the 
University of Pittsburgh (Taylor,1980. p.257). It is an experimental 
programme designed to cover the broad context of general medicine 
and not just a single discipline as with MYCIN. In attempting to be 
more general in application the system has been found to suffer 
serious deficiencies, principally its inability to construct diagnoses 
spanning multiple problem areas and to explain the reasons for its 
conclusions (Miller et a1, 1982, pp. 468-476j Barnett, G.O. 1982). The 
system has now been enhanced to become INTERNIST-II which is 
considered to be about 75% comprehensive in its coverage of the 
diseases of in ternal medicine (Simons, G.L. 1984) 
iii) MEDICL. de Dombal's approach to developing a computer programme to 
assist medical decision-making is to utilise statistical techniques 
based on Bayes Theorem and to ignore the rule-based approach 
altogether (de Dombal et a1, 1972, de Dombal and Horrocks, 1974). The 
MEDICL (MEdical DIagnosis and Computer-aided Learning) system is one 
which is designed to aid the diagnosis of acute abdominal pain, which 
is a difficult category to diagnose accurately: clinical accuracy is 
of the order of 81% whereas the computers accuracy is in excess of 
91% (Wardle and Wardle, 1978, p18). Technically the system is less 
complex than the rule-based approach adopted by Shortcliffe (MYCIN) 
and the associates of Dr Myers <INTERNIST). It does not reason, only 
calculates. Its higher accuracy over clinical diagnosis not only 
relates to the rigorous application of differential diagnosis but to 
the particular vagueness of the clinical symptoms commonly presented 
in cases of abdominal pain, which makes clinical judgement 
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particularly problematic. The sys tem has been developed over more 
than 15 years and has recently become the first diagnostic system to 
be marketed by ICL hence the acronym MEDICL. 
iv) PROMIS (Problem-Orientated Medical Information System) is a medical 
information (data-base) system designed to facilitate the capture of 
patient information comprehensively and systematically. It is premised 
on Dr. L. L. Weed's system of problem orientated medical records 
(POMR) (Weed, 1968, pp.593-600 and 652-657, 1969; McIntyre N. et B1 
1972, pp.603-611). The difference between POMRs and customary 
methods of recording case notes essentially relates to the clinicians 
approach to the patients and their complaints. Weed's approach is to 
identify the patient's problems and to deal with them systematically 
over time, the medical record being used as a set of active progress 
, 
notes. The kernel of the computer system is a collection of j 
computerised clinical displays called frames which are intended to 
both guide and teach doctors in their clinical work. These frames are 
interactive and the doctor can update the information contained 
within them, while at the same time being guided by the 'prompts' (an 
automated reminder) which the system gives in response to that 
information. An important component of the system is the 'audit trail' 
continuously maintained within every patient's file in order to ensure 
continuity of care/treatment (Giebinck and Hurst, 1975, pp.199-200). 
The system is installed at the University of Vermont Medical Center, 
Burlington, Vermont. It is claimed to be in operational use in at 
least the obstetrics and gynaecology ward <ibid.> but there is little 
evidence that it has been transferred to any other sites successfully 
(e.g. Fischer et a1, 1980). 
v) COSTAR was designed as a medical record system for ambulatory 
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patient care in the USA (Barnett, 1968, Barnett et a1., 1979). It is a 
data-based system designed both as an administrative system (dealing 
with appointments and registrations of patients), and as a medical 
records system (dealing with the contents of the clinic record, 
laboratory results etc.). On the clinical side, the patients' records 
are maintained on computer files which can be produced as, 
(a) a printed (encounter) report of the medical encounter, 
(b) a summary (status) report of a patient's medical condition, 
or 
(c) a flowchart, which displays the temporal course of the 
disease process, or variations in clinical findings, over 
time. 
These three outputs are produced as 'hardcopy' printouts for each 
clinic the patient attends. The clinical data is captured on a form, 
known as the encounter form, which is completed by the clinician 
(very similar to the aborted system within the NHS experimental 
project reported above). COSTAR is a data-base system and the data on 
each individual patient is accessible to aggregate analysis via report 
generator and query language facilities (5) (e.g. statistical analysis 
of patients with particular medical complications) (Barnett et al, 
1979, pp.1226-1237). In addition, a doctor can have programmed into 
the system 'prompts' to remind the doctors treating patients to carry 
out certain procedures or to identify any potential complications 
<Barnett et a1, 1978, pp.962-970). The system is technically well 
developed and its administrative modules have been implemented at a 
number of sites in the USA and Europe (Fiddleman, 1980, pp.1-4) 
The first point to be be made is that this list is by no means complete. 
There are many other knowledge-based systems in existence (cf. Simons, 
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1984, pp.187-193j Wardle and Wardle, 1978, pp.15-28) as well as medical 
information and record (data-base) systems (Giebink and Hurst, 1975, p.37>. 
Nevertheless, the list does give some idea of the better known systems in 
existence. 
The significant difference between data-base systems and knowledge-
based systems is that data-bases are costly and time consuming to 
maintain while knowledge-based systems do not suffer from this problem 
(Shortcliffe, 1976j Alvey, 1982, p. 21 para. 4.1.2(c)j Solotovits, 1982, pp. 
2-4 and 5-6). Instead, these systems require a comprehensive underlying 
conceptual structure (not a data-base) and the technical ability to emulate 
human reasoning often with incomplete evidence. This is known as the 
exercise of 'fuzzy' logic which has been defined as a system of symbolic 
reasoning codified as heuristics (Weizenbaum, 1976, pp. 221-222j 
ShortclHfe, 1976, pp. 159-194, 219j Fitter and Sime, 1980, pp. 60-62; 
Szolovits, 1982, pp. 2-4j Feigenbaum and McCorduck, 1984). Although some of 
these systems are based on statistical and not heuristic reasoning; in 
healthcare computing the most notable example is de Dombal's MEDICL system 
described above (page 28). It is the logistics of capturing and storing 
data that distinguishes the two types of system, not necessarily the way 
they function. Medical information systems <including some medical records 
systems) can provide 'advice', similar to a knowledge-based system, in the 
form of 'prompts' for clinical, educational (medical training) or audit 
purposes (see PROMIS and COSTAR above). 
There are practical limitations to the usefulness of these systems to 
doctors for as Shortcliffe (writing of knowledge-based systems) has 
poin ted ou t , 
(a) doctors, like other mortals, quickly reject systems that are 
pedantic in their presentation of knowledge and advice. 
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Knowledge-based systems have to somehow discriminate as to how 
much information and/or advice is required at any particular 
time, 
(b) it takes time to correct errors, or gaps, in the system's 
knowledge-base. There is often a delay of months between 
identifying an error and that error being correct in the next 
'release' of the system. 
(c) despite the intention, or optimism, of designers of knowledge-
based systems it is an arduous and time consuming task 
acquiring the knowledge, whether based on statistical data or 
extracting judgmental information from the minds of experts 
<1984, pp.216-217> 
These systems also raise very interesting philosophical and ontological 
questions concerning the nature of knowledge and understanding, for even 
if such systems are successful in terms of their designer's aims, they will 
not be intelligent in the sense of having understanding. While the 
reasoning programmed into such systems will be analogous, it is not 
identical to its human counterpart, if only because a computer does not 
suffer from the results of its own reasoning (cf. Weizenbaum, 1984, 
pp.202-227j Smith, 1980, pp.l0-12 in Smith and Green)(6). 
Hospital doctors, medical information (data-base) 
and knowledge-based systems 
The various systems available to doctors have their supporters within 
the medical profession but, as already indicated, these people have been 
very much in the minority both in Britain and the USA. Computers as data-
or knowledge-based systems have not been widely used by hospital doctors 
(Friedman and Gustafson, 1976j Young,1980j Jay and Anderson, 1982, pp. 303-
305j Smith, R., 1982, pp. 1859-1860). Diagnostic systems are known to be 
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more accurate than real doctors in making diagnoses (Ellison, 1978, pp. 30-
59; Wardle and Wardle, 1978, pp.15-28; Feigenbaum and McCorduck, 1984.). Yet 
these systems are not in anything like general use. The reasons for this 
arise fairly straightforwardly from the character of medical work, 
(a) junior doctors learn their clinical skills practising on patients 
starting with the task of 'clerking' patients on the wards. This 
involves taking a comprehensive medical history and examination 
and concluding with a diagnosis (Rees, 1981>. To replace this 
method with one appropriate for the data capture requirements 
of a computer system undermines the training of junior doctors. 
(b) diagnosis may not be the most important consideration, 
"Hypertension, arthritis and heart failure are all usually 
treated before the cause (if there is one to be found) is 
determined. Treatment and views about the prognosis are 
more important, certainly to the patient" (Young, 1980, p. 
522) 
(c) a computer based diagnostic (knowledge-based) system cannot 
exceed the capabilities of a hospital medical or surgical team 
as a whole and especially not that of a specialist consultant, 
for such systems are based on the knowledge of real life 
specialists 
In practice, these computer systems have not been treated as clinical tools 
so much as another object for medical research by individuals and small 
groups of doctors and computer personnel. Only the committed 'aficionados' 
within the medical profession appear to be interested in designing and 
using any of these systems (Friedman and Gustafson, 1977; Anderson and 
Jay, 1983; Young, 1984). This has been so in both the USA and Britain and 
led to the developmen t in the 'seven ties of, 
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"a disorganised array of compu ter languages and compu ter 
systems dedicated to medical applications" <Friedman and 
Gustafson, 1976, p.201) 
and until recently little attempt was made to make any of these systems 
transferable from one site to another. There is now some evidence that 
this situation is changing. In Britain, fr instance, the NHS have adopted 
the US medical computing language MUMPS in order that medical systems 
might be standardised, therefore making such systems more readily 
available to other hospitals (DHSS 1977 p. 213 para 5.10.2; WMRHA, 1979). It 
would be wrong, however, to claim that this objective has been fully 
attained, for it has not. Secondly, certain 'packages' have, with the elapse 
of time, become more acceptable, and specialties are in effect 
standardising on particular systems. This, for example, is increasingly the 
case in renal medicine (Will and Selwood, 1985, pp 11-18 BJHC, Vol. 2, No. 
1, Spring). 
Summary and conclusions 
It was only after consideration of the general issues relating to the 
organisation of hospitals and the introduction of healthcare computing 
generally that the specific subject of medical computing was dealt with. 
The first point made was that medical computing has developed separately 
from the general developments of hospital computing, This was in part 
because of the way the NHS Computer Experimental Programmed developed 
(see below), but it also related to the doctors' own general desire for 
organisational separateness and their general lack of enthusiasm for the 
new teChnology. 
Medical computer systems can be broadly categorised as being either 
data-based or knowledge-based. The former is the usual model for medical 
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information systems, the latter, for decision support systems (including 
diagnostic-aids>. Data-base systems are plagued by problems of data-
capture and input (onto the system> while knowledge-based systems seem to 
be largely (but not wholly) irrelevant to anyone but their creators and 
others interested in developing such systems rather than routinely using 
them. Most systems, at least within the NHS, have been developed as a 
research initiative of individual consultants and not as part of any 
general computer development, either within the hospital or the health 
service generally. Whether the systems have been developed independently 
of other NHS computer programmes or not, however, they have so far been 
unacceptable to the majority of clinicians. 
This chapter was concerned, however, with more than just medical 
computing. My concern was to contextualise the subject of doctors and 
computers both institutionally and historically. First, I set out a brief 
account of the organisation of hospitals and the doctors' medical dominance 
(Freidson, 1970b) within them. Then I moved on to discuss the issue of 
healthcare computing generally, and here I argued that computer systems 
were developed within the hospital service as the outcome of the interplay 
of the political and economic interests of the British computer industry 
and central government and not as part of any managerial strategy to 
rationalise the service. This development manifested itself in the form of 
the NHS Experimental Computer Programme <1968-1981> which was funded by 
the DHSS. As a result of its pragmatic origins the experimental computer 
programme lacked any clear objective, other than a very general one of 
seeing what could be done with computers in hospitals. At first attempts 
were made to develop computerised integrated hospital information systems 
that incorporated all hospital activities, including those of hospital 
doctors. However, because the task of developing such integrated systems 
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were so complex, technically and organisationally, it was impossible for 
the computer specialists to create any - or certainly none that were 
readily transferable to other hospital sites. 
There were not to be any transferable hospital systems until 
computer policy within the NHS changed and attention was shifted away 
from developing the technology and towards subordinating it to the 
informational requirements of the hospital service. This process had 
started as early as the mid-seventies (this was, at least in part, the 
result from the criticism of the Public Accoun ts Commit tee). One 
consequence of this change of emphasis was that far less attention was 
given to developing medical systems and the programme became more 
concerned with developing and implementing administrative systems. 
The Experimental Programme ended formally in 1981, but by that time 
the policy makers within the DHSS and NHS had become concerned with 
information and its use for organisational control rather than with 
experimenting with computer systems. The new body of policy was 
articulated in the KBrner Committee reports and incorporated within the 
Griffiths Report of 1983. From then on computers were to be used to 
automate specific administrative and other data collating tasks in order to 
facilitate, it was believed, more effective monitoring of the service. 
As part of these developments there was renewed pressure on 
consultants, explicitly stated in the Griffiths Report (1983), to become 
resource managers. In fact, computer-based pilot schemes have been set up 
at various hospital throughout the country to see how this might be 
developed (BJHC January, 1987, p. 1 and p. 4). Prior to the policy makers 
within the NHS attempting to develop effective means of controlling the 
costs of medical care through the application of computer-based 
information systems, the medical computer speCialists had been attempting 
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to improve the accuracy of medical decision-making (knowledge-base system) 
and clinical records (data-base system) by programming in control 
mechanisms that are intended to prevent medical mistakes occurring. These 
mechanisms included 'decision-support' and 'prompt' facilities (see above). 
In order for me to be able to address these issues of cost and quality 
accountability, and the role of the computer systems, it will be necessary 
to examine the issue of medical accountability within its historical and 
organisational context, and this will be done in Chapter Four. Before doing 
tha t, however, it will be appropria te firs t to clarify the theoretical 
issues and arguments involved in the analysis of professional 
accountability and control and this is the topic of Chapter Three . 
••• 
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NOTES 
1. Possibly the most prominent computer 'aficionado' among hospital 
doctors was Professor John Anderson at Kings College Hospital (and 
has since become chairperson of the Medical Specialists' Group of the 
British Computer SOciety). He played a leading role in the 
developments in medical computing the 'sixties (The Times 5th 
October, 1982, p.13). 
2. Larson quotes the date for the establishment of the Royal College of 
Surgeons as being 1800 <1977, p.87) 
3. The date given in the official and very brief evaluation report on 
the NHS Experimental Computer Programme by the DHSS (1982) was 1967, 
this date is also cited by Scrivens <1985, p.5.) 
4. The hospitals are listed in the Interim Report on the Evaluation of 
the NHS Experimental Computer Programme (DHSS, 1977, p.3) 
5, A report genera tor is a facility by which clinical and research da ta 
on groups of patients can be produced according to a common format 
(e,g. relating drug therapy to response of an infection, or blood 
pressure, etc.). The query language, on the other hand, enables one to 
ask specific ad hoc questions of the data-base. This facility is a 
more powerful instrument (technically) with which to interrogate the 
data-base than the report generator. 
6. The intelligence of machine intelligence has been amusingly 
illustrated by Weizenbaum's ELIZA programme, which was an early 
development in this area of computer science. This programme 
apparently worked like a psychotherapist which, while it appeared to 
be very intelligent, had been programmed to operate more like a 
'script' for a play. But instead of there being a set sequence of 
conversations between the 'actors', ELIZA's 'script' was composed of a 
... 
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mosaic of sentences and sentence fragments, a repertoire with which 
the sys tern was able to emula te the role of a sympa the tic 
in terroga tor once ac ti va ted ('cued ') by 'keywords' in the users 
responses. The illusion created for the user was that of taking part 
in an intelligent psychia tric interview (Weizenbaum, 1976, pp. 188-
191j Lodge, 1984, pp. 154-155 and 242-249) . 
CHAPTER THREE 
ORGANISATIONAL ANALYSIS, THE LABOUR 
PROCESS AND COMPUTERISATION 
Introduction 
In this chapter I review the prevailing forms of explanation relating 
to the consequences of implementing computer-based information systems 
within organisations and for the members of organisations. The chapter is 
organised into three sections each dealing with specific literatures on the 
subject, 
1. Medical computing literaturej 
2. Organisational analysisj 
3. Labour process analysis. 
In treating the literature in this order it is possible to locate the 
specific studies relating to doctors in hospitals within the broader 
context of organisational analysis. The second section acts as both an 
extension to the first and as a necessary precursor to the consideration 
of Labour Process analysis of medical computing in hospitals. The 
underlying argument is that a labour process model can provide the 
theoretical leverage required to analyse developments in a way that can 
systematically relate the different levels of analysis (social and 
organisational) not found within the medical computing, or organisational 
analysis literatures. At the same time, the introduction of IT into 
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hospit8l clinics confronts labour process theory with fundamental problems. 
As has been pointed out in the Introduction (Chapter One), the labour 
process model is not readily applicable to the analysis of the organisation 
and control of non-industrial work processes within the non-market sector. 
It will, therefore, be necessary to reassess and develop the model prior to 
operationalising it. 
1. Medical computing literature 
Within the literature on medical (8nd more broadly, healthcare) 
computing there are essenti8lly three basic models of analysis that have 
been adop ted (1), 
(a) Diffusionist 
(b) Human Factor 
(c) Systems. 
E8ch of these will now be reviewed in turn. 
(B) Diffusionis t models. 
In order to expl8in an Bpparen t par8dox 8S between doctors generally 
positive eV8lu8tion of computers in medicine and their lack of acceptance 
of the actual systems when they have been introduced many commentators 
and analysts, particularly in the USA, turn to diffusion theory for their 
explanation (Greer, 1977; Lindberg, 1979; Kaplan, 1982; Jay and Anderson, 
1982) Before looking in any detail at the theory, however, I need first to 
present 8 little of the evidence from the literature concerning the 
hospital doctors' general lack of acceptance of these computer systems. 
More th8n twenty years ago Sir George Godber, then the Chief Medical 
Officer 8t the DHSS, was advocating development and adoption of automated 
mediC8l records systems in order that (among other things) case histories 
might be autom8tically and systematically retrievable and analysable 
- 42-
(Godber,1964, pp.1893-94) .. Others within the medical profession have 
attempted to develop and introduce clinical and diagnostic systems of 
various kinds but hardly any have become widely accepted, or used, 
"Of 32 systems in clinical medicine surveyed in 1977, half 
had been abandoned or temporarily stopped and only 19% 
were used routinely (Friedman and Gustafson, 1977 , 
Enormous numbers of diagnostic systems have been 
developed <Wardle and Wardle, 1978), yet the dissemination 
of any single system is limited." (Young, 1984, p.663) 
This state of affairs had led to a number of studies being carried out, 
particularly in the USA, during the seventies and eighties aimed at 
identifying and measuring hospital doctors attitudes towards computers 
being used in medicine <e.g. Startsman and Robinson, 1972; Melhorn et a1., 
1979; Teach and Shortcliffe, 1981; Singer et a1., 1983). These surveys. 
which covered both senior and junior medical staff. indicated that 
generally doctors have been 
Although. 
"favourably disposed toward the use of compu ters in the 
health care field. (even though) their value is 
unproven" (Melhorn et al., op cit. p.327> 
"(they) tend to oppose applications in which they perceive 
an infringement on their management role" (Teach and 
Shortcliffe. op cit., p.5(2) 
These surveys presented descriptive statistical data on the doctors 
attitudes to the technology. but they could not go beyond that point and 
commentators have tended to turn to diffusion theory in order to explain 
the combined evidence of the attitude surveys and the high failure rate of 
medical and hospital computer systems. 
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Diffusion theory first became fully developed in the work of Everett 
Rogers. He utilised Merton's classification 'localites' or 'cosmopolites' to 
identify those persons most likely to be susceptible to new ideas and 
inn ova tions and argued tha t, following Coleman e t a1 (1966), the persons 
who adopted the innovations acted as the opinion leaders among their peer 
groups (Rogers, 1962; Rogers and Shoemaker,1971), The earlier classic 
study of Coleman et a1 (1966) is particularly relevant here for it 
concerned medical innovation, specifically the process by which doctors 
came to adopt and use new drugs in their clinics. The researchers found 
that it was the younger, better educated, more competent and 
geographically mobile cosmopolite doctors that were the first to be aware 
of new drugs, and then to use them. In a more recent and less ambitious 
study Anderson and Jay (1983, pp.45-52) came to parallel conclusions. In 
this more recent study a detailed analysis was presented of the 
progressive utilisation of computers in clinical practice among a group of 
24 physicians within a teaching hospital in Indiana, USA. The authors 
utilised network analysis (Mitchell, 1971) and more especially smallest 
space analysis, a multi-dimensional scaling technique, to analyse and 
measure professional relations in diffusionist terms (Kruskal and Wish, 
1978). The method did have some merit in terms of defining the variations 
in intensity and frequency of interactions between medical colleagues as 
well as identifying the relative levels of dominance possessed by each 
doctor. The authors concluded that their study, 
"demonstrate(d) the importance of peer influences ... in the 
introduction of computer technology" <ibid. p. 51) 
However, the study was of only a small group of doctors <physicians) in 
one hospital. At best the conclusions can only be indicative and certainly 
not conclusive. Furthermore, quantitative studies on their own are not 
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capable of incorporating the participants own informed (if incomplete) 
reasoning and responses. Both Coleman (with his associates) (1966) as well 
as Anderson and Jay (1983) assumed that opinion leaders, at least among 
doctors (physicians), would always equate the new with the desirable and 
demonstrate a cosmopolite habit of promoting innovation. This assumption, 
however, is not necessarily warranted, for as Greer has pointed out, 
" .. opinion leaders may use their influence to speed up or 
slow down the diffusion process. Similarly, cosmopolites 
may, in perfect accord with standards of their reference 
groups, distrust proposed innovation." (Greer, 1977, p.509) 
But, she goes on to argue, even if the link between innovation, opinion 
leaders and cosmopolitanism matched the requirements of the diffusion 
model the theory could not adequa tely explain the organisa tional adoption 
of innovation, at least, not without shifting the focus of analysis away 
from the network of relations between opinion leaders and colleagues 
"toward organisational and political theory" <ibid. p. 506) which could then 
account for the negotiation of the organisational policies relating to 
innovation based on interests, resources and strategies <ibid> - a model 
that has much in common with Pettigrew's analysis of The Politics of 
Organisa tional Decision-Making (1973) (see below). 
Both Pettigrew (1973) and Greer (1977) claim that diffusion theory 
requires further elaboration, but not in terms of the development, or 
application, of detailed quantitative techniques, as seems to be Anderson 
and Jays' position, instead they argue that recognition needs to be given 
to the interplay of communications and power, 
"that decision makers negotiate policies and determine the 
interests, resources and strategies which they bring to 
the decision process." (Greer, 1977, p.506) 
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Greer, however, has not gone beyond pointing to the desirability of 
developing a broad based model that can overcome the present limitations 
of diffusion theory (and as a necessary prerequisite to a more adequate 
interpretation of empirical data and hence policy formulation) <1977 e.g. 
p.529). Pettigrew, on the other hand, has developed a detailed theoretical 
formulation of the component missing from the classic diffusionist model, 
namely the decision processes (concerning innova tion) within organisa tions. 
His solution was to develop the concept of 'gatekeeper' derived from Allen 
(1966), coupled with the assumption tha t communica tion sys terns within 
organisations were power systems <1972, p.188). Pettigrew's revision of the 
diffusion model, however, was undermined by his commitment to a systems 
approach, to be discussed later, in which "actors operat(e) from one or 
more structural positions within a specific social system" (Pettigrew,1972, 
p.188) which in consequence meant that the negotiations and interactions 
involved in the adoption and implementation of innovation were preordained 
within the over-arching theoretical model. 
(b) The Human Factor approach. 
The diffusionist model is concerned with the social processes by 
which innovation, including information technology, is taken up and used 
within a community (or society). The human factor approach, by contrast, 
examines this process of acceptability from a psychological starting point. 
The adherents of this model argue that, in relation to computer 
technology, it is necessary to design human acceptability into the very 
systems themselves (Schneiderman, 1980). Within the computer systems 
design community the approach is referred to by the British Computer 
Society as Human Computer Interaction (HC!), and more chauvinistically as 
man-machine interface (MMI) as in the case of the Alvey Programme 
(discussed in Chapter Two). 
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The general approach has its roots in the industrial psychology of 
C.S. Myers and others associated with the National Institute of Industri15l 
Psychology (NIIP) whose central concerns related to pr15ctical questions of 
ergonomics and the improvement of the psychological well-being of workers 
15t work (Rose, M., 1978, pp. 65-87 en passim). In this earlier form 
"<p)sychology and biology were still intimately linked" (Rose, 1978, p.67> 
whereas for HeI this is no longer the case. Now the psychology component, 
which is principally of a cognitive kind, is applied on an ad hoc basis, 
with the objective of finding the best 'fit' between the human user and 
the computer system (cf Smith,H.T. 1980, pp.5-38) In practice 8 vast array 
of people from many disciplinary backgrounds now concern themselves with 
HCI, from the ergonomics engineer <e.g. B15iley, 1982) through to the 
philosophically inclined (Weizenbaum, 1984). HCI rese15rch is basically a 
pragmatic, multi-, or in ter-, disciplinary and prescriptive enterprise (e.g 
Martin, 1980, pp.171-173). 
Within medical computing it has been principally in the area of 
medical decision-making that cognitive psychology has contributed most and 
its practitioners have attempted to develop models of human reason and 
deCision-making for the computer systems to emulate. In this country it 
has been John Fox who has been the most consistent champion of the Human 
Factor approach <1977, pp.669-686j 1979, pp.425-431>. Fox's approach, at 
least in these articles, has been of a pragmatic and prescriptive kind: the 
theoretical or conceptual framework on which the approach was premised 
remained unstated. Instead, in the second paper <ibid.), the point was 
forcefully made that human factors are important to the good design and 
acceptability of computer systems. At that time Fox was working at the MRC 
Social and Applied Psychology Unit at the University of Sheffield where, 
more recent.ly, Fitter, with others, has been researching and writing on 
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this subject (Fitter and Sime, 1980; and Cruikshank, 1983). These 
researchers "raise 'human factors' issues specific to the medical 
consultation environment" in their work (Fitter and Cruikshank, 1983, p.8t> 
but they come to the view that user interface design needs to be based on 
more than human factors considerations (e.g. dialogues, task analysis, work 
station design) if only because of the "additional complexities of the 
three way interaction (doctor, computer, patient) in a sensitive 
environment" <ibid. p.91). This has led these researchers to explore 
conversational analysis, in association with Heath (ibid.) a development 
that indicates a growing interest in a particular kind of sociological 
analysis. Whether this indicates a recognition of the limitations of a 
wholly psychological approach and methodology, or whether it is just 
another form of HC! pragmatism, is not wholly clear, but on past 
performance it is more realistic to take the pragmatist interpretation. 
(c) Systems models. 
The systems model plays a paradigmatic role for both doctors and 
computer personnel. Both professional groups trea t the model as a basis 
for action. Not for them the uncertainties of reification, or objectivity, 
expressed by sociologists (Brown, 1967; Silverman, 1970; Elger, 1975). Both 
medicine and systems analysis are heavily dependant upon assumptions of 
closed and partially closed systems (Silverman, 1970 pp. 32-35). Medical 
students are trained at medical schools to develop their diagnostic skills 
by assuming the patient is a combination of largely discrete systems (e.g. 
circulatory, respiratory, urinary, reproductive and even sociaD. The 
practice of hospital medicine may vary considerably from the medical 
school model, but doctors rarely repudiate the model altogether (see 
Chapter Eight). Computer and systems personnel are, if anything, even more 
firmly rooted in the systems universe (see Rienhoff and Abrams, 1980; 
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Jenkins, 1981; Checkland, 1981>. This paradigmatic allegiance to systems 
thinking is more than a commitment to a general theoretical orientation 
for it also has practical consequences for the control and organisation of 
the labour process it is supposed to explain. An example of what I mean 
here is the way in which systems analysts assess the user acceptability 
(and hence successful implementation) of a system. Success here is defined 
in terms of a se t of agreed cri teria es tablished prior to the sys tem 's 
implementation (known as systems specifications). The criteria of 
acceptability also demarcate the boundaries of responsibilities for the 
systems personnel, once the criteria have been objectively met, whether the 
users are satisfied with the new arrangements or not, the job is defined 
as being satisfactorily completed (see also Chapter Six). 
Systems theory is vulnerable to two major criticisms. The first 
concerns the inadequate attention given to the question of organisational 
power relations, a point already raised in section (a) in relation to 
Pettigrew's work. In the present context, the key example is the power 
hospital doctors (more accurately consultants) have to refuse to use a 
computer-based system if they wish (see case studies reported in Part II>. 
The second criticism is that the systems model assumes only one level of 
organisational reality, that of the working system (Burns, 1966, pp. 165-
178; Silverman, 1970, pp.26-43). A particularly appropriate example within 
the healthcare literature is the work of the BruneI Health Services 
Organisational Research Unit (BHSORU). In both 'Hospital Organisation' 
(Rowbottom et 81 .. 1973) and 'Health Services' <Jacques et a1., 1978) the 
heal th service is analysed according to the principles of 'social analysis' 
(ibid., 1978, p. x) which are derived from the systems approach Jacques 
originally developed in his classic study of Glacier Metals <1951, c.f. 
Emery and Trist, 1981 (2nd edition), p.322j Clegg and Dunkerley, 1980, 
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p.204) and more recently defined in relation to its application to the 
health service by Rowbot tom (1977). Within, this model the clinical 
autonomy of consultant doctors, for instance, is viewed not as the outcome 
of the doctors "dignity, status and power" (Tolliday, 1978, p.42) but as the 
means by which the necessary confidentiality and trust can be maintained 
in the doctor-patient relationship <ibid) and is subject to systematic 
monitoring arrangements, "to ensure that clinicians keep within the law, 
binding professional standards, and NHS policy and resource limits " 
<ibid. p.41). This functional interpretation is oversimplistic, for clinical 
autonomy is a crucial element of the professional autonomy enjoyed by 
doctors (cf. Freidson, 1970b, p.45) independent of the organisational 
imperatives of the NHS. It is true that the state and NHS management would 
wish to have matters different and that under the recent change to a 
system of general management doctors have been exhorted to "accept the 
management responsibility that goes with clinical freedom" (Griffiths 
Report, 1983, p.l8), but one has reason to be sceptical as to the likely 
outcome of these new arrangements for previous reorganisations were never 
able to fully incorporate the competing interests of the doctors and the 
other occupational groups and the administration (Klein, 1984). In short, 
the systems model is flawed, it is over-simplistic and unable to 
satisfactorily account for the possibility that a work organisation <e.g. 
hospital> may contain a number of legitimate but conflicting interests as 
with clinicians and managers. 
Recapitulation 
The literature on medical computing then can be broadly organised 
under the three headings of Diffusionist, Human Factors and Systems. These 
approaches are not to be thought of as wholly discrete, or mutually 
exclusive, in their application to the analysis or assessment of the impact 
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of medical computing. They are commonly utilised in a pragmatic way to 
account for the present state of development and acceptability of 
computing in medicine. This state of affairs is hardly surprising given 
that this literature is principally and overtly prescriptive in intent. For 
the most part the concern is to explain the apparent resistance of doctors 
to the use of computers in clinical medicine. The concern, however, is too 
narrowly focused. Resistance may relate more to the lack of availability of 
systems that doctors find appropriate for their use (Kaplan, 1982; Young, 
1984) and not the psychological predispositions of hospital doctors, nor 
the proximity of innovative colleagues (as argued by the dHfusionists). 
And while these technical issues are addressed within the Human Factor/Her 
approach (es) the question of organisational power, and its implication for 
individual choice relating to systems use, is largely overlooked. Given that 
the potential user group are members of the medical profession that 
appears strange, although this hiatus can be explained in terms of the 
implicit assumption within the literature that doctors can choose whether 
or not they adopt computer technology. Writers within the general field of 
organisational theory, on the other hand, have tended to place the issues 
of organisational power and control far more to the centre of their 
considerations of the implications of information technology. It is this 
topic, in rela tion to the developmen t, implemen ta tion and u tilisa tion of 
computer based-information systems, to which I now turn. 
2. Oraanisational analysis and information technoloaY 
In this section I will present an overview of the organisational 
Ii tera ture as it rela tes to the implemen ta tion and use of in forma tion 
technology (IT). My purpose here is to critically evaluate the 
organisational literature concerned with the theme of power and control in 
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relation to information technology. I will begin with a fairly detailed 
account of Whisler's influential argument and will follow this with 8 
consideration of a range of further themes which point to an alternative 
approach to organisational analysis than that identified by Whisler. 
Whisler on Centralisation 
One of the first, and certainly a most influential, writer on the 
subject to offer a systematic analysis of the impact of information 
technology on organisational structures was Whisler, who since the fifties 
has been presenting evidence and an analysis that he argues points to the 
centralisation and simplification effect of information teChnology. Whisler 
argues, in one article, that decisions-taking can be literally programmed 
into the organisation's computer system. (Whisler, 1966). The person taking 
the decision is not the arbiter of the criteria (rules) which determine the 
decision-making but merely the agent of the system. His more general 
argument is that the introduction of IT, in the form of computer-based 
management information systems (MIS), would ensure a concentration of 
managerial control within a less complex, and less hierarchical, 
organisation. This, he argued, would consequently lead to a reduction in 
the number of managers employed (particularly in the middle ranks) 
(Leavitt and Whisler, 1958; Whisler, 1966; Whisler, 1970). This analysiS 
suggested that the computer technology was being used to rationalise, and 
centralise, managerial control within work organisations with the result 
that the functions and status of middle management would be eroded in a 
parallel way to Braverman's labour process analysiS of the work of manual 
and clerical workers (1974) (cf. also Crompton, 1979; Crompton and Reid, 
1982, pp.173-175)' 
Whisler's argument. however, is vulnerable to a number of fundamental 
criticisms. 
- 52-
(a) The assumptions relating to organisational centralisation are 
problematic and "considerable conceptual difficulties exist as to 
what exactly constitutes 'centralisation' and how it should be 
measured" (Crompton, 1979, p.416). 
(b) The analysis places too much emphasis on technology as the 
primary causal factor influencing organisational structures, and 
ignores the possibility of alternative management arrangements 
for utiliSing, or coping with computer-based management 
information systems 
(c) At the same time Whisler failed to recognise that the 
development of computer technology in the seventies gave rise 
to the possibility of developing information systems of greater 
flexibility than previously. 
(d) Whisler is too ready to claim a general, or universal, 
applicabili ty for conclusions derived from the study of 
organisations within specific sectors. 
To expand on each of these points. 
(a) On the question of centralisation, Blau, a consistent critic of 
Whisler, has questioned the assertion that the automation of MIS 
systems necessarily results in the greater centralisation of 
management control. In an article in which he and his associates both 
reviewed the literature and presented empirical evidence, based on 
110 New Jersey manufacturing companies, he attempted to demonstrate 
that Whisler's thesis was wrong. The evidence produced by Blau and 
his associates indicated that the introduction of information 
technology into "administra tive support functions" (Blau e t 81, 1976, 
p. 20) tended to lead to a devolvement of decision-taking to lower 
levels of managemen t (and an increase in the number of levels in the 
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organisational hierarchy) (8lau et 131, 1976, pp. 32-33). However, it is 
arguable whether this delegation of decision-taking observed by Blau 
et 131 was, in reality, a matter of decentralisation, for as Blau has 
argued elsewhere, 
" ... management decisions in organisations are significant, 
in which case they are not delegated, or delegated. in 
which case they are not significant." <1970, p.l72) 
Or, put in more pedestrian terms, delegated authority is usually 
found to be constrained by specific rules designed to ensure that 
decision-making at the lower levels within the organisational 
hierarchy will only be of a kind commensura te wi th the policies of 
higher management, thereby ensuring that control remains centralised 
(Child, 19846, pp. 145-153). In any case higher management is unlikely 
to be directly involved with operational decision-making; their 
ability to exercise direct control over this process will normally be 
less than the managers and specialists employed directly within those 
areas of activity. Instead, their concern will be limited to ensuring 
that operational decisions do not jeopardise either any overall 
strategy or run counter to the organisation's missions or goals as 
perceived by the higher management (dominant coalition). 
Nevertheless, the evidence produced by 8lau and his associates 
is useful as an illustration of the limitations of Whisler'S over-
simplistic argument (cf. also Pfeffer and Leblebici, 1977). The main 
problem with 8lau's argumen t, however, is tha t his analyses is 
concerned solely with the contingencies of organisational structure 
and effectively overlooks the issue of organisation power; the 
important questions relating to the exercise of strategic choice 
(Child, 1973a and b) and the implications this has for the politics of 
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organ is a tiona I decision-making (cf. Pe t tigrew, 1973) are ignored. 
These aspects of the organisational implications of managements use 
of information technology will be explored and developed further 
within this chapter. 
(b) On the question of computer technology Whisler has stated, 
"that the technology is sufficiently powerful to alter, in 
systematic and predictable ways, all existing 
organisational structures ... " <1970, p.33) 
What he does not seem to be aware of is that the design of the 
technology embodies some degree of social choice (Noble, 1979) and 
tha t any tendency towards the cen tralisa tion and ra tionalisa tion of 
managerial control and structure identified by Whisler will have been, 
at least to a substantial degree, the result of conscious decisions 
rather than the inevitable outcome of technological determinism 
(Child, 1984b, 1985). Even the systems design typically reflects 
influence of Taylorism rather than technological necessity (see 
Hedberg and Mumford, 1975; Crompton, 1982, p. 177)(2). 
(c) Moreover, the determinative role of the computer technology in 
bringing about any of the increased levels of centralisation (or re-
centralisation) of organisational control reported by some observers 
(Child, 198413 and b) is undermined by the development of the 
technology, in particular, the development of mini- and micro-
computer systems in the 'seventies. Some companies have chosen to 
use mini- and micro-computers in order to maximise the degree of 
decentralisation possible within an organisation (Burnett and Nolan, 
1975; den Hertog, 1980, pp. 117-118; Business Week, 1985). And even 
when this is not official company policy individual managers do 
sometimes chose to run their own autonomous systems separate from 
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any organisation-wide MIS (if there is one) thereby controlling the 
access of others to their own departmental data-base and undermining 
any attempt of higher management to develop an integrated system for 
the entire organisation (Mc.1, Computer Marketing. Int. 1, July, 1980) 
Another technical consideration has been the problems associated 
with the development of data-base management systems which have 
largely worked against effective centralisation based on computer-
based MIS. While it is self-evidently true that the mainframe 
computer constituted a central source and store of organisational 
information and data for senior managers, the technology of data-base 
managemen t has proven to be complex to mas ter (Chandor e t 81, 1977; 
Business Week, 1985, pp.40-41). Furthermore, it has not been possible 
to ensure the provision of an integrated and accessible organisation-
wide centralised system of management information because of the 
difficulties of maintaining the integrity (accuracy) of the data 
entered on the system (Chandor et 81, 1977, p. 108) (popularly 
referred to as the "Crap In Crap Out" syndrome) and the 
difficulties encountered in agreeing common da ta standards tha tare 
meeningful to both the departments, or functions, of origin and 
useful to higher management (Scrivens, 1985, p. 49; Dent et 81, 1986), 
These problems are an importan t reason for the curren tat tempts to 
develop artificial intelligence which is perceived by many within 
compu ter science and the indus try as the means of overcoming this 
major limitation; expert systems (AD rely on a leaner 'knowledge-
bese' programmed to simulate thinking rather than just storing and 
recalling masses of data <Immel, 1985; Business Week, 1985, p. 41) 
In over-emphasing the role of technology as the determinant of 
organisational control structures Whisler'S analysis also fails to 
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give sufficient weight to other factors (Whisler, 1970, p.33) such as 
environment and size, (Blau et 131, 1976j Pfeffer and Leblebici, 1977) 
which with a little over-simplification, represent the remaining 
elements of the 'holy trinity' of organisational theory. This is a 
point which will be further developed in a moment for it demands 
more space and elaboration than is appropriate here. 
(d) The criticism that Whisler's analysis is too universalistic means, 
in reality, that it is reasonably accurate with reference to a very 
limited number of work organisations, namely, large financial 
institution such as banks and insurances companies. It is largely 
within the financial institutions that large main-frame computer 
systems were first and most effectively introduced for storing, 
retrieving and manipulating great quantities of figures (money 
numbers). In shor t, 'number- crunching'. Moreover, it was precisely 
this capacity that gave computer technology its potentiality as an 
instrument of organisational rationalisation and the means of 
centralising control (Blau et a1, 1976, p.36j Crompton, 1979, p. 417; 
Child, 1985, p. 152). Studies of banks and insurance companies have 
generally supported Whisler'S findings on this point, for example, 
Mumford and Banks (1967) and Argyris (1970) (see also Mann and 
Williams, 1960j Hardin, 1960j Hoos, 1960; Mann, 1962). What is 
applicable to one type of organisation does not, however, 
automatically apply to other types. Any trend towards greater 
centralisation of organisational control results not from the 
application of computer technology but is contingent on other 
factors, not least being managerial choice. 
Further Themes 1n Organisa tiona1 Analysis 
It is now appropriate to take up the discussion of the other 
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organisational factors that influence the structure and functioning of work 
organisations which were ignored by Whisler but are considered important 
by other organisational theorists namely organisational environment and 
size. Having considered these I will then be able to take up the issue of 
power (as distinct from control) in relation to computerisation and MIS 
systems. 
(a) Environment 
Environment as a causal factor in organisational analysis has been 
particularly associated with the open systems approach and it will 
therefore be useful to make a few general points regarding systems theory 
and its treatment of the environment. Attempts have been made to define 
the term environment in precise terms, most notably by Emery and Trist in 
the article on 'The causal texture of organisational environments' (1965). 
The concept, however, remains problematic in being too general and 
imprecise and in practice can become merely a residual category. Burn's 
critique of open systems models (including socio- technical models) can be 
usefully cited here. His argument is that an organisation is not one but 
three inter-related systems, (i) the working organisation, (11) the 
political system, and (Ui> the career structure (p.241> and the 
relationship between them is not one of potential technical integration but 
"must be a moral ordering" (p. 248) relating to the wider society 
(culture). In short, systems of action interpenetrate both the organisation 
and the society in which it is located and the distinction between 
organisation and environment is too simplistic (969). 
On the substantive issue that concerns me here - computerisation of 
MIS systems - environmental factors are, in practice, not perceived as 
being of more than passing or residual importance. The socio-technical 
analyses, for instance, are largely prescriptive in orientation and 
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frequently applied as part of a consultancy exercise with the result that 
the factor is not seriously considered. Instead the analysts are more 
concerned with intra-organisational 'problems' largely defined by 
management (Brown, 1967; Albrow, 1973; Elger, 1975). One good example here 
is the work of Mumford, particularly with regard to the ETHICS method. 
This approach is entirely prescriptive, concerned primarily with the 
development of a participative systems design (Mumford, 1980). This 
commitment to participation is essentially in the 'human relations' mould 
and concerned with the relationship between job satisfaction and efficiency 
rather than the issue of organisational control. The ETHICS method, 
however, was not designed as a tool of analysis but as a method of 
implementation and as an alternative to the 'Tayloristic' approach of 
systems designers and analysts noted by Mumford and mentioned earlier in 
this section. 
(b) Size 
Size, the other factor ignored by Whisler, is the dominant causal 
factor in strategic contingency theory. The basic argument was originally 
developed, at least in part, as a critique of Woodward's classic analysiS in 
which she argued that different production technologies gave rise to 
different management structures (1965). The contingency theorists of Aston 
argued that, beyond a certain minimum, organisational size had a greater 
influence on the management structure of a company than did technology 
because large size gave rise to problems of coordination between the 
various functions and activities comprising the organisation, of which 
production technology was only one (Child, 1973b). The theory, however, 
does not claim that size is the only factor, but emphasises the point that 
each organisation has its own particular profile of factors (contingencies) 
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which together determine its performance (Pugh and Hickson, 1973). This 
assumption, as Child has argued, ignores the role of choice that also 
influences the structure and performance of organisations 0973b). It is 
for this reason that strategic contingencies theory can only be a partial 
analysis because it ignores the crucial role of the strategic choice 
exercised by management and the competition and conflict that thereby 
exists between the dominant coalition and other management forces present. 
Yet despite the criticisms of the strategic contingency model the factor, 
size, does remain important as a major influence on the structures of an 
organisation, for it is a truism to say that the coordination of a large 
enterprise is more complex than a small one (Child, 1985, pp. 58-61). 
Strategic contingencies theory seems to have impinged very little on 
the analyses and evalua tions of the organisa t ional impact of compu ters. 
The notable exception to this is the work of Blau and his associates who 
have been directly influenced by the approach, and claim that their 
research "verifies the general findings of the Aston studies" (Blau et 81, 
1976, p.20). At the same time, as I have already stated earlier in this 
chapter, they have also been concerned to criticize the analysis of Whisler 
pointing out that there is no evidence to support the claim that the 
introduction of computer-based MIS leads to an increased centralisation of 
management control (Blau et 81, 1976, p.36). 
(c) Power 
There has developed a loose knit European socio- technical school 
concerned with the implications of computer systems design and 
implemen ta tion, which includes Mum ford, Eason, Pe t tigrew, Bjorn-Anderson 
and Hedberg (e.g. Bjorn-Anderson, 1980). This 'school' has not ignored the 
issues of organisa tiona 1 power and con trol al though they are trea ted as 
unproblematic Cli tegories seeming not to recognise the processual aspects 
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involved (e.g. Eason et 131, 1977; Bjorn-Anderson and Rasmussen, 1980, 
pp.l08-113). However, not all these accounts use, or are based on, 
simplistic notions of power and control, Pettigrew while utilising a 
systems approach gives a central role to organisational power as both a 
resource and a relational phenomenon <1972, 1973, 1980, p.45) Pettigrew 
views organisations as open political systems the sub-units of which are 
based on specialised functions and tasks. The sub-units are necessarily 
inter dependant but nevertheless are sites of interest-based demands 
<1972, p.17, 1980, pp. 45-46). The study reported in the article and book 
published in the early 'seven ties concerned the "changing pa t terns of 
status and control between systems analysts and programmers" (1972, p. 
190) This was particularly so in relation to the decision-making process 
relating to the purchase of a new computer system. Significant here was 
Pettigrew's discussion of organisational power in terms of 'resources' and 
importantly, the tactics of resource use - relational aspects <1972, p.187>. 
The strategic resource is that of information, and power is seen as 
resting with those who control the access to information. These persons 
are the 'gatekeepers'. The model is a compelling one for there is an 
attempt made to incorporate processual elements of negotiation and the 
active exercise, or attempted exercise of power and influence. Yet, insofar 
as it is rooted in systems theory, it remains vulnerable to the criticisms 
stated above. In particular, Pettigrew's study limits the analysis of 
interest to that of organisational status and career. Within the division 
of labour to be found in a work organisation other factors are also 
relevant, for example both the sexual division of labour (Stacey, 1981; 
Beechey, 1982; Davies and Rosser, 1984) and professional autonomy 
(Johnson, 1972,(3) 1977; Larson, 1977) have their bases outside the work 
organisation. Extending the point further these factors also relate to the 
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overall class, and gender, relations within society (Salaman, 1978, 1979, 
1981; Clegg and Dunkerley, 1980; Abercrombie and Urry, 1983>. Furthermore, 
these extra-organisational factors, which always require specifying and 
are not defined a priori as part of a system model, can have a causal 
effect on organisational outcomes. 
Structures and process 
The basic problem for much organisational theory relates to the issue 
of reification (Elger, 1975), or, "misplaced concreteness" <Donaldson, 1985, 
p.19>' The utilisation of systems modelling, in one form or another, has 
rarely been qualified for being the heuris tic device tha t it 1s bu t has 
come to be seen, erroneously, as the very reality the methodology is 
intended to reveal (cf. Silverman, 1970, p.50)(4). In order to capture the 
open and contingent character of work organisations it is necessary to 
adopt a perspective that focuses on the constructed, processual and 
contested aspects of organisational life. It is for these reasons, if not 
necessarily couched in precisely these terms, tha t considerable in teres t 
has been shown in labour process analyses (e.g. Clegg and Dunkerley, 1980). 
It is to labour process analysis that I now turn. 
3. Labour process analysiS. 
There has been a cons is ten t sociological and organisa tiona I in teres t 
since the late nineteen fifties concerning the role of new technology, 
including information technology. This interest has been in terms of both 
managerial strategies and the implications for the division of labour. Over 
recent years this work has been much influenced by labour process analysiS 
which in its various forms has revitalised the study of management and 
work (Littler and Salaman, 1982, p.251; Wood, 1982, p. 16; Knights et a1., 
1985, p. 3; Reed, 1985, pp. 82-90). In this section my aim is to review the 
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main developments in labour process analysis as it relates, broadly, to the 
discussion of the in troduc tion of compu ter- based technologies. I will 
ou tline the agreemen ts and disagreemen ts among labour process theor is ts 
and provide a brief discussion of the limitations of labour process 
analysis in terms of its inability to theorise BdequB tely the rela tionship 
between societal structures and organisational work processes. My 
particular resolution (or suggestion) will be that it is not a universally 
applicable labour process theory that is required. Instead the limitations 
of scope of the approach needs to be recognised and concern focused on 
developing the conceptual linkages necessary in order to locate the 
specific details of work processes within the wider analysis of capitalis t 
society. I would assert that a labour process approach has an important 
contribution to make in extending our understanding of the organisation, 
control and execution of work processes. Nevertheless, I would also argue 
that it is necessary to move away from the 'top down' theorisation of 
Braverman and look more closely at the work processes themselves and find 
ways of theorising their integration into the broader model. My reasons 
for persevering with the labour process model is that it enables one to 
focus on two crucial and inter-related aspects of work and its 
organisation and control, namely, the dynamics of 
(a) con trol and coun ter-con trol, 
(b) shifts in effort and skill within the division of labour, 
Further these two concerns directly relate to a third; 
(c) the pol! tical economy. 
It was, of course, Braverman (1974) who refocused interest on the 
labour process and managerial control within both marxist and sociological 
studies. This work generated a veritable industry of labour process 
analyses and studies. Wood, in fact, has suggest.ed that we have seen .3 t 
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least three waves of reaction to Braverman's 'Labor and Monopoly Capital'j 
the 'enthusiastic', the 'critical' and a third wave that might be termed the 
'reappraisal' <1983, p.16). He also pointed to the potentiality of a fourth 
wave in which the connection between the logic of capital accumulation and 
the labour process is severely attenuated or denied altogether) (Littler, 
1980, p.33; Littler and Salaman, 1982, p.257j Tomlinson, 1982, pp.128-129). 
The main point is that there now exists several versions of labour process 
analysis from marxist functionalism through to a model within which 
management control is contingent on factors other than capital 
accumulation narrowly defined (Littler and Salaman, op cit., p. 256). Issues 
of worker resistance and consent to managerial control are seen as crucial, 
particularly in relation to the notions of 'craft' and 'skill' (Elger, 1979, 
1982j Stark, 1982; Cockburn, 1983, pp. 112-122). Similarly, the external 
realities of the labour markets and the related development of career 
structures within the administration and occupational structures of the 
work organisations has also received attention in terms of their effects 
on the historical development, organisation and practise of managerial 
control (Edwards, 1979; Friedman, 1977j Clawson, 1980). Finally, the issues 
of legitimation and consent within the workplace have been studied from a 
labour process perspective, notably by Burawoy <1979, pp.75-120) and in 
this country by Hales, <1980; see also Thompson, 1983, pp.153-179). 
Whatever form the reappraisal of labour process analysis has taken, a 
broad consensus has emerged around the point that the organisation of 
labour process is the outcome of more than economic forces. Also, it is 
clear that within this broad consensus two distinct and different 
approaches are discernible. The first, which might be referred to as the 
integrationist, is concerned with attempting to systematise the analysis so 
that processual and structural dimensions can be fully integrated one with 
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the other (e.g. Friedman, 1977 j Burawoy, 1979). The other, which could be 
labelled the social choice approach is more concerned with organisational 
policies and issues than in the analysis of the wider structures within 
capitalism (5). A key figure in the development of the social choice 
version of labour process analysis is Child, who has utilised the concepts 
and findings of labour process analysis in order to develop an alternative 
model to strategic contingency theory, which he refers to as political 
contingency theory, specifically designed to take account of "managerial 
preferences, market conditions and political context" <1985, pp.230-233): 
labour process theory is here subordina ted to organisa tiona I theory and 
design. The distinction between the two orientations hinges on the fact 
that the 'integrationists' are concerned to analyse the mediated influences 
of the economic structures within capitalism upon specific labour 
process (es) while the analyses of the social choice theor is ts are almos t 
wholly concerned with organisa tiona 1 considerations only. If, at the 
organisational level, particular political, or social factors are identified 
as determining the immediate outcome(s) relating to the organisation and 
control of the labour process that is sufficient, or all that is possible. 
The wider economic and class dimensions of the labour process are ignored, 
or at least set to one side. Wilkinson's study of the shopfloor pOlitics of 
new technology would be an example of this approach (1983) as are the 
various studies of Buchanan and Boddy (1983) (see also Buchanan, 1984, 
1985 ). 
Whether the analyses have been developed within an integrationist or 
a social choice frame of reference there has developed a broad consensus 
that the implementation of new technologies and associated management 
strategies and worker responses are not simply the outcome of economic 
considerations. The difference between the two broad orientations to labour 
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process theory is tha t the integra tionis ts (marx ian . or neo-marxian) would 
argue that the economic considerations (i.e. the imperative for capital 
accumulation) are more complex than one of simple profit maximisation, or 
worker immiseration. Short term exigencies (e.g. in the field of industrial 
relations) may conflict with long term goals (Hyman, 1987>, and capitalist 
society also, and necessarily, includes institutional arrangements more 
concerned wi th the reproduction of cap ita lis t rela tions than with the 
production of surplus value directly (Poulantzas, 1975, pp. 13-35; Gough, 
1979, pp. 39-54; Clegg and Dunkerley, 1980, pp. 540-543; Offe, 1984, pp. 
119-129). Relatedly, economic relationships are frequently mediated by 
apparently non-economic considerations, such as occupational ideologies, 
relating to skill (Elger, 1982; Cockburn, 1983, pp. 112-122) and 
professionalism (Larson, 1977; Hales, 1980; Esland, 1980). Whereas those 
writers to whom the appellation social choice analyst is more applicable 
(e.g. Wilkinson, 1983; Child, 1985) tend to view the political dimension of 
organisational change as being the dominant factor in determining 
organisational outcomes. 
The important point is not that certain writers have now got labels, 
but that the different orientations, or approaches, have different 
implications for labour process analysis. This can be pinpointed using the 
key example, both in wider debate and for the empirical focus of this 
thesis, of the public sector. How is one to make sense of the labour 
processes within the health service 7 For the integrationist writers it is 
necessary for them to at leas tat tempt to demons tra te the rela tionship 
between the imperative of capital accumulation and the role of the health 
service within capitalist society (Poulantzas, 1975; Carchedi, 1977, p.13t>. 
The social choice labour process writers, however, are confronted with a 
less daunting task (but not necessarily a less complex one), of detailing 
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the linkages between the organisational structures (size, technology and 
'environment' - e.g. labour and product markets), control systems and, 
importan tly, the politics of organisa tiona 1 decision-making and managerial 
choice (Child, 1985; Wilkinson, 1983, pp. 17-23; Buchanan, 1985). 
Accounting for public sector activity in economic terms is not 
necessarily an impossible problem for an 'integrationist' labour process 
analysis. One would anticipate that within capitalist society (Keynes not 
withstanding) costs will be subject to scrutiny and strategies of 
minimisation. However, this is too simple because moneys are in fact spent 
within the public sector for more than just the economic reasons of 
sustaining and reproducing capitalist relations of production. The general 
function of what O'Connor has referred to as legitima tion is also crucially 
relevant (1973). Furthermore, it can be argued that not all forms of social 
expenses are effective, or even directly related to maintaining social 
harmony <legitimacy> as O'Connor suggested (1973), either because such 
projects and programmes are ineffective in that role, or because the state 
policy makers are prepared to risk disrupting existing levels of social 
harmony in order to favour specific social groups for some political 
advantage. 
It is also important to note that management strategies within the 
private sector of the capitalist economy are not always, or directly, the 
outcome of the inherent necessity to accumulate, but can reflect "inter-
managerial competition" (Storey, 1985, p.195) more concerned with "power, 
privilege and sta tus" (Armstrong, 1984, p.l0 1) of the participa ting 
managerial and professional groups than with any 'global functions of 
capitalism' they are supposed to perform. Nor is state intervention absent 
in the private sector, for example, in the case of research, development 
and investment 1n the computer industry which started with the support of 
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the Wilson government for the British computer industry in the 'sixties 
(see Chapter Two) and, more recently, the 'Alvey Programme' (6). 
A possible solution to this problem for labour process analysis might 
be to adopt a sectoral form of analysis distinguishing between market and 
non-market sectors, state and non-state sectors or, with less exactitude, 
public and private sectors (O'Connor, 1973j Offe, 1984, pp.42-46j Clegg and 
Dunkerley, 1980, pp.522-5(5). This would, as Clegg and Dunkerley have 
argued, lienable 0 one to begin a structural .. analysis of organisations ... " 
<ibid. p.5(3), but it would not resolve the difficulty of relating public 
sector activities to capitalism in terms directly compatible with labour 
process analysis. A sectoral analysis would still subordinate the analysis 
of the strategies and struggles within the sectors to the overarching 
theorisation. It is arguable whether labour process analysis, with its 
emphasis on the organisation of the division of labour and work processes, 
of itself, is capable of supporting a fully adequate analysis of wider 
social and economic relations. 
In the hands of Braverman, of course, the labour process is the 
central component of a marxian analysis of capital and in this way the 
analysis is part of a comprehensive theory of capitalism. On the other 
hand, if the labour process model is processu(jl (Elger, 1975) - tha t is to 
say, designed to account for developments, interrelationships, competition, 
conflict and struggles within and around work processes (i.e. at the level 
of the work organisation) - then the conceptual 'fit' between labour 
process analysis and a theory of capitalism necessarily becomes less 
precise. Speaking figuratively, the conceptual 'magnification' required for 
the study of the organisation and control of work processes renders the 
wider structures 'fuzzy' (8). Theoretical integration can only be obtained 
by recognising that the wider structures influence (constrain or enable) 
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the specific labour process arrangements but do not determine them. Thus, 
the relationship between managerial control at the level of the work 
organisation and as the 'global function of capitalism', for example, cannot 
be analysed within the same model, although one can deduce conclusions 
from the one and input those into the other analytic model. Obversely, a 
concentration on the wider structures obscures the details of the labour 
process which need to be understood. 
It is possible that the specific concept of stra tegies might be the 
means by which the 'processual' and the 'structural' aspects of the 
analysis begin to be integrated. Wilkinson (1983) has pointed out that " .. 
organisational structure can .. be seen as referents used by organisational 
members .. " (1983, p.18) and this particularly applies to management (see 
also Child, 1973b). I would want to extend the notion of strategy to 
include whoever might be involved in a 'dominant coalition' (Child, 1973b) 
and not to exclude the possibility that there may be a plurality of 
'coalitions' (as in so-called 'clan' organisations - Ouchi 1980 p.837>. This 
is not to argue that these strategies determine outcomes, rather that they 
constitute (whether managerial, professional, or union) a mediation between 
the imperatives of 'capitalism', the corporate objectives of the 
organisation and the labour process outcomes (Child,1985, pp.112-113). 
There is no implication that the strategies in practice will always be 
coherent, nor that the implementation of the policies will reflect 
precisely the intentions of those groups involved. But what can be 
asserted is that the labour process will be primarily affected (but not 
necessarily determined) by strategies employed by dominant groups within 
work organisations, whether they are managerial, as Child argues, or 
occupational, including professional, or a combination of both. It is the 
organisa tion and con trol of the labour process at the level of the work 
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organ is a tion tha t is the crucial elemen t of this approach to labour 
process analysis. Thus it is the conceptualisation of strategy that 
provides the conceptual linkage between structure, action and outcome, and 
thereby provides the integrative element to the theorisation. 
Professions. autonomy and the new middle classes 
Bearing in mind the previous argumen t, the concern here is with the 
National Health Service (NHS), and more particularly the profession of 
medicine. In the mid 'seventies there developed a labour process 
literature relating to healthcare services deriving not from Braverman but 
from Carchedi <1975, 1977). Within this theoretical model inter-
relationships between workers, managers, professionals, and clients were 
subjected to a structuralist-marxist analysis. In the hands of Johnson 
<1977 ) the analysis proved a useful critique of both the 
professionalisation and the middle class proletarianisation theses 
(Freidson, 1973; Oppenheimer, 1973). Johnson argued that it was possible to 
demonstrate that some 'professional' work was free of external managerial 
control while other varieties of professional work were not. This analysis, 
however, owed more to J amous and Peloilles' concepts of technic! ty and 
indetermination (1970) than to the formalistic nature of Carchedi's 
theorisa tion. 
The study of professional work within a broadly labour process 
framework and with particular reference to the medical profession has also 
been developed in the USA <Larson, 1977; Mckinley. 1982; Derber, 1982, 
1983a, 1983b). A focus here has been on the issue of proletarianisation, 
which according to Larson is analagous but not identical with the process 
identified as occurring in other types of work <e.g. manual work). In the 
case of the professions it is not deskilling but "The transformation of 
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professionalisa tion s tra tegies in to generalised creden tialism" <1980, p.14-4) 
that leads to a general loss of occupational status that may be 
experienced as "proletarianisation" (ibid p.U5). The reason is that 
organised professions have historically controlled the duration and content 
of the training process for their neophyte members and this rela tionship 
between the professional associations and professional training has been 
seen as part of the very definition of professional autonomy (Abercrombie 
and Urry, 1983, p.121-123). Consequently, to the extent that the appellation 
'professional' is applied to managerial and organisational specialists <e.g. 
works study engineers, computer programmers), that have generally lacked 
comprehensive control over the selection and training of their members, the 
more there will be a general "proletarianising" effect on the concept of 
professionalism. (Larson, 1980) 
'Prole tarianisa tion ' has no t, however, been generally seen as the 
reality, or experience, for the members of the medical profession, for as 
Derber has argued, they have had the ability to be able to identify their 
own occupational interests with that of the ruling class and in 
consequence have been eble to retain their control over the education and 
training of doctors end sustain their dominant position within the social 
division of lebour (1983) (8). This interpretetion derived directly from 
Gramsci's analysis of 'organic' and 'traditional' intellectuals (Larson, 1977, 
p.xivj Glasner, 1979). However, while neither Larson nor Derber would argue 
that hospital doctors have been proletarianised, Derber has argued that 
members of the medical profession have had to come to accept certain 
changes in their work situation which involve an erosion of their work 
autonomy. This Derber refers to as sponsorship' (1983b) a notion remarkably 
like that of 'mediation' (Johnson, 1972), or 'heteronomy' (Johnson, 1977). 
Derber distinguished between 'patronage' where the client is dominant and 
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'sponsorship' whereby it is an influential third party who mediates 
between the doctors and their clients <Derber, 1983b, p.565). What is being 
described is similar to the notion of 'responsible autonomy' (Friedman, 
1977). There are parallels here with the classic marx ian concept of formal 
subordination (as opposed to the real subordination) of labour power 
except that in these classic terms there is an explicit assumption that 
within capitalist societies at least formal subordination will be followed 
by an attempt at a more real subordination, whereas 'responsible autonomy' 
relates to managerial strategies designed to incorporate certain 
occupational groups within the capitalist labour process while leaving them 
to organise their own methods of working (Friedman, 1977). Also, 
occupational groups thus organised are differentiated from other groups 
as having a strategic, or a central, role within the division of labour 
<ibid.). There remains an important difference, however, between responsible 
autonomy and professional autonomy. Responsible autonomy is the outcome of 
management strategies within the context of prevailing labour markets and 
specific worker resistance under monopoly capitalism <ibid.) whereas 
professional autonomy results from professionalisation strategies that 
historically predate monopoly capital (Johnson, 1972, p.52 j Larson, 1977). 
In addition, professional au tonomy primarily represen ts the ou tcome of 
competition and conflict between professional and managerial groups 
<Armstrong, 1984) and not directly the outcome of class struggle at the 
workplace - which is an essential component of Friedman'S analysis (1977). 
Professionalism, as Larson points out, is not unaffected by the 
s tra tegies of the s ta te (1977). Indeed paralleling the concep t of 
responsible autonomy certain professions can be said to have been promoted 
by the state to unequivocally meet the reqUirements of both capitalist 
market organisations and public bodies. Examples are accountants (Johnson, 
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1972; 1982) and engineers (Larson, 1977). However, others occupational 
groups - such as doctors - have been able to define the collaboration 
between themselves and the state as ones in which the administrators are 
not their managers. The distinction might be said to be that between 
OrgBnisa tional Con trol where the management is able to de termine the 
limits of the autonomy of particular occupational groups (including 
professionals) and, Institutional Control where the ability to define the 
occupational group's autonomy regarding the labour process is largely in 
the hands of a professional association because it has the power and 
authority to do so. The distinction is, in reality, not that clearcut, for 
both types of conkol are the result of the particular form of state 
forma tion tha t has emerged in Britain and mu ta tis mu tan dis in 0 ther 
liberal democratic/capitalist SOCieties, and the degree of autonomy enjoyed 
by any profession is historically determined as a condition of that state 
formation (Johnson, 1982, p.189). Accountants and personnel officers, for 
example, are usually more constrained by the imperatives of capital 
accumulation than are doctors and lawyers. This might have led me to argue 
that in the case of the doctors their autonomy is both dependant on and 
determined by the state in a manner analogous to responsible autonomy. 
However, the political negotiations that took place at various times 
between state and profession, for example, between Bevan and the BMA in 
the 'forties indicate that historically this cannot be true (Eckstein, 1958; 
Klein, 1983, pp. 17-25). Rather, their autonomy was a condition of the 
state formation and contributed to the legitimacy of the social and 
political arrangements that characterised the establishment of the post-
war welfare state. Therefore, arguments that the legitimate autonomy of 
doctors is technically limited to the clinic only (e.g. Tolliday, 1978) are 
clearly erroneous even if that is what the state would prefer. Despite the 
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introduction of arrangements to bring such a state of affairs into being 
there is little attempt by the NHS., or government administration, to claim 
that the medical profession is acting illegitimately when they do 
otherwise. This is an issue which I will return to in detail in the next 
chapter. 
Clearly the relationship between professional autonomy, organisational 
control and the state is complex. In figure 3.1 the relationships are 
presented in diagramatic form with regard to hospital doctors. The inter-
relationship between general concepts and the specific organisational 
arrangements is indicated by a dashed line (---) appropriately labelled 
(i.e. Hospital Service, Hospital in District). The interconnecting lines 
indicate the separateness of Institutional and Organisational control and 
the places, or points in the organisation and control of the labour process 
where they become contiguous and potentially enmeshed; as in the principle 
of 'clinical autonomy' as formally defined, with the emphasis of a division 
of responsibilities between technical expertise and administration (DHSS, 
1971 'Grey Book'; Tolliday, 1978). The relationship between the 'parts' is 
represented as being systemically dualistic, but it is not my intention to 
indicate that the two 'halves' of the system share some kind of equality. 
The best way of summarising the relationship between the two 'halves' of 
the diagram (Institutional and Organisational Control) is to say that the 
adminis tra tion make available the organisational setting but the 
doctors domina te the work processes carried ou t wi thin them. The diagram 
charts the context but not the detail of hospital medical work and 
consequently it does not analyse the organisation and control of the 
labour process (es) within hospital clinics. This aspect is to be discussed 
separately in the next chapter in terms of the consultants' functional 
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autonomy which as I shall argue is rooted in the routines and organisation 
of day to day clinic work (see pp.80-82). 
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INSTITUTIONAL. CONTROL ORGANISATIONAL CONTROL 
Implications for medical computing 
Returning now to the specific issue of computers in medicine. What is 
particularly relevant here is the issue of contested control. If we were to 
follow Whisler's approach then the introduction of computer-based medical 
in forma tion systems could be interpreted as a device to enhance 
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organisational control over the doctors, particularly in establishing 
standards of care as, for instance, measured in terms of the number of 
days particular types of patients are kept in hospital ('inpatient stay') 
relative to other consultants/hospitals. There is some evidence (e.g. 
Godber, 1964), as was shown in Chapter Two, that this might have been the 
case in the 'sixties when the impetus for the 1974 reorganisation of the 
health service was gaining momentum. However, neither the technology nor 
the organisational politics (in which I would include resource constraints) 
developed in a way that enabled such a strategy to be followed. Acceptance 
or rejection of the use of computer systems was, and remains, entirely up 
to the doctors themselves (although the financing of the systems does not 
(a point that is developed in connection with the case studies later). 
Furthermore, it is clear from the preceding chapter that generally doctors 
welcome systems that enhance their clinical abilities (e.g.Durie, 1984) but 
not those that they perceive as bringing about an encroachment upon their 
professional autonomy. 
Conclusions 
In this chapter the theoretical models underpinning the literature on 
medical computing has been critically examined. First, the predominant 
models were identified (diffusionist, systems and human factor) and then 
discussed wi thin their broader organisa tiona I framework. The discussion of 
organisational analysis demonstrated the limitations to the medical 
computer literature, in large part because of its lack of attention to the 
issues of power and control and the role these play in the introduction of 
new technologies. I argued, however, that the organisational models were 
themselves seriously flawed because they reified and oversimplified 
complex and variable work processes. This in turn led on to a 
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consideration of labour process analysis which, despite its own limitations 
concerning the integration of the analysis of work processes into a 
broader social analysis, can nevertheless be useful as a means of gaining 
theoretical leverage on the question of the usage and non-usage of 
computers by doctors, one which avoids simplistic notions of technical 
rationality and concentrates on the social and economic issues relating to 
the organisation and control of the work processes . 
••• 
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1. Other models have been used within the medical computing literature, 
but this does not alter the general point that it is the diffusionist, 
systems and human factor models that dominate this literature. 
2. The inherent Taylorism in systems design has led commentators within 
the socio-technical school to argue for the adoption of participative 
approaches to the introduction of new technology and systems design, 
most notable of these has been the ETHICS method (cf. Mumford, 1980). 
3. "A profession is not ... an occupation but a means of controlling an 
occupation." (Johnson, 1972, p.45) and a couple of pages further on 
" .. where a given set of social conditions is influential 
in affecting the development of occupations, there will 
emerge dominant institutional forms of control ... " (p.47 
emphasis added> 
4. The heuristic fiction 'systems' is being criticised here for its 
limitations as theoretical constructs, not in terms of any pragmatic 
use it may have, for example, in organising programmes of work, or 
designing computer programmes. 
5. The label social choice refers to the use of labour process analysis 
independently of wider marxian theory and concepts. 
6. The Alvey Programme aimed to develop industry-academic collaborative 
projects in advanced ('fifth generation') computer technology in order 
that the UK might remain competitive with Japanese developments 
(Alvey Committee, 1982; Feigenbaum and McCorduck, 1984, pp. 208-209). 
7. Parallelling the concept as used in A.!, <Fitter and Sime, 1980, p.6t> 
8. Mckinley, by contrast, does argue that proletarianisation is taking 
place within US medicine with the doctors losing out to the 
administrators (1982). • •• 
CHAPTER FOUR 
HOSPITAL DOCTORS, PROFESSIONAL 
AUTONOMY AND THE CONTROL OF MEDICINE 
Introduction. 
This chapter marks the end of Part I of the thesis. The purpose of 
Part I has been to to have set out the issues and develop the theoretical 
framework necessary to understand the material analysed within the case 
studies reported in par tIl. My concern has been to se t ou t ma t ters 
directly rela ting to the organisa tion and con trol of the medical labour 
process within the NHS hospital service, and to discuss the implications of 
the introduction of information technology as automated systems of 
control. This chapter completes this task without any further discussion of 
the question of computers because its twin foci of concern are the 
organisation and control of medical work within the hospital clinic and the 
role of the state in relation to to this work. These topiCS, which were not 
discussed in the previous chapter, require elaboration before moving on to 
present the case studies in Part II 
The primary purpose of this particular chapter will be to extend the 
theoretical model developed in Chapter Three in order to provide the 
necessary conceptual linkage between the structural, institutional and 
processual dimensionsllevels of the medical labour process. My approach 
here will be to explore the nature of the dominant role of hospital 
- 79-
doctors within the division of labour associated with clinical care <i.e. 
clinic work) through two lines of enquiry, addressing: 
(a) clinic work as a social process 
<b) the politics of medical autonomy and dominance 
The discussion of clinic work is intended to demonstrate how the concept 
of ins titu tional con trol and the organisa tion and con trol of cEnic work 
can be theoretically linked to and incorporated within a labour process 
model. It includes a consideration of the role of the medical record, for 
this documen t plays a crucial, if peculiar, role in ensuring t~e 
consultants' control of clinic work, while being <potentially at least> a 
candidate for automation (see Chapter Two). The political dimension is 
examined 1n order to demonstrate that the 'frontier of control' (Goodrich, 
1975) in relation to the organised medical profession is not a fixed one. 
In order to examine this issue I focus on the question of medical audit 
because of the importan t role it has played in the deba te:=, and 
negotiations relating to the issue of medical autonomy and accountability. 
In addition, it also enables me to discuss the role of the state as the 
equivocal guarantor of the medical profession's autonomy and 
(institutional) control. 
The profession of medicine and medical work 
The medical profession in this country is constituted of specific 
institutions, namely the British Medical Association and the Royal Colleges 
(Parry and Parry, 1976). The membership of the profession covers hospital 
doctors, community physicians, general practioners, anaes the tis ts, 
pathologists, and radiologists (cf. Kc;rner (Third Report), 1984, Annexe I, 
pp.33-34). The profession is also stratified hierarchicaLy 9S between 
consultants and doctors in training grades, commonly reierred to as junior 
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doctors <Godber, 1969). Junior doctors are divided into four gra1es, House 
Officer, Senior House Officer, Registrar and Senior Registrar. House 
Officers are recently qualified medical graduates with ~y:)ica:ly less tnan 
12 mon ths experience of doctoring; by con tras t the senior regis trar can 
even be more qualified and/or experienced than many consultants waiting 
for an appropria te consultan tship to become availible. 
Sociological accounts of professionalism withb healthcare3s 
Illsley has pointed out, have since the early 'seventies tended to 
concen tra te on the issue of occupa tional con trol as opposed to expertise 
and altruism <1980, p.60). Notable examples here would be Freidson, 1971, 
Larson, (1977) and Johnson (1972). Freidson's structuralist definition of 
professional autonomy links together legal monopoly, restricted entry and 
the occupa tion 's dominance within the division of labour <Freidson, 1971, 
pp.135-137). This structural analyses, however, does not provide the means 
of analysing the na ture of day to day clinic work and it is necessary to 
interlink the processual 
professionalism in order 
<day to day work) and structural 
to more fully account for the 
e _emen ts of 
profession's 
autonomy. Doctors' independence from lay evaluation and control is also 
generated and sustained within the doctor-patient interaction of the 
medical encounter (Bloor, in Wadsworth and Robinson,1976, p.52). It is 
possible to interlink these two 'levels' of analysis by reference to the 
concept of functional autonomy, which Bloor adopted from Freidson <ibid.). 
In order to explain what is involved it is worth examining the studies 01' 
Bloor (1976 a and b) and Strong <1979; 1982). In both analyses the element 
that can be called 'functional autonomy' has been defined in terms that 
indicate a linkage between the institutional setting <of the clinic) .3nd 
the interaction between doctor and patient. 
Bloor's study concerned ear, nose and throat <ENT) clinics and his 
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conclusion was that it was the clinic 'routines' employed by the doctors 
that prohibited, or facilitated, participation by the patient (or, being a 
study of a childrens' clinic, the parent) <ibid., pp.66-67). Strong's 
findings, were broadly similar. Instead of analysing functional autonomy 
in terms of routines Strong focused on the way the type of institutional 
setting systematically gave rise to different types of doctor-patient 
relations, or role formats <1979, pp.6-10) - his analysis being informed by 
Goffman's frame analysis <ibid., pp. 10-13), The argument was that 
"(the) role format supplies merely a guideline of the overt 
form of events, not a detailed prescription.... (They) are 
not structures that totally determine action but are 
instead routinised, culturally available solutions which 
members (Le.doctors) 'use' to solve whatever problems they 
have at hand." <ibid., p.13). 
Strong in his 1982 paper developed the analYSis further in a way 
reminiscent of Johnson's typology of occupational control (Johnson,1972). He 
linked his typology of formats explicitly with the issues of power and 
medical authority. Bloor's analysis was less directly concerned with these 
structural aspects of the medical encounter, concentrating instead on the 
criteria that determines a doctor's decision to operate or not. But the 
point I wish to make here is that both researchers found that the 
variations in the doctor-patient relationship within the medical encounter 
both supported (reproduced) and were contained within structurally and 
institutionally determined ground rules. The doctors' freedom from 
subordination to the patient was the outcome of the organised autonomy of 
the medical profession (Freidson, 1971, p.136) sustained under the guise of 
institutionalised expertise (ibid., p. 137). In sum, it is possible to 
explain vari8tions in the functional autonomy exercised by doctors in the 
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clinic in terms of the interplay between the structural, institutional and 
processual elements which are neither universally constant nor randomly 
structured but, exhibit identifiable regularities. 
One aspect of clinicians' functional autonomy, not discussed in any 
detail by ei ther Bloor or Strong, concerns the role played by the medical 
record. This is a crucial (if ambivalent) document which links the medical 
encounter and the institutional structure of the health service and for 
this reason alone would require attention here. In addition, however, the 
medical record had initially been a primary candidate for computerisation 
within the NHS experimen tal compu ter programme although, in the even t, 
this failed to happen (see Chapter Two). Here then is a subject that con-
stitutes a critical interface between clinical practice and computerisation. 
For these reasons I now turn my attention to the subject of hospital 
medical records. 
The medical record 
The subject of the medical record is not one tha t has gained grea t 
sociological attention, although this has begun to change (Heath, 1982, 
pp.56-57). The interest that has been shown has not been with the records 
as sources of object i ve s ta tis tical da ta, bu t ra ther with the records 
integral role in organisational processes - hence their relevance here 
<ibid., p.57). The common feature of these studies has been the focus on 
the medical record as the substitute for the patient, for instance, 
II (m)any persons in ... hospitals, several who figure in 
decisions of grave importance, see the patient only 
through the oblique lens provided by the dossier and to 
them the patient has substance, a shape, a character, an 
identity based almost exclusively on what is recorded in 
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those files." (Erickson and Gilbertson, 1969, p.393) 
A t the same time it has long been known by those wi th an in teres t in 
medical records, whether doctors, administrators, or academic researchers, 
that the contents of the records are " ... usually inadequate and their 
structure chaotic. It may be impossible to find required information at 
811, let alone quickly and easily." (McIntyre,N. 1979, cited in Rees, 1981a., 
p.4). Yet the medical record, formally at least, is designed to be both the 
archival record of the patient's history and the doctors' clinical findings, 
as well as the documentary instrument coordinating the various disciplines 
involved in the patient's care and treatment e.g. laboratory investigations, 
nursing, paramedical and social work support (1). 
In their classic paper "'Good' Organisational Reasons for 'Bad' Clinic 
Records" Bittner and Garfinkel (1967)(2) demonstrated that clinical records 
are often of a cryptic nature and can only be 'read' with the 'insider 
knowledge' of the particular clinic concerned. Indeed the knowledge 
requirements necessary in order that the file can be deciphered are, 
according to the researchers, so complex that they leave the record 
decipherable only by a small coterie of cognescen ti, 
"In order to read the (record) without incongruity ... (one 
must) know and use knowledge (1) of particular persons to 
whom the record refers, (2) of persons who contributed to 
the record, (3) of the clinics actual organisation and 
operating procedures at the time the documents are being 
consulted, (4) of a mutual history with other persons -
patients and clinic members - and (5) of clinic procedures, 
including procedures for reading a record, as these 
procedures involved the pa tien t and the clinic members ... " 
(1967, p. 206) 
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According to these authors the underlying reason for this cryptic quality 
of the medical records is that of economy, that is, whether the collection 
of the information, in whole or in part, is deemed to be worth the effort 
by those involved <ibid., pp. 192-194). This was the major, but not the 
only, reason for the authors' also identified the desire to control the 
information available to the administration <"keeping the front office 
appropriately misinformed" ibid., p.194), as also being a relevant 
considera tion. This they saw, however, as having li t tle to do with the 
issues of power and control, acknowledging only that there were, 
" well-guarded team secrets of cliques and cabals in 
(the) clinics, as they are in all bureaucratically organised 
se t tings' (p.195, emphasis added> 
Instead they viewed the selection of data for inclusion within the medical 
record as being related to what was minimally necessary in order for the 
doctors' to function effectively <ibid., p.194). The authors argued that 
clinic records could be read either as a record of a "therapeutic contract" 
or as an "actuarial record", but in reality the two readings were 
irreconcilable (pp. 198). The capac! ty for the records to deliver accurate 
data for acturial purposes (i.e. aggregate analysis for administrative or 
research purposes) was very limited (to the point of being useless), 
because the definition of the record as a medico-legal theurapeutic 
contract was the one that took precedence and was the main rationale for 
the medical records; 
"In our view the contents of clinic folders (medical 
record) are assembled wi th regard for the poSSibility tha t 
the relationship may have to be portrayed as having been 
in accord wi th expects tions of sanctionable performances 
by clinicians' <ibid. p.199. Emphasis in the original) 
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in combination with a knowledge of the organisation of the clinic, that a 
clinician could reconstitute the information he, or she required, for either 
clinical, or legal, reasons <p. 206). <pp. 202-205). The clinical reader (the 
doctor) determined the meaning of the record according to the purpose to 
which it was being put. The technique, it was argued, was the same as a 
lawyer when he, or she, "makes a brief" from the evidence available (p.203), 
for the medical record file would contain a sufficient selection of items 
of information and clinical data to permit a case to be made, whether for 
clinical or medico-legal purposes (pp.202-205). This set of practices 
should not be read, it was argued, as being an attempt by doctors to 
misrepresent, or deceive anyone. According to Bittner and Garfinkel, the 
cryptic quality of the 'records' was "related to the demands of organised 
(clinical> practice" and not to any "personal considera Hons in advancing a 
cause" p.200). The point is an important one because it clearly indicates 
that the account was an analysis of normal arrangements and not an expose 
of bad pract ice. 
Despite not using the terms 'indexicality' and 'reflexivity' Bittner 
and Garfinkels' account clearly rests on the twin ethnomethodological 
concepts which mean, in summary, that meanings are dependant upon their 
situation, or practical context <indexicality) and are only comprehensible 
to the participants because they have the capacity to look back on their 
past activities (reflexivity). Indeed the concepts are intrinsically 
intertwined in the ethnomethodological account of social reality (Garfinkel, 
1967, pp.l-10j Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p.24-8). Reality is seen as a 
practical activity constructed, negotiated and acted out by the 
participants. Clinic records can be seen as one aspect of this social and 
organisational reality. The ethnomethodological account is, however, only 
par tiel , for there is no edeque te account of the role the clinic record 
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partial, for there is no adequate account of the role the clinic record 
plays in maintaining the configuration of power and control within the 
hospital and the clinics. 
Recently discourse analysis, with its concern for the written text 
(and the medical record is a written text) has become increasingly 
interested in the topic of language as an instrument of power and control. 
As J.B .Thompson pu ts it, "(1)t is this increasingly sociological turn which 
has made discourse analysis relevant to ... the study of ideology" 0984,p.99) 
including of course the ideologies of medical 'professionalism' (Larson, 
1977, pp.220-232). This development, however, has not been incorporated 
within ethnomethodological analysis for, as Thompson has pointed out (in 
discussing the work of Sacks et a1., 1974), these researchers still persist 
in being oblivious to the probability that the constructions of meanings 
are achieved within asymmetrical relations of power (pp. 117-118). 
In contradistinction to Bit tner and Garfinkels' analysis my own 
research leads me to argue that it is more appropriate to typify medical 
records, at least in the British context, as possessing implicitly, four 
medical rationales, (1) research, (ii) training and monitoring, (Hi> medico-
legal, and (iv) as a decision aid. These rationales will be explored in 
detail in relation to the case study of the outpatients' clinics computer 
system (Chapter Eight). For the moment it is sufficient for me to assert 
that it is the decision aid rationale that is the paramount one. To 
explain, a doctor uses the medical record (by writing entries, and reading 
items and documents contained within the file) to aid him- or her-self to 
come to a decision regarding the patient, in such a way that he or she is 
simultaneously able to maintain a social ascendancy within the encounter 
(cf Waitzkin and Stoeckle, 1976, p.265). In practice this has little to do 
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with the technical details of medical decision-making and more with what 
Bloor has called "those indiosyncra tically developed rules of thumb" <1976, 
p.45) that are nevertheless systema tic in their particularity <ibid. p.55) 
and are constructed with the intention of avoiding what Scheff has termed 
a Type 1 error ("to dismiss a patient who is actually ill") <1978, p.609). 
Unlike 'clerking', neither the criteria for the use of medical evidence nor 
the line of reasoning adopted are other than the doctor's own (based on 
medical knowledge and clinical experience). This means that the experienced 
doctor is freed from the need to follow a rigid format of history-taking, 
examination and investigations but can approach those facets of the 
medical encounter with considerable flexibility in order to save time and 
reinforce the patient's confidence in the chosen course of treatment. The 
use of the medical record in this way facilitates and represents an aspect 
of what Goffman has referred to as 'face-work' (1972) at least in the way 
it has been utilised by Strong, <1979, p.40) and is an integral part of the 
process of maintaining functional autonomy. 
There are also other lacunae of a more substantive kind in the 
Bittner and Garfinkels' account. Firstly, there is no attempt to present an 
analysis of the actual clinic notes themselves and as a result we have to 
take the authors' functionalist analysis on trust (see Rees, 19818, pp.6-7, 
for a similar point). Secondly, while indicating implicitly that variations 
will occur in the contents of different medical records, no attempt is 
made to find out whether there is any systematic variation, for example, 
between clinic members, whether in terms of sta tus or specialties. If one 
turns to more recent studies relating to clinic records, these issues do 
gain some recognition. Both MacIntyre (1976) and Rees <1981b), for example, 
in their studies, of antenatal and gynaecological clinics and of case note 
writing on inpatient wards respectively, clearly indicate that variations do 
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exist. In one case it is the difference between specialties that accounted 
for the variations (MacIntyre, 1976) while in the other was the difference 
in career status (Rees, 1981b). These factors are important when one is 
attempting to analyse the role and content of the medical record. It is 
possible, of course, that the psychiatric outpatient clinic which was the 
subject of the Bittner and Garfinkel study did not include sufficient 
variation of individual clinic members and disciplines for this aspect to 
be included in the account. 
In this section my argument has been that the medical record plays a 
crucial role in sustaining doctors' functional autonomy in the clinic, not 
simply as a record of patient diagnosis and treatment - for which purpose 
the file may well only have a limited usefulness - but as a device for 
controlling the medical encounter (see also Chapter 8). Therefore it is 
necessary to incorporate the subject within any analysis of functional 
autonomy. This is especially so when the research is concerned - as it is 
here - with the question of doctors' responses to the introduction of 
computer-based medical information systems. The reason being that medical 
records constitute the doctors' manual medical information system and will, 
implicitly if not explicitly, influence (or be affected by) the introduction 
of any computer-based system. 
Now that the relationship between medical record and functional 
autonomy has been established it is possible to turn to the broader aspect 
of medical autonomy concerning the relationship between the profession of 
medicine and the state. I shall concentrate on the issue of professional 
accountability and, in particular, the topic of medical audit. My 
justification for this is that medical accountability and audit have been 
key areas of negotia tion between the profession and the Bri tish a t leas t 
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since the 'sixties and, moreover, they impinged directly on the question of 
the role of the medical record and its relationship to Functional autonomy. 
Hospital doctors. clinical management and medical audit 
Hospital consultants, as has already been indicated, enjoy almost 
complete alJtonomy (i.e. freedom from organisational control) in relation to 
their management of patients. Consultants, in turn, are formally 
responsible for the work of the junior medical staff (Godber, 1969). 
Medical autonomy is not, however, immutable and unchanging. It has largely 
been the outcome of explicit and implicit negotiations between the 
profession and the state. Other factors have also been involved, including 
changes in patients' expectations with the consequence, in the USA at 
least, to an increasing willingness among patients to sue their doctors for 
malpractice (Stimson, 1985, pp.147-148). In addition, other members of the 
hospital division of labour have also challenged the medical autonomy of 
hospital doctors and in particular its hegemonic effects on the division of 
labour (Elston, 1977; Manson, 1977. pp.195-214) 
Some of the concerns informing state policy were particularly clear-
ly articulated by George Godber, the Chief Medical Officer until the early 
eighties. He argued that traditional assump-tions about medical autonomy 
required revision and the reasons he gave were, 
(a) changing pa t terns of diseases, 
(b) increased medical specialisation and 
(c) increased application of high technology to medicine. 
These three developments necessitated, he argued, a more 'collective' 
interpretation of medical autonomy. Chronic illness, increasingly the major 
concern of the health services, necessitated an integrated service over 
time, at least if the problem was to be effectively treated. Similarly, 
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specialisation and the use of high technology in medicine necessitated 
extensive cooperation between the hospital specialist and a whole range of 
other skilled and professional personnel (Godber, 1975, pp.85-106). Academic 
analyses were also coming to similar conclusions, and a good example here 
would be Elston's analysis (1977). The most important difference between 
the two accounts was that Elston considered that the general developments 
were to be having an eroding (rather than a modifying) effect on the 
doctors medical autonomy. She too pointed out the effects of changes in 
population and morbidity patterns as well as extending her analysis to 
include considera tion of the challenge of other health service workers 
and the pressure from the junior medical staff for better pay, conditions 
and prospects which were not central to Godber's considerations. In the 
event, while the organised profession did have to respond to these 
developments the net result was that medical autonomy within the 
institutions of healthcare remained undiminished. This is not the same, 
however, as saying that the autonomy had been unchanged for, while the 
functional autonomy of the doctor-patient relationship was not affected, 
institutional autonomy was subjected to continuous negotiations and modi-
fications from the mid 'sixties onwards. In the event the biggest challenge 
to the medical autonomy of the profession proved to be the issue of re-
source constraints (Elston,1977, p.30 and p.44). Doctors, both individually 
and collectively, were increasingly expected to become more cost conscious 
and consultants were pressurised to accept responsibility as resource 
manlJ8'9rs and responsible for the cos ts of running their particular clinics 
(Garner, 1979, pp.114-117; Merrison, 1979; Griffiths Report, 1983, para.8.2). 
The limits of professional autonomy and medical audit 
The particular issue that brought together the issue of professional 
accountability and systems of control <including computer-based systems) 
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and, at various points, linked them to the issue of resource constraints 
was that of medical audit. Therefore, looking at this allows us to explain 
the broader character and parameters of professional control. This subject 
is explored here through an analYSis of the historical developments of 
medical audit in Britain over the last twenty years, from the time of the 
introduction of 'divisionalisation' into hospital medicine ('Cogwheel', 1967a 
and 1967b). This history will be dealt with in terms of the concepts of 
institutional and organisational control as developed in Chapter Three. 
There will be a brief digression in order to present an account of the 
developments in the United States, necessary in order to clarify the nature 
of medical audit, for it is from that country that the British profession 
learn t of the subjec t. 
The term medical audit is a general one which covers a plethora of 
techniques rela ting to the evalua tion of medical care. The term 'audit' has 
been seen by some advocates within the medical profession to have 
connotations of an external assessment in a manner paralleling the 
practice of accountants. This has led to the common practice within the 
profession of using the more anodyne term of 'quality assurance' <Duncan, 
1980; Shaw, 1980a, pp.1256-1257). This practice will not be adopted here 
and 'medical audit' will be used as the generic term. 
Medical audit origina ted in the USA with the American College of 
Surgeons (ACS) national standardisation programme for hospitals as far 
back as 1919. The roots of the movement can be traced back directly to the 
Flexner Report on medical education of 1910 (Maynard,1978) and reflected a 
real concern regarding the often inadequate arrangements for both the 
quality of patient care and the organisation of doctors within American 
hospitals at that time (Roemer and Friedman,1971, pp.36-37). It was also 
the case, however, that the ACS programme was one of self interest being 
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the response of the private interest of the doctors to the competitive 
anarchy of the market in medical care in the USA at that time. By imple-
menting the national standardisation programme the ACS was able to en-
hance the status and income levels of its members (cf. Maynard, 1978, p.l>. 
Originally medical audits were little more than case meetings where 
the management of the patient was discussed. In the case of surgical 
specialities mortality and morbidity meetings would be organised. Such a 
meeting was sometimes known as the 'Death Round'. In practice these 
meetings appeared to have functioned less as an audit and more as a 
carthetic exercise for those involved (Arluke, 1977; Millman, 1977>. While 
these meetings still take place medical audit methodology in the United 
States has become more sophisticated. Instead of reviewing individual 
cases, explicit, written criteria for judging the adequacy of the care 
provided was now established beforehand by the senior medical staff for 
the medical audit committee. The medical records staff had the 
responsibility for monitoring the clinical records and when discrepancies 
were found they brought them to the attention of the medical audit 
committee (Sanazaro, 1974; Shaw, 1980b). The formal requirement was that 
doctors found to be consistently substandard in their work were 
recommended for remedial education (Sanazaro, 1974), 
This more sophisticated criteria method of audit is premised on a 
systems model developed initially by Donabedian (1966), The model 
comprises of three key elements, structure, process and outcome which 
together defined the components of medical audit within modern medicine 
(see Figure 4.1>, The methods of medical audit generally preferred by the 
profession, in Britain as well as the USA, were those concerned solely with 
the 'process' element, which referred only to the clinical care directly 
under the doctors control. In contrast to process, 'structure' referred to 
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the setting in which the clinical care took place; the facilities and 
equipment. qualifications of staff, administrative and technical support and 
suchlike <ibid .• pp.169-170)' 'Outcome'. as the name suggests, referred to 
whether. and how well the patients recovered. This compartmentalisation of 
the major components of health care meant, however. that the medical care 
(process) is viewed as being central to the whole system and 'structure', 
including the work of nursing and paramedical staff, as well as 'outcome' 
can only be treated as residual factors. There have been debates 
surrounding the issue of 'outcome' and its measurement that have threaten-
ed the ascendancy of process evalua tion (e.g. Cochrane. 1971; Hlsley, 
1980). But a major practical problem is that outcome studies are notor-
iously difficult to carry out. Tracing expatients, for example, is difficult 
and usually expensive. Furthermore. in cases of chronic illnesses the 'out-
come' may be more a matter of the alleviation of suffering rather than 
whether the disease has been cured or not and the alleviation of sUffer-
ing is very difficult to objectively measure (Cochrane, 1971; Illsley. 1980; 
Butler and Vaile. 1984). It is also the case. as Cochrane has clearly shown. 
many 'outcome' studies indicate that at least some medical procedures are 
less effective than might be supposed (op cit). Similarly. the Scottish 
Home and Health Department has reported that more than one third of all 
pa tien ts were dead wi thin two years of leaving hospital and if they were 
not dead. the medical condition in over a half of the discharged patients 
was unimproved (quoted in Garner, 1979. p.114). It is hardly surprising, 
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therefore, that those in the medical profession that supported the intro-
duction of medical audit tended to favour the 'process' varieties (includ-
ing Donebedian,1966, p.168), for these audits were not overtly concerned 
with ou tcome. Clinical work is the 'in terven tion' in the disease process and 
by focusing on this aspect alone had the effect of drawing attention away 
from the condition of the patient (i.e. outcome). Moreover, with process 
audits, the doctors define the rules of performance themselves. 
Medical o~anisation and audit in Britain 
Prior to the publication in 1967 of the two reports, later known as 
'Cogwheel' <1967a and b) there was little obvious interest among the 
medical profession in medical audit. At the same time the Department of 
Health was commit ted to challenging the profession on the issue of the 
cost and effectiveness of medical work. The challenge first became public 
with the 'Cogwheel' recommenda Hons concerning the organisa tion of medical 
work in England and Wales (1967a) and Scotland (1967b)' Both reports 
recommended the introduction into the NHS of a "divisional system of 
staffing similar to that widely used in North America ... " (BMJ., Leading 
Article, 1967), although it was only the Scottish report that contained any 
specific reference to medical audit (ibid). Nevertheless, even the 
'Cogwheel' report for England and Wales <1967a) made speCific reference to, 
" the review of hospital bed usage against the background 
of community needs, the organisation of outpatient and 
inpa tien t services (and), the review of clinical practice,". 
(Quoted in Forsyth, G. et a1., 1971, p.5. emphasis added). 
It was hardly surprising that the leading articles in the BMJ on the week 
of the reports publication did express concern that, whilst the divisional 
system (3) might well promote the, 
"more efficient use of beds, staff and equipment. The 
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danger is that a doctors freedom to treat his patients as he 
sees fit <clinical autonomy) may be eroded by the adoption of 
uniform regiments of management" (op cit). 
In short, the essential ingredients of an institutionalised system of medical 
audit (the review of clinical practice) was contained within the 'Cogwheel' 
reports. 
In practice the divisional system recommended by the 'Cogwheel' reports 
was often no more than groupings of the traditional consultan t-led 'firms '. This 
led one hospital doctor, at least, to comment in a letter to the BMJ., 
"One has been encouraged ... to find as expected, that there are 
many ways of playing Cogwheel - by various paper schemes ... 
designed to satisfy the administrators ... " (BMJ., 30th January, 
1971, p.29) 
In rather less cynical terms, Forsyth came to a parallel view that the 
reorganisation of hospital doctors into divisions had not necessarily led to the 
development of better controls over costs and quality of medical care. This he 
argued was because the doctors and others involved did not always fully 
accepted their new responsibilities <1971, pp.41-43). 
The profession's s trB tegy 
Neither the BMA nor the Royal Colleges recommended, or accepted, the kind 
of medical audit contained within the 'Cogwheel' Reports. Any development of 
medical audit during the latter half of the sixties was entirely of a local and 
VOluntary kind (4), Medical audit did not emerge as a major issue for the 
organised medical profession un til 1971. And it did so because the profession 
was becoming disquieted by the lack of discussions between themselves and the 
Department of Heelth over the then proposed reorganisation of the NHS. In the 
words of a leader writer in the BMJ, 
" ... there is ... serious concern among doctors about the vidual 
And further on, 
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exclusion of the health professions from the management in the 
reformed NHS. They are concerned lest clinical care will take 
second place and patients will suffer... Medicine is not the 
same as business ... " 
" If the Consultative Document ("Grey Book",1971) is translated 
into legislation, then the Health Service is destined to have 
management based on cost effectiveness 
provide good medical care ... " (BMJ., 
Leading Ar ticle, 1971 a emphases added). 
It is not the way to 
It was in this pre-reorganisation period <1971-74) that the organised 
profession, or at least its leadership, at the British Medical Association (BMA), 
began to recognise the potential of medical audit as a basis of a counter 
strategy to thwart that of the state. The medical profession considered the 
proposed NHS reorganisation, at least in part, as constituting an unwarranted 
encroachment into a doctors proper area of autonomy; the organisation and 
control of medical work. This was no doubt in part because they were becoming 
concerned that if the profession did not take the initiative the DHSS would. The 
profession, for example, had to be reassured by the Permanent Secretary to the 
DHSS that the term "monitoring" which is used in the "Grey Book" <1971> (the 
consultative document relating to the NHS reorganisation) "did not entail the 
right to give orders (to doctors)" (BMJ Supplement 16th December, 1972, p.97) 
and later the BMA was able to tell its members that the new specialism of 
Community Medicine would not be used to operate as a system of clinical audit 
<W Supplement, 3rd February, 1973, p.29). 
One can clearly trace the rise and fall of the medical audit strategy of 
the organised profession in the pages of the BMJ. On the 20 th November, 1971 
the journal contained a leader article and the first of a series of (three) 
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articles which directly linked the then proposed reorganisation of the NHS with 
the issue of medical audit. The 'leader' was concerned with a book of essays. 
edited by G. McLachlan. entitled "Challenge for Change". Whereas previously the 
leaders had tended to emphasise the perceived excesses of the reorganisation 
proposal (e.g. BMJ. 1971a quoted above) this one asked. "But is what the 
Government has proposed ."enough?" and with reference to the introduction of 
the book argued for the then proposed reorganisation to become more than simply 
a reordering of management structures and functions. The leader writer clearly 
wanted the agenda of the book's authors. brought to general notice within the 
profession. 
"In their introduction ... (the editors) put forward four proposals 
which specially merit the professions attention: 
(l) to develop a philosophy of health services ... without 
political or professional bombastj 
(2) to develop 'series of objectives for the NHS ... j 
(3) the moni toring of the quali ty of heal th carej .. 
(4) the development of a coherent manpower policy" 
(BMJ Leader Article 1971 b. p.443. emphasis added> 
Here we have for the first time. medical audit being advocated as the means of 
defending the interests of doctors. The argument developed in the article was 
that if the profession could make "their concerted views. based on thorough 
research,,, continuously availible to local and central health authorities" they 
were more likely to be able to "claim " a bigger share of national resources 
for the NHS ... " (ibid.). In other words medical audit was being promoted within 
the profession as a means of defending their interests and not as a means per 
se of improving the efficacy of medical diagnosiS and treatment. although 
improvements in medical care might follow. 
A primary reason for this proposal was tha t doctors were being cri ticised 
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by the DHSS for the problems clinical freedom gave rise to in relation to 
forecasting the annual budget of the NHS <ibid; Garner, 1979, p.30). The leader 
writer's response to this claim was to argue for a system of medical audit 
controlled by the profession, for it was the doctors' 
"collective duty to suggest improvements in health care, within 
resources likely to be available ... " (ibid. Some emphases added>. 
This notion of professional responsibility, which relates to concern for the 
interests of the institution rather than the individual patient is a point 
doctors have not often made. 
The actual strategy adopted by the BMA was not in the event a very 
coherent one. The problem was a lack of organisational unity within the BMA. The 
Association's leadership attempted to overcome this difficulty, which was a 
general one, by reorganising the BMA. The problem for the leadership was that 
the Association's Council had few executive powers and was considerably 
constrained by the Representative Body (of the membership) in its negotiations 
with the government particularly during the period of reorganisation of the NHS. 
The BMA attempted to remedy this by instigating its own reorganisation, Sir Paul 
Chambers was asked to investigate and make recommendations. This he did and the 
resulting report appeared in a BMJ Supplement (6th May, 1972, pp.45-67>. The 
changes in the balance of powers between the Council and the Representative 
Body may well have had some effect on the efficacy of the organisation of the 
BMA, but if it did the issue of medical audit was an exception. The reason for 
this was that while the leadership (the Council) of the SMA were willing to 
accept medical audit in a number of forms (so long as it was totally under 
medical control) the membership took a very long time to be convinced. 
From 1972 onwards the issue was discussed in one form or another at the 
Annual Representatives Meetings of the BMA and specifically from 1977, but it 
was not until 1981 was the policy of promoting medical audit organised and 
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administered by the medical profession finally accepted (5) des it th , pee 
leaderships known preference on the matter over a number of years. This lack of 
firm policy and commi tmen t gave rise to cri tic isms wi thin the report of the 
Royal Commission (1979). 
Other pressures 
Pressure for doctors to be accountable for their mistakes has taken a 
number of forms over the last twenty years. The leadership of the profession 
intended the introduction of medical audit to be the means of defusing these 
various threats to the doctors' autonomy. 
The profession was being made aware, by the early seventies, that there 
was considerable public and political pressure for doctors to be more answerable 
to the state administration (ultimately the government minister and parliament) 
for the quality of medical care delivered, particularly in the cases where 
mistakes were believed to have been made. There was between 1971 and 1975 the 
publication of three government reports that in different ways were concerned 
with 'medical mistakes', these were, 
(a) the committee of enquiry into Farleigh Hospital <1971> 
(b) the "Report of the Committee on Hospital Complaints Procedure" 
(Davies Report, London, HMSO, 1973) 
(c) The Committee of Inquery into the Regulation of the Medical 
Profession (Merrison, 1975) 
These three reports were in varying degrees evidence of the concern of the 
administration and other interested parties that doctors were too well protected 
against the complaints of patients, and others. To explain, the 'Far leigh Enquiry' 
recommended the appointment of a Health Service Commissioner ('Ombudsman'). The 
recommendation was implemented towards the end of 1972. Although the powers of 
the 'Ombudsman' did not extend initially to matters of clinical judgement 
(autonomy) this did change in 1981 when, in Klein's words, a "compromise was 
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cobbled up" <1983, p.163) which permitted complaints into the quality of medical 
treatment to be investigated although only in a form totally controlled by the 
medical profession <ibid. pp. 84 and 163). The BMA at the time of the report of 
the original enquiry experienced a sense of 
"'grave disquiet' over many of the details. (and) did not 
believe that any convincing case had been made in favour of 
appointing a commissioner ... " (BMJ Supplement, 29th January,1972, 
pp.29-30). 
Nevertheless the 'Ombudsman' fared better than the recommendations of the 
'Davies Report' which called for internal reforms. This report was an attempt 
"(T)o provide the hospital service with practical gUidance in 
the form of a code of principles and practice ... (relating to) 
matters affecting patients which go wrong in hospitals ... " (p.3, 
para. 1.1.) 
This guidance principally concerned the 'overhaul' of the system of handling 
complaints from patients and their possibly litiguous consequences. In addition, 
and pert in en t to the issue of medical audit, the report also recommended tha t 
the system of external checks available through the services of the Health 
Service Commissioner, the Community Health Councils and the Hospital (now 
Health) Advisory Service should have their "functions, powers and constitutional 
status reviewed and ... reformed or supplemented as necessary" <ibid. p.l04, 
para 60). This report despite being nominally aCCf~pted by the government was 
never implemented. Not only did the BMA oppose it but apparently no major group 
within the NHS lobbied for its implementation (Martin, 1984, pp.151-154). 
Turning now to the Merrison Committee (1975), initially the organised 
profession (institutional control> was concerned that this committee might 
recommend a system of medical audit not fully under medical control (cf. BMJ 
5\,\pplement 23rd June, 1972, p.133). For this reason the BMA called a Special 
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Annual Represen ta ti ves Meeting (ARM) that year to consider their evidence to 
the committee of enquiry. The problem for the BMA was that if they simply said 
that there were already sufficient safeguards to maintain the professional 
competence of doctors the Committee might not believe them. Yet if they said 
that outside regulations were unnecessary because the profession was already 
dealing with the ma t ter and were in the process of se t ting up its own commit tee 
of enquiry (see below) then that might also be seen as an admission that new 
forms of regulation and monitoring were required in the profession. The BMA 
were clearly pessimistic regarding their powers to convince. The dilemma for the 
profession, however, was not a very real one. By the December of that year 
(1973) Dr Merrison was seeking the advice of the BMA on the ques tion of 
'competence to practice' (one aspect of medical audiO. The BMA chose to respond 
by telling Dr Merrison, possibly in less tortuous prose, that, 
"an advanced stage was being reached in preliminary 
arrangements for setting up the professions inquiry into the 
subject. Dr Merrison would be advised as to its progress" (BMJ 
Supplement, 22nd December, 1973, p.86) 
This the Merrison Committee found satisfactory and were quite prepared to leave 
the matter of the "surveillence of doctors compe tence" (BMJ, 26 th April,1975, 
p.156) wholly in the hands of the organised profession. The Committee touched 
upon this matter in terms of 'relicensure' (6) commenting only that, 
"We do not wish to prejudice the consideration of schemes of 
relicensure, especially because the medical profession is in fact 
mounting its own inquiry in this field.,," (Merrison, 1975) 
This internal committee of enquiry into "Competence to Practice" of the 
organised medical profession. The Committee was chaired by E.A.J.Alment 
(Consultant Obstetrician and Gynaecologist> and had 19 members j 7 were from the 
SMA., 7 from the Royal Colleges plus 4. more representing medical education and 
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postgraduate training (Alment,1976, Appendix 1; BMJ Supplement 27th April, 1974, 
p.30). 
Too 11 t tle too 1a te 
The Alment Report can only be described as anodyne, although the BMJ 
leader preferred to diplomatically ask, "Do these proposals go far enough?" and 
go on to point to the reluctance of some clinicians to change their ways and 
the DHSS's desire for clinicians to be responsible for the rationing of the 
limited resources availible for medical treatment (BMJ Leader, 'Separating the 
Sheep from the Goats', 20th November, 1976). This intertwining of the issues of 
clinicians' responsibilities for the quality and costs of medical care were to 
become increasingly pronounced, and certainly so after the Royal Committee's 
report (1979) (see below) 
On the specific issue of medical audit the Committee found 'peer-group 
reviews' and 'self assessments' acceptable so long as they were solely for 
educational purposes and no sanctions were "deployed against those who appear 
to do less well than their colleagues" <ibid. p.55,para.9.12). Medical audit was 
thought to be "threatening to a professional" for the establishment of "norms" 
of good practice might be interpreted as rules for doctors to obey. Furthermore, 
these "norms" might be used by "employers and others to serve their own 
purposes"." <ibid., p.37,para. 6.9). It was recommended that peer reviews should 
be encouraged by the Royal Colleges and their faculties who should also carry 
out such activities (p.39, para. 6.14). This the 'Colleges' did and the results 
were subsequently reviewed in 'Reviewing Practice in Medical Care' (McLachlan, 
1981). Alment in the Prologue to this book indicated that the major reason for 
the cautious tone of his report was that the committee was concerned to avoid 
internal polarisation and antagonism within the wider profession. The committee 
had also been at pains to point out that a high standard of care was dependent 
on the "level of resource availability" (ibid., p.55, para. 9.8) which was not seen 
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as being the responsibility of the doctor. They argued instead that "there is a 
level of resource availability below which doctors are not able to provide 
reasonable standards of care" (ibid., p.30, para 5.20). 
8aulking at these twin issues of quality and costs weakened the organised 
profession's influence in determining the future of the NHS, as the subsequent 
Royal Commission (Mer rison , 1979) and the more recent organisational 
restructuring <Griffiths Report,1983) have indicated (see above). In short, the 
organised profession had great difficulty in 'cobbling together' a workable 
consensus and was in a state of some disarray on these issues long after 
publication of the Merrison Report (1975). This inability to develop and sustain 
a coherent policy on these issues was to have its implications for the 
profession when it again came under public scrutiny in the form of the Royal 
Commission which reported in 1979 (Merrison,1979). The 8MA was unable to gain 
formal membership support until the appropriate motion was passed at the ARM in 
1981 (see above). This only added to the leadership's problems and in its 
evidence to the Royal Commission the SMA were forced to equivocate over the 
issue of medical audit, com men ting tha t "its place ... in health care is still 
controversial" but if it was to be inevitable it should be carried out by the 
profession as a whole (BMJ Supplement, 29th January, 1977, p.301, para. 2.5>. The 
SMA also regretted "any suggestion that there should be 'medical audit' by the 
state" (ibid.). The Royal Commission had reservations about the medical 
professions will, if not its ability, to implement medical audit, for they 
commented, 
"".(W)e are not convinced that the professions generally regard 
the introduction of audit or peer review ... with a proper sense 
of urgency" (Merrison, 1979, p.176, para. 12.56) 
and recommended that, 
" (A) planned programme for the introduction of audit or peer 
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review... should be set up for the health professions by their 
professional bodies and progress moni tored by the heal th departmen ts" 
(ibid., p.370. para.63, emphasis added) 
The report also favoured doctors becoming their own resource managers and 
holding their own budgets - a proposal currently being implemented as part of 
the Griffiths reorganisation (1983). The overall tenor of the commissions report 
was that the profession would be required to give up some of its institutional 
control and for doctors to accept greater organisational control. 
Medical audi t: the ou tcome 
The medical audit strategy of the leadership of the medical profession was 
intended to bring about the introduction of an effective system of peer review 
with the objective of ensuring the maintenance and improvement of the quality 
of clinical care within hospitals without reference to costs. There were those 
in the profession who supported this developmen t as desirable in itself, bu t the 
principle aim of the strategy was to prevent, or make unnecessary, the 
introduction of externally designed control systems aimed at making hospital 
consultants more accountable to third parties (including the state) than 
previously either for medical mistakes or resource management. This strategy, as 
we have seen, never wholly cohered. This was largely because the membership 
were unconvinced of the merits of medical audit either as practice or policy as 
evidenced by the fate of the recommendations of the Alment Report and the BMA's 
inability to get formal support in time to counter criticism from the Royal 
Commission into the NHS of 1979. Even so, the strategy of the profession's 
leadership did postpone for over a decade any serious negotiations between 
themselves and the state administration over the matter of controlling clinical 
costs. 
The long term managerial strategy of the state administration has been to 
attempt to incorporate hospital consultants more fully within the system of 
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o~anisational control. Earlier attempts to introduce a greater measure of 
medical accountability associated with the introduction of the divisional system 
of medical organisation of 1967 and the NHS reorganisation of 1974 were 
unsuccessful because no way was found to breach the profession's monopoly 
control of medical work. The DHSS (the state), and others that Klein (1983) has 
referred to as the paternalistic rationalisers wanted hospital consultants to 
become explicit resource managers. But it has been the market reformers, to 
adopt Alford's term (1972), who have brought about the changes in the NHS aimed 
at limiting the autonomy of hospital consultants by insisting they take 
responsibility for their clinic budgets (resource management). 
It was the KBrner Committee, set up to examine and make recommendations 
regarding the basic information systems required for effective management of 
the service (discussed in Chapter One), that re-established the issue of clinical 
budgeting as part of NHS policy <DHSS ('Klkner') The First Report; the collection 
and use of information about hospital clinical activity, 1982). The Committee's 
recommendations were made mandatory by the Secretary of State in 1984 <BJHC, 
Summer, 1984, p.32) and reinforced by the recommendations of the Griffiths 
Report (1983), 
"Doctors should be closely involved in local management through 
the development of management budgets for which they would be 
accountable.... (Statement on the NHS Management Inquiry 
('Griffiths'): Tuesday 25th October, 1983, p.2 Secretary of State 
to Parliament) 
While the implementation of clinical budgeting has not proceeded very far, as 
yet, this development does show that the issue of doctors <i.e. hospital 
consultants) having responSibility for controlling clinical costs has remained on 
the administrations agenda for a considerable period of time. The medical audit 
strategy organised by the leadership. and some 'segments' of the profession 
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<Stelling and Bucher, 1973), has not changed that priority. While the doctors are 
not losing their dominant position in the division of labour of healthcare they 
have been, and remain, under considerable and sustained pressure to take 
managerial responsibility for their clinical budgets. It remains the case, 
however, that doctors collectively have never wanted the formal responsibility 
of allocating scarce and life sustaining resources according to financial 
criteria. It remains to be seen whether the formal requirements to adopt 
clinical budgeting will be carried through into practice, or whether the doctors 
will continue to prevaricate long enough for the circumstances to change 
sufficiently to become avoidable, or at least transmuted into ineffective "paper 
schemes" as happened with the Cogwheel arrangements (see page 96 above>. 
Conclusions 
This chapter has extended the analytical discussion developed in Chapter 
Three in two specific ways. Firstly it has identified some of the control 
fea tures of clinical (functional) autonomy as they are encapsula ted in the 
activity of note taking and the clinical record, and secondly it has discussed 
the lengthy debate between the organised profession and the state about the 
institutional framework of clinical autonomy which has centred on the issue of 
medical audit. Having set out the these features of the patterns of clinical 
(functional) and institutional <professional> autonomy, I can now turn to the 
specific case study investigations of computerisation to be presented in Part II . 
... 
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1. The medical record does not contain details of all aspects of t:"e 
patients treatment for the members of the sepera~e disci~~ines 
maintain also maintain their own recor·ds <e.g. nurses, social workers, 
physio- therapists, etc.). 
2. Organisational records have been a of interes t to the organise tional 
sociologist ever since Max Weber identified written documents <lithe 
files") as being a key characteristic of legal-rational bureaucracies 
<Weber, 1957 reprin ted in Gruskey and Miller, 1970, p.6. 'O.ee also 
Albrow,1970, p.44). There is however a fundamental difference between 
the Weber ian and the ethnomethodological analyses. Weber defined the 
role of the administrative records as an instrument of administrative 
control within monocratic systems of administration <i.e. bureaucracy), 
by contrast, Bittner and Garfinkels' analysis <1967> was concerned to 
show the limita tions of clinic (i.e. organisa tiona!) records as 
information systems for administrative purposes. 
3. The divisional system of medical organisation advocated by the 
'Cogwheel' reports <1967a & b) entailed the organisation of hospital 
doctors into 'divisions'. These divisions would normally be according 
to medical specialities, or clinical areas. The chairpersons of the 
divisions within a hospital, or group of hospitals, wou:"':' form the 
medical membership of the medical executive commi t tee. The re;)ort 
also stressed the necessity of the divisions liaising with nursing 
staff, other occupational groups and the administration within the 
health service. 
4 I do not refer to the various 'confidentia.l enquiries' some of which 
have been in existence for decades <e.g. The Confide,,>ial Enquiry 
into Maternal Deaths (Godber, in MacLachlan (ed),197(j'. whilst these 
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are directly rela ted to the principles of medical audit they have 
been very much a separate development. 
5 For items on medical audi t between 1972 and 1981 see BMJ 
Supplements for, 
24th June,1972, 
29th July,1972 
p.168. Motion 284, 
"Competence to Practice" 
"ARM Professional Standards" 
and p.133. 
13th August,1977, p.474 "From the ARM: Competence to 
Practice. 
17th June,1978 "ARM Agenda" 
14th July, p.143 "From the ARM: Medical Audit" 
14th June,1980, p.1467 "ARM Agenda" 
July,1980, pp. 24-3-244 
18th July,1981. "From the ARM: Medical Audit" 
The motions and debates 1973 - 1976 subsumed medical audit under 
other issues notably the Merrison Inquery. See for example "From the 
ARM: Competence to Practice" 23rd June,1973.p.133 and more generally, 
"BMA Special Representatives Meeting" 16th June,1973. 
6 'Relicensure' refers to a system of retraining or reeducation whereby 
doctors have their medical knowledge, and perhaps skills, updated at 
intervals. If a doctor fails such a course he, or she, could lose 
their license to practice medicine. However no such system exists in 
this country. And in the USA relicensure appears only to apply to the 
'impaired physician' (Stimpson, 1985) despite earlier pronouncements 
that relicensure would apply to all physicians (Sanazaro, 1974, p.274) 
... 
PART TWO 
CHAPTER FIVE 
METHODOLOGY AND THE RESEARCH PROCESS 
Introduction 
This chapter starts with an account of the 'natural history' of the 
research in order tha t the issues and the ethics of sponsorship and 
funding in relation to this research can be fully discussed. Only then, in 
the second half of the chapter, will the the methods used be discus:::.ed and 
their contribution to the final description and analysis be assessed. 
The natural history of the research 
My interest in hospital doctors and their usage of computers 
developed out of discussions I had with colleagues, Geoff Stanley and Tony 
Charles around 1979-1980. At that time they were carrying out research 
into the impact of a computer-based patient administration system at a 
district general hospital (DGH) (Charles and Stanley. 1983). It was from 
these discussions tha t I became aware for the firs t time the ex ten t of 
compu ter developmen ts wi thin the NHS. There was also at this time grea t 
interest in labour process arguments particularly as they applied to the 
analysis of manual or routine clerical work in the market sector (see 
Chapter Two). What particularly interested me was whether the tneory, in 
some form. could be utilised to analyse the labour process of NHS hospital 
clinics which. in contrast with industrial and clerical work, were. 
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(a) professional hierarchies, 
(b) wi thin non-market organisations, 
(c) in the public sector. 
It was not the doctor-patient relationship that principally concerned me 
but what Freidson has referred to as medical dominance <1970b), that is 
the central, and dominant, role of hospital doctors within the division of 
labour of hospital clinics. In this con text, I judged the issue oi the 
introduction of computer systems into hospital clinics to be an appropriate 
subject for study, for the following reasons, 
(1) the hospital clinics as a professional work se t ting 
presented a critical - or strategic - case for labour 
process theory. 
(11) computerisation had exercised the minds of many 
sociologists and others working within the labour process 
'tradition' (e.g Braverman, 1974-; Kraft, 1979; Glenn and 
Feldburg, 1979; Crompton and Reid, 1982) as well as many 
within the discipline of organisa tional theory (e.g. 
Whisler, 1970; Blau, 1970; Blau e tal, 1976) (see also 
Chapter Three). 
(iii) the substantive issue of computerisation could also be 
anticipated to be of some interest to those working within 
the prospective research settings and this interest could 
aid the process of negotiating research access. 
Bearing these points in mind I now turn to the discussion of the issues 
and difficulties involved in the selection of, and gaining access to, the 
research s1 tes. 
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Sponsorship and accomplishing access 
Access proved to be a difficulty. My first attempt, which was in 
1980, involved a comparative study of two professional groups (hospital 
doctors and computer specialists) within one hospital complex, but my 
request to the hospital authorities for permission to carry out the 
research was turned down {D. My subsequent attempts were more 
successful, largely because I took a more considered and circuitous 
approach to gaining research access. First, I found out what I could about 
some of the major computer manufacturers involvement in the NHS. This I 
did by interviewing members of their marketing organisations (IBM, ICL and 
NCR) (2). Second, I followed the advice of Dalton, but without the explicit 
deviousness in his method, in that I cultivated contacts ('intimates') 
within the health service and involved in hospital computing <1959 quoted 
in Gruskey and Miller, 1970 p.162). One of these people was particularly 
helpful in (a) telling me about the NHS computer experimental programme 
and its evalua tion and (b) directing me to two senior officers t one at 
region the other at the DHSS, directly involved in the NHS computer 
programme who might possibly be able and willing to assist me in 
identifying suitable sites for my research project. These two senior 
officers gave me a lot of information regarding the history, policies and a 
little on the politics of healthcare computing from a 'top down' 
perspective (i.e. regionally and nationally). One of them did give me the 
name and telephone number of a hospital consultant, Dr Old, who was at 
that time, just in the process of introducing a computer-based medical 
information system which is the subject of Chapter Eight of this thesis 
(below). This officer knew from talking with Dr Old (they were members of 
the same regional computer committee) that he was on the look out for 
someone interested in carrying out research into the doctors attitudes to 
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the computer system. 
All of these initial interviews were taped and fairly lengthy 
(typically 1\2-2 hours). My objectives were to find out about (a) the 
history of computer developments (and the involvement of the 
manufacturers), (b) the then current situation within the region as well as 
(c) to follow up leads that might lead to an introduction to a doctor or 
group of doctors in the process of introducing a computer system within a 
clinic or group of clinics within a hospital. The strategy did eventually 
work both in terms of a familiarisation process and as a means of building 
up contacts with a network of people directly involved with computer 
developments within the NHS and especially within the region. 
The first research site: st Giles Outpatients' Department 
I met Dr Old for the first time in May, 1981. The first meeting took 
the form of my interviewing him. In this way he was able to make his own 
evalua tion of my reques t to carry ou t research rela t ing to the 
introduction of the computer system he was about to introduce into the 
outpatient department of the hospital. Following my interviewing him he 
asked me to send him copies of any material that I may have published, but 
as I had none I sent copies of relevant student handouts. He then proposed 
in a letter that we collaborated on the research. This proposal initially 
flummoxed me as I was unsure what would be involved, whether it would 
constrain the fieldwork, raise problems of confidentiality (discussed below) 
or would limit my ability to publish details of the resulting research 
unhindered. What Dr Old intended by the proposal was that he could use the 
research for inclusion in any papers and articles he might publish as his 
own, while I might publish accounts of the research as and where I wished. 
Having clarified the matter I agreed to this rather odd collaborative 
arrangement; there were no plans to publish papers jointly. 
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Dr Old had been involved in developing medical computing for more 
than a decade. He had now become interested in gaining a better 
understanding of the psychology and sociology of the issues involved and I 
was the only 'half way decen t' social science researcher to show a direct 
interest his particular project despite his own contacts with a number of 
universi ties and researchers. I seemed to have had a certain scarcity 
value. To start with I entertained suspicions of Dr Old's motives in terms 
of his using me as a free research assistant, manipulating research access, 
and possibly restricting publication of any results. In the event none of 
this happened. We would argue and discuss methodology, the role of 
consultants, medical dominance, bureaucratic vs professional control, 
patients and the medical encounter, the role of community medicine, and of 
course developments in medical computing particularly the CORES system. 
There was never any attempt to influence my work or its interpretation 
except through argument and debate which was always very useful for me 
and did not prejudice my autonomy. One crucial aspect of the collaboration 
was that Dr Old won a research award in January 1982 for my work from 
the Region's Research Committee to cover my travelling expenses (3). 
To gain access to the hospital in order to carry out the research it 
was necessary for me to write to the chairperson of the CORES Steering 
Committee (Dr Old) requesting permission, stating my research intentions 
and methodology. Permission was granted in June, 1981. Dr Old also offered 
me access to the District's Computer and Information Advisory Group, which 
he also chaired, as an observer at about the same time. This allowed me to 
both understand the CORES project within the broader district context and 
monitor the decision making processes at district level regarding the 
CORES system. This latter arrangement was of little advantage to Dr Old 
-114-
but very useful to me. In short, this consultant was an extremely helpful 
(facilitative) gatekeeper and sponsor in providing access and supporr: for 
the research (cf. Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983, pp.63-68 and 72-76; 
Burgess, 1984, pp.194-197). Initially he had hoped the CORES project would 
prove to be a successful innovation but even when his consultant 
colleagues had stopped using the system he made no attempts to influence 
my work. In part this was because he found the conclusions intrinsically 
interesting both in terms of the account of collegiate solidarity and as an 
analysis of the use of medical records/clinical notes (and the relationship 
between the two with regard to the specific CORES project) (see Chapters 
Six and Eight). More fundamentally, however, Dr Old was committed to the 
precepts of good ethical practice in the conduct of research, I at least 
could not fault him. 
I did encounter one awkward problem in negotiating research access. A 
regional management services officer viewed my presence as a threat to his 
own project of developing a new system of computer evaluation. As a means 
of resolving this conflict of interest we negotiated a 'treaty' in which I 
would not interview secretarial or clerical staff (at least during the 
period of the officer's evaluation period of six months). At the time I did 
not see this as being more than of nuisance value. My larger concern was 
to maintain good and open communications with both hospital and regional 
staff. I had plans to carry out further research in the NHS. However, what 
it did mean was tha t research rna terial on the clerical and secre tarial 
s ta ff was gained by observa tion and in formal conversa t ions and 
questioning, not taped interviews. One result of this compromise was that I 
failed to monitor fully the reluctance of most of the medical secretaries 
to the implementation of the CORES system and this was a key reason why 
the data entry was carried out by clerks (see Chapter E~ht). 
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Comparative analysis 
Having organised the research for the CORES element of the project I 
needed to look for (an)other research site(s) for comparative purpos€s. At 
first I had seriously considered remaining with the single case study for 
it seemed to me to have particular strengths; it enabled me to study the 
variations between clinics and specialisms within the broader 
organisational framework of the hospital, health district and region. 
Moreover, I thought the study could be extended to include consideration 
of the involvement of the DHSS and the computer manufacturers in the 
development of medical computing generally. Another reason was that I 
believed that it would be quite difficult to include a suitable comparative 
case study (or studies) because, 
(a) medical computer system for use by hospital doctors were 
not in common use, 
(b) even if I did find a suitable site there was no guaran tee 
that the computer system would be implemented wi thin a 
time scale synchronous with my own research timetable. 
My general strategy would have been to put greater emphasis on the policy, 
decision making and politics of the relationships between doctors, health 
service and DHSS than, in the event, appears in this thesis. 
I came to realise over time and with prompting from my supervisors 
that a comparative element was needed on the grounds that, 
(a) the variety and types computer systems and doctors 
experiences could not be indicated from one case study and 
(b) it would at least enable an assessment to be made as to 
the uniqueness of the St Giles setting and the comparison 
would make possible the identification of any disconf1rming 
instances. 
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Without the inclusion of another case st'Jdy any conclusions drawn from the 
CORES case study would be limited. Only by comparing the St Giles case 
study with another site. or sites. would it be possible to begin to come to 
any general. theoretically informed. conclusions regarding the medical 
labour process and the implications of the introduction of information 
technology into hospital clinics. 
Given the qualitative design of the research it was not desirable to 
simply replicate the St Giles study. One of the main objectives was to 
search out disconfirming instances to the analysis and conclusions from 
the first case study. To do this most effectively I thought it best to find 
a hospital setting and computer system sufficiently similar to the CORES 
system to make comparisons meaningful but different enough in the clinic 
organisation. specialties and the computer system to be able to ascertain 
whether the labour process analysis, as applied to hospital doctors, had 
any general applicability. 
The selection of the comparative case studies 
The task of finding a comparative site proved to be very time-
consuming. Between January. 1982 and July. 1983. I explored the 
possibilities of three different systems for use by hospital clinicians 
before committing myself to the Renal System. It will be useful here to 
present, at least briefly. details of all the three systems considered for 
inclusion in order that (a) the methodological problems associated with 
finding an appropriate case study. or studies, can be discussed and (b) in 
order that the system selected for study might be understood within the 
broader context of the choice and variety of systems (then) being 
developed and introduced within the region 
1. The A & E System 
In January, 1982 I was told. during the course of an interview with 
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a senior adminis tra tor, of the exis tence of a compu ter- based Acciden t and 
Emergency (A & E) system being introduced within the region. I visited the 
Accident and Emergency Unit involved in the March (1982), was shown the 
unit and and computer system, met some members of staff and interviewed 
the consultan t concerned. The A & E sys tern was one the consultan twas 
familiar with having used it in his previous post which had been in 
another region. One of the main objectives of the system was to improve 
the system of patient records in the unit in order that patients and their 
injuries could be better monitored for patient management and research 
purposes. Under the manual system of patient records a new record card 
was made on every occasion a patient presented themselves for treatment. 
and there was no easy way of identifying the number of times a person 
migh t present themself or their child (ren) for trea tment. The main reason 
for this was that the unit, like all A & E clinics, was organised on the 
assumption that patient visits were exceptional not routine and once the 
immediate cause of the patient being presented had been dealt with the 
patient record was closed. Only patients transferred onto a ward or 
given an outpatient appointment would have their cases written up in the 
hospital medical records <1.e. in addition to the A & E unit's own records). 
There would not have been any difficulty in gaining research access 
to this site. As a comparative case study to St Giles, however, it was 
limited for the system only involved one consultant (plus the medical, 
nursing secretarial and clerical staff) in a single A & E unit and what I 
was looking for was a site, or sites, with several consultants using or 
committed to using a computer system in their medical work. 
2. Orthopaedics Information Retrieval System 
In December, 1982, I was made aware from references made to it at 
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the CORES Steering Group Meetings that the U)RES sys~em was alSO to be 
implemented in an orthopaedic hospital elsewhere in the region. ~ 
interviewed the consultant responsible for the systems introduction in the 
spring of 1983 and found out that six consultants intended to use the 
system for both clinical and research purposes. Moreover, the system was 
being introduced to replace and improve upon the pre-existing computer-
based medical information system that had been in existence for fourteen 
years. Again research access was readily arranged. 
There were two factors, however, that prevented this hospital 
becoming the comparative study. First, the system was exactly the same as 
that being used at St Giles, and therefore, presented no opportunity to 
compare variations between different types of computer-based medical 
information systems. Secondly, the timescale for implementation was 
inordina tely slow, and eventually <towards the end of 1983) I gave up the 
any idea of this site being included within the study. I continued to 
attended their computer project steering group meetings regularly unti~ 
about a year ago and have organised a separate research project at this 
site that started in 1987. 
3. The Renal Computer System 
Back in 1982 I was made aware from conversations with Dr Old, of the 
intention of the Regional Health Authority to fund and give technical 
support for the introduction of a region-wide computer system in the renal 
units. The proposal was to introduce a computer 'package' providing a 
comprehensive clinical data system to all of the five renal units in the 
region. 
My introduction to the consultant who had been responsible for 
introducing the system <Dr Earl) was made by Dr Old over the telephone and 
immediately followed up by my visiting the renal unit in July, 1983. The 
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relevance of this detail was that Dr Old and Dr Earl were in opposite 
'camps' in the then regional debate as to what computer system was to be 
used to support the Renal Computer System (see Chapter Six). Yet despite 
my association with Dr Old, Dr Earl was quite happy for me to carry out my 
research - he readily believed my protestations that I was not a 'fifth 
columnist', or a St Giles system 'mole' committed to undermining the 
credibility of the Renal Computer System but a hard working sociologist 
trying to complete a research thesis. Furthermore, this consultant was to 
be of great help to me in gaining the formal support I needed from the 
Regional Renal Computer System Steering Group in order to carry out the 
research at the renal units within the region. It was he who advised me 
who to write to as well as explaining my interest and involvement at the 
meeting (at which I would not be present). My interpretation of the 
reasons for Dr Earl's cooperation and support is as follows, 
(i) like many consultants, he was not antipathetic to research. 
(11) the renal unit for which he was responsible was to be the 'pilot 
site' for the system. It was to be evaluated by the region's 
management services division, but my project gave him the 
prospect of an independent research report. 
(11i> any report I might produce would not cost anything to the 
consul tan ts. 
I eventually came to accept that the renal computer system was to became 
the focus of the comparative case study, although the decision was not a 
clear-cut one for the timescale for the implementation of the system at 
all the five renal units was too long for the purpose of inclusion in this 
thesis. In the end (mid 1984) I compromised and included only the first 
two renal units to use the computer system in this study. 
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The case studies selected: simi.1arities and differences 
Clearly the selection of the Renal Computer System as the comparative 
study to the CORES system at the St Giles Outpatients' Department was, to 
large part, dictated by what was available. Pragmatism, however, was not 
the only criterion, for what was being sought were cases that offered 
contrasting settings to the various specialisms working within the 
outpatients' department. This was required in order to find out what was 
generalisable from the the specific work processes of the St Giles 
outpatients' clinics to medical work generally. To do this most effectively 
within a qualitative methodological framework it was necessary to find 
comparative sites and systems that contained elements that distinctly 
contrasted with the St Giles setting, particularly in relation to the clinic 
work processes and division of labour. The full list of the criteria for 
comparison is set out in Table 5.1 (below). These similarities and 
differences (see also Chapter Six, Figure 6.1) were such as to offer broad 
scope in examining, comparing and contrasting, doctors' methods of using 
different types of computer-based medical information systems within 
different specialties including importantly the intended and unintended 
consequences for the clinic labour process. Nevertheless, as quali ta tive 
research it would not be possible to make any universal generalisations 
from the subsequent research findings, but it could go some way to fill 
the hiatus within the medical computer literature in detailing the reasons 
why clinicians seemed to be generally reluctant to routinely utilise 
computer-based medical information systems (see Chapter Two). Moreover, it 
would be possible to identify disconfirminlJ instances - for example 
concerning the role of case notes within clinic work that might 
contradict the convential wisdom of those involved in developing computer 
systems for hospital doctors. Lastly, the field research was part of the 
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TABLE G ,1 CRrrERIA FOR COMPARISONS 
'I, 
2. 
3. 
The ca.. _tud:i.. w.,"'", broadly in tt-_ 
numb"r. 0" ' .... die .. l _t • .,., invc.lv_d. Tn.",.... "",.re e conaultan-t.s 
~lu_ 16 junior m_dical _t."" includ_d in -th_ CORES study and E. 
consul't."nt. 16 junior rn.dic .. l w ith1n "'t:J-a.. R_nal 
Comput.r System .tudy C ••• alwcl Tabl._ 6.2 and 6.3), 
exp_rirn_nt.al b •• i_ 
"",her.... .tt-•• F~_nlhl Comput.r Sy.1:.ertl w •• at tLu"nk_y system. Tf"-le 
two ay.t..I'nw w.r.~ ..... ow."'.r, .u'ffic:i.n-tly similar in d •• ign to 
w .. rr_Y'lt cornp .. o·":i-.c:.n. 
Th. coo,"dinat:lon and control 0" "t:.I-a. c:omputar 
pro.:: ••• w.s d;l."".r_"t :l.n th., ·twc. c: .... _.; t.t-._ CORES; system 
impl.rn."t_d unci .. , .. th_ di,".c:t:lon 0" • mult1-diaciplinary .t..rinQ 
4. Th. divi,.:iOl""\ 0" labour r.la.t.:Lng to tt-,_ data jn,:'tu-t and .cc; •• ,.inQ 
t.t--,. ay ... t..m.· C'LJ'tpu·ta Wah_ very dj"'''.rant in tJ-._ c ... e of tJ-._ two 
.y.t ........ 
S. Tn .. CORES say.t-.m :lnvolv.ct • number 0" medical ap.c:1iltlt:1e_, whi.l_ 
th.. R.,-,.l Computer Sy_t.am wa. de. ign_d and implemented w 11:J-1 in 
.. • :l.n.., 1. .I='_C ial i_Ill (, .... ".1 rn_d 1.:: in.). 
of .:12. and compl ... ><1ty, 
( .. ) th • .,irst un;i"t <H ..... mo) wa. employed a _mall_,... numb ... --
c." medic .. l ."d nursing .taf"f than tn_ •• c:c" .... d unit 
<O.:lalyai_ ."d T,".nsplant) 
<b) Th.. ·f irta1:. uy-.:l1:. o"'''' .. r_d h ... modi.lysis 1:J-._rapy o ..... ly 
whil_ the .... cc"'d also o'f.,. ..... d Contirll..lou_ Ambulatory 
P .... ito" ... l O:t.alys:i. (CAPD) .. nd ., .. ciliti __ "or kidney 
tran_p lan'1:a, tic ....... 
Thi_ ., .... ' .. th_r 1.ve1 cd' tcorrq:.:.ar .. tive analy_is gave .. richer taoxt.L.Ir_ 
to tt-.. "' ...... rch, 1'0r :it w .... tn .. , .... pes.ibl_ to cornp ... ra bet""" •• " 
( i ) (Sit 
EI:l.l_.), 
(1:1) betw_.n the .am_ ap .. c::l.lkl1arn in di-f"'eren"t ._tting_ (th. 
two ren .. 1 units) ."d~ 
(iii) B_t",,".n di·'-f.ren"t. .ptDc:1ali.rns .. t di.,.,.,~.nt _ita. cSt 
911._ and. r_nal unit 
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broader research strategy of evaluating and revising labour process theory 
and in this role the research would contribute to the broader debates 
within sociology and organisational theory. 
Funding and sponsorship 
Even before I had finally decided on the Renal Computer System as 
the focus of the comparative study I had persuaded the regional 
management services to subsidise the study of the five renal units. This 
study would provide them with information on which they might assess the 
impact of the Renal Computer System on the renal service within the 
region. My reasons for seeking minimal funding from the region was that 
(a) the consultants could not provide any financial support, 
(b) it would be very difficult to carry out the research 
without funds to pay for the travelling expenses, 
(c) if, as seemed possible a tone time during 1983, the sys tem 
was not going to be included as part of the thesis 
research then I either had to withdraw or find some other 
rationale for continuing. Funded research is a reason in 
itself and it permit ted me to keep this <renal> option 
open. 
The access and sponsorship arrangements in the case of the renal units 
were different from that arranged at St Giles. Dr Earl, the senior 
consultant at the first ('Haemo') unit sponsored my research at the 
Regional Renal Consultants' Computer Advisory Committee in terms of 
supporting my request to carry out research at all in the five units. I 
subsequently, and additionally, had to make separate applications to each 
site. Access to carry out the research was granted in all cases subject to 
my guaranteeing confidentiality of all respondents and agreeing not to 
present any reports to the regional management services or anyone else 
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within the NHS without the consultants having the opportunity of studying 
the report first; I made no agreement about them having any right of 
censorship, only of prior knowledge. The same arrangements existed for all 
the occupational groups, my original intention had been to give a 
presentation of my findings at each unit. In the event, it was only 
possible to organise presentations for the first unit (Haemo) and the renal 
consultants, as part of one of their regular regional seminars. None of the 
other units took up my offer to give a presentation to take place, but the 
consultants did all see the subsequent report in the spring of 1986 before 
it was submitted to the Regional Management Services. The then new 
chairperson of the Regional Renal Consultants Computer Advisory Committee 
was very critical of this report. He argued that it was inaccurate, 
particularly in relation to the renal unit for which he was responsible. In 
the report I pointed out that the nursing and junior medical staff found 
the system generally acceptable. This was a conclusion that offered little 
support to his critical view of the system which was founded on its 
limitation as a tool for clinical research and audit (see Chapter Seven for 
further details). He telephoned me to tell me of his criticisms, but did 
not ask me to withdraw it, or to modify it in any way. What he did say, 
however, was that he was going to be very critical of the report and that 
I should not take the criticisms personally. My interpretation of this 
developmen t was that his hostility to the report was related to its being 
produced at just the time when he was pressing for major changes to the 
system, in order that it could be used more readily for research and audit 
as well as for clinical purposes, and was pressing the region for more 
funds and additional technical support for these purposes. This 
consultant's antipathy towards the report (but apparently not towards me) 
was not universally shared, while only one consultant ever pointed this out 
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the consultants and nursing staff at two renal units have been quite happy 
to cooperate in further research (4) even after reading the report. Wha~ 
use the Region has made of the report is unclear to me at this point in 
time: I was told by the officer concerned that slhe did not know what use 
to put the report because of the conflicts the chairperson consultant had 
generated between himself and the computer services personnelj no computer 
specialist wanted to work on the renal system for any reason. The report, 
however, was circulated among the region's computer specialists involved 
with medical computing. 
The methods of investigation 
The general methodological strategy adopted was derived from Denzin's 
triangulation method (1978). I did not assume that 'triangulation' enabled 
one to identify an underlying social reality as Denzin has argued <ibid. 
p.308) for, as Silverman has pointed out, the assumption that 
'triangulation' is the means by which a single reality can be identified 
from methodologically being multiply mapped is problema tic <1985, p.l 05). 
In order to avoid any positivistic implications I now tend to use the more 
neutral term 'multiple strategies' (Burgess, 1984, pp. 143-146). Each method 
was used to supplement and corroborate or, conversely, disconfirm the 
findings of the others in order to gain as full and as accurate an account 
of the in troduc tion of the compu ter sys tems and their impact on clinic 
work as possible. The methodology was designed to achieve two very 
different objectives, first, to detail the processes and events associated 
with clinic work and the introduction of the computer systems and second, 
to seek out disconfirming instances that would force me to modify and 
possibly even reject the particular labour process analysis I was 
developing either wholly or in part. This method of searching ou t 
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disconfirming instances evidence has some parallels with that of analytic 
induction (cf. Burgess, 1984, pp. 179-180) although my use of this 
technique was more directly influenced by reading Bloor's study of ear, 
nose and throat (ENT) specialists (1978) in which he identified both the 
necessary and sufficient conditions to explain the variation between 
consultants practices (decision-making rules) (cf. Hammersley and Atkinson, 
1983, pp.202-204). 
In general terms my objectives were to, 
(i) study the work of clinicians and their responses to the 
computerisation of patient data and information within the 
broader division of labour associated with hospital clinic 
work, 
(ii) identify the division of labour and clinic work processes 
involved within each clinic, 
(iii) identify and describe the documentary records to be 
compu terised, 
(iv) monitor the course of events associated with the 
introduction of the computer systems over as long a period 
as possible 
(v) identify the reasons for the course of events and the 
consequences associated with the introduction of the 
computer systems. 
By focussing on the issue of the introduction of information technology 
and the related organisational changes would, I suspected, highlight both 
the organisation of the work processes and the politics of innovat:on 
within a professional setting. Essentially I was concerned to carry out 
field research, that is a methodologically qualitative natural history of 
people socially interacting within a particular social se~tlng over 8 
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period of time. I was influenced in part by the methodological 8::;proach 
adopted by Pettigrew who also adopted a multiple (triangulated) resea.rc;) 
strategy <1973, p.65). His study of 'Bria.n Michaels' seemed to me to have 
some parallels with the research I was undertaking particularly in relation 
to the issues of inn ova tion and organisa tiona 1 power and control. However, 
both the methodology and the theoretical concerns are sufficiently 
differen t tha t the pres en t thesis is not to be judged as being, in any way, 
a replication of Pettigrew's stUdy (c.f. Chapter Three above for further 
discussion of Pettigrew's study). My commitment to using multiple 
strategies derived from my need to organise the collection and recording 
of data that was flexible enough to be responsive to, 
(a) changes in the fieldwork set ting (the clinics), 
(b) changes, or refinements, in my own developing analysis of 
the the research ma terial. 
At the same time it had to be suffiCiently comprehensive and structured to 
permit me to analyse and cross compare the data systematically and relate 
the findings to the broader theory informing the research. This is the 
very stuff of anthropology and the methodological orientation derives from 
that source (Pettigrew, 1973, pp.52-55j Burgess, 1984, pp. 12-30). The 
research methodologies adopted were, 
(a) Observations. 
(b) Interviews 
(c) Documentary data 
and these will now serve as subheadings for the discussion on the methods 
that follows. 
(a) Observations 
The distinction between participant and non-participant observa tion 
is not a particularly useful one in the context of the fieldwork for this 
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research. My field role was that of an academic researcher, but ~;-le 
findings contributed directly to the evaluation of the systems as reports 
and presentations were offered by, and required of, me for the consultants 
and unit staffs and the authorities funding the computer projects. My 
fieldwork strategy was, as far as possible, to adopt a 'participant as 
observer' role (Gold, 1958). The observational work was never intended as 
the primary source of field data, limitations on time available for 
research prevented that being the case, but it nevertheless had a crucial 
role to play, giving me the opportunity to, 
(a) understand better the work processes involved and, 
(b) check the validity (i.e. identify any contradictions between 
what was told me in interviews and described in the 
reports, minutes and related literature. 
Observations were either 'formal' or 'informal'. In the case of formal 
observations I would arrange an invitation to the various meetings and 
clinics as an observer. Notes were normally recorded on the spot, except 
where this was thought to inhibit the participants and then the fieldnotes 
would be written up immediately afterwards. These observations were of, 
(i) meetings relating to computer policy or implementation; 
(ii) case meetings and ward rounds, 
(iii) direct observations of the clinic work of nurses and/or 
doctors; 
(iv) direct observations of dialysis work. 
In the CORES case study there were no direct observations carried out of 
clinic work (although some interviews were carried out in t'le c~inics 
either prior to or after the completion of a clinic). The focus of ~'1e 
observational work here was on the workings of the computer steering 
group and I-elatedly the health district's information and computer advisory 
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group as well as other ad hoc meetings of doc tors ana other :1oS0i tal 
staff. The routine meetings of the steering group constituted the main 
source of observational data within the CORES case study. It was through 
following the deliberations of this steering group that it was possible to 
monitor the process and outcome of decisions relating to the 
implementation of the system; issues that I did not understand would be 
discussed with Dr Old and/or another member of the committee afterwards. 
The fieldwork notes were recorded in spiral bound journalist-
secretaries note pads in date order and preceded by a small chart 
identifying all persons present (and sometimes absent) and where they sat. 
The pages were subsequently numbered. All aspects of the meetings and 
later, in the case of the renal studies, clinic work were noted. In 
recording the fieldnotes it was necessary to avoid becoming too involved 
in the technical detail of the hospital organisation, or the computer 
system. These details could be gained separately, often from the minutes 
of the meeting, and always by asking individuals directly involved. What 
was necessary was for me to write sufficient detail so as not to preclude 
alternative interpretations to my initial conclusions. An early example of 
this 'alternative reading' related to my change of interpretation of Dr 
Old's strategic role within the project. At the beginning I assumed that he 
was a clear demonstration of medical dominance as applied to technical 
innovation for he had been able to set up the project and organise the 
necessary authorisations from the region and district and had even won a 
grant for my contribution to the project. However, as time went on it 
became increasingly clear that the project was very much under-resourced 
as a clinical system which led to there being few direct benefits for the 
consultants involved. It was only by recording sufficient observational 
information at the time of the meetings was it possible for me to go bad 
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to the fieldnotes after about twelve months and re-assess my initia~ 
interpretation. 
Before presenting any further details of the observational work it is 
important to comment on the question as to whether my presence affected 
the ways in which the participants behaved, and related, to one another and 
to me. Initially at St Giles my presence did give rise to participants 
being a little selfconscious, but as time passed - over several visits - I 
became seen as part of the same world as themselves and related to 
accordingly. This 'naturalisation' process resulted from the nature of my 
relationship with Dr Old, the fact that the CORES project was seen by the 
participants as a positive development, and that it gave a sense of kudos 
to the members of the steering committee. At the same time, those who 
were antipathetic towards the system were less open and accessible and 
this did affect the organisation and carrying out of interviews, but not 
the observation of meetings, and will be discussed later in more detail. 
In the cases of the renal units, 'naturalisation' did not develop to 
anything like the same degree. My presence at meetings and in clinics was 
always in the role of an outside researcher carrying out research, but 
again as the number of visits increased I did become more accepted and 
interaction between staff more natural (i.e. less selfconscious, or 
premeditated) and of equal importance I could begin to understand more 
What was being discussed. At the same time the observational work at the 
Renal Units had a different focus than that at St Giles. Instead of 
studying the computer steering group it was the meetings concerned with 
the organisation of clinic work I focused upon i.e. case conferences, ward 
and graph rounds, as well as nurses reports at the change of shifts. The 
reasons for this relate to the following points, 
(a) the local steering group within each unit was primarily 
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concerned with technical matters of implementa~ion and 
staff training, the policy issues were matters for t~e 
regional renal consultants' computer system adv:" )ry 
committee (see Chapter Six for further details), 
(b) the purpose of the system was different, it was designed 
in order that the clinical data and information (outputs) 
to be used by all members of the clinic staff. and not 
solely or principally by the doctors as was the case with 
the CORES system. 
The renal case studies presented, and were intended to present a different 
set of opportunities and constraints to the CORES case study for 
observational fieldwork (see the earlier section on Comparative Analysis). 
In the case of the CORES study the politics of the introducing computer 
technology into clinic work was particularly apparent because of the 
na ture of the sys tem - it directly replaced the medical records (see 
Chapter Eight). In the case with of the renal computer system this was not 
the case, at least not initially, and instead the case studies presented me 
with the opportunity to study the system in use within the unit and 
clinics (See Chapter Seven for details). 
In both renal units the computer terminals and VDUs were to be used 
directly to replace, or at least supplement, the manual systems of 
recording, accessing or analysing patient data. At the first renal unit I 
was able to observe several multi-disciplinary case meetings (3 occaSiOn"3) 
covering both the period prior to computerisation and afterwards. Here the 
renal computer system was used to access patient data directly. The 
equivalent meeting at the second renal unit were the weekly combined case 
conferences and ward rounds where the computer system was not used (5). 
Nevertheless, these events were crucial components of the U'1it's labour 
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process and as such warranted observation (observed 2). At the first renal 
unit the senior consultant used a VDU and terminal in his clinic to 
directly access (but not to input> patient data rather than using the 
clinic notes. I was able to observe this clinic on two occasions. At t:-te 
second renal unit it was the nurses who used the computer system in the 
weekly clinics so it was the work of the nurses I observed. Thus, the key 
feature of the formal observational element in the renal research was in 
order to gain firsthand knowledge of the work processes wi thin the unit 
and clinics. It would have been desirable to have spent more time on 
observing the work of the renal units, but there were strong time 
constraints on me to complete the research. It was also the case that I 
was studying the work of two of the other units in the region, 
necessitated my ra tionalising the formal observational work to 
strategically important events rather than attending an extensive number 
of ward rounds or clinics in order to be absolutely sure that I had seen 
and recorded the work of the units in their na tural s ta te. But it also 
meant that I had the fieldnotes from these other units (not included here) 
to draw upon. 
When carrying out observational work I would always have a number of 
questions requiring clarification, for example I was particularly interested 
in the case conferences and ward rounds at the second renal unit (Dialysis 
and Transplant> because they demonstrated, particularly clearly, the ways 
that data records (medical record, graphs and charts) underpinned the 
division of labour and hierarchy within the unit (see Chapter Seven). 
Turning now to the topic of informal observations. This refers to the 
general observations of all aspects of clinic and related activities that 
were noted while visiting the hospitals, but not covered by the heading of 
'formal observations'. The fieldnotes here were kept in the form of a 
-132-
journal (diary) alongside the formal observational notes, in the same 
notebooks, and therefore in date order and page numbered. The fieldnotes 
collected under the heading of informal observations included details of 
all visits to the hospitals and in particular any episodes relating to 
computerisation, medical or dialYSis work. To illustrate, there was the 
occasion when a junior doctor sought reassurance from a colleague (who I 
was talking with following an research interview) having just previously 
injected a very ill patient with a particularly powerful drug. Previously, 
this same situation had been discussed in conversa tion with a consultan t 
in terms of how one comes to terms with just such a situation as a junior 
doctor in which a patient may die. Clearly junior doctors were, on 
occasions, presented with very difficult decisions and I needed to bear 
that in mind when interpreting the interview data. Whether this was 
directly relevant to the working of the outpatients' clinics or the CORES 
system was not immediately clear, but as contextual information it was 
very useful, and ultimately informed my interpretation of some of the 
doctors criticisms of the computer system. Similarly, a discussion between 
a registrar and nurses over what 'tender loving care', abbreviated to TLC, 
meant when written in the case notes. To the renal nurses it meant to take 
special care of the patient in addition to carrying out the normal 
procedures. The doctor's understanding of the term was that the patient 
was going to die and all tha t can be done is to reduce the pain and 
suffering as far as possible. The doctor's interpretation came from working 
on an neuro-surgical ward, the nurses from the experience of the renal 
units; here was a clear example of variations in the implied meanings of 
cryptic case note entries which was discussed in Chapter Three - and will 
be further elaborated in the case study in Chapter Eight. In Gold's ter:r,s 
these were cases of the participant as observer, people knew of my role 
and purpose within the hospital, or clinic (cf. Burgess, 1984, pp. 80-82). 
Within the St Giles study these informal observations had only a limited 
role to play, but in the case of the renal case studies be informal 
observations were a crucial element of the research. Only by my treating 
each 'trip' to the hospitals as an exercise in fieldwork was it possiole to 
develop any comprehensive datum within which to locate the information 
collected from the formal observa tions and the in terviews. These even ts 
were recorded because of their usefulness in building up an account 
(narrative) of the introduction of the computer system and its 
ramifications for the clinic work processes, and the associated social 
relations between the various participants in the process. 
The fieldnotes for all three casestudies were made in summary form 
during the course of the day. These would be written up later the '::",me 
day either prior to driving home, most usually in a medical library, nurse'~ 
rest room or the staff canteen or, alternatively, in the car before 
arriving home. My objectives were to identify the main substantive issues 
involved as well as adding comments relating to theoretical issues and 
indicating the implecations for the next stage in the research <e.g. who to 
ask for clarification of some detail, line of questioning to be followed in 
interviews, documents to be obtained). 
(b) In terviews (see Appendices I-III) 
Here I need to discuss three main aspects to interviewing, these are, 
(D criteria for selection 
<iD timing of in terviews 
(iiD structure and purpose of interviews. 
I will not use these points as subheadings as the three aspects tend to 
run into one another. My aim was to interview all the doctors on three 
separate occasions (see Table 5.2). The intended timing was to have been 
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one month (approximately) orior ·n the instal' ti f OJ 1a on 0 ~ne comouter system, 
one month 
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TO'l-AL "":1 ,I If· INTr~RV J~::'W::~ E< E. 
(b;J NI...JMI::::ER!:'!:; rJF OClcrl:::IF~:::; IN '-t~AIN:rN(?J GF.:AOE'S INTE-:RVIEWED (BY ~.F'£:.tC:IALTVJ 
,,' ED IC INE (3YNAECOLCIGY TOTALS 
C).,', '\'::&, ... 6 :3 11 
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(:i: Incl,,,,,d .. d witJ--iin ·th:il~; -t, .. ·lt .... .l ~iI'"'' :3 SHO .. Wl-IO WIoIi)'''. int.\"'v118wad c.ne. pr'1or to 
HO (,to1:..al 4) 
after implementation and again five months, or more, later (i.e. six months 
after the installation of the computer system), The reasoning, \,'~ic~ is 
probably self-evident, was that I wanted to be able to compare the doctors 
(and other members of the clinic staff) expectations of t'1e system~ with 
(a) the experience of accommodating to the demands computer- sys tern': 
immediately following implementation of the system and t'len (b) a m'Jr'" 
considered view some months later. In the case of t':e (ORE;: s"Jdy this 
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procedure worked reasonably well with regard to the consultants but was 
impracticable for use with the junior doctors; very few house s~aif and 
registrars were in post longer than six months. I therefore modifi8c t:--,e 
timings of the interviews for these junior doctors - once the system had 
been installed to once during their stay, trying to organise this 
interview for between 4- and 8 weeks after slhe had joined the particular 
clinic. This timing was not always possible to arrange because some 
consultants would bring junior staff from the nearby DGH to assist in the 
outpatients' clinics and because they did not appear on the hospital 
adminis tra tionslis t of junior staff in post were unknown to me. It was 
necessary, therefore, to supplement the official list with informa':ion 
gleaned from the doctors themselves. Despite these constraints some of the 
junior doctors were interviewed twice, once before and once after the 
implementation of the computer systems, where they were still in post at 
the appropriate time. 
The members of the CORES steering group were all interviewed 
individually usually adopting an unstructured format. I conducted semi-
structured, tape recorded, interviews with the hospital administra tor and 
the senior nursing officer, the former on two occasions and the latter once 
(because slhe was a recent arrival to the hospital following the 
implementation of the system). I spoke with the other members of the 
committee conversationally as well as directly questioning them as and when 
I needed to gain new information. The computer specialist was a particular~y 
useful informant regarding (a) the CORES system, (b) similar comouter 
developments elsewhere in the region and (c) the changing politics of 
medical and hospital computing over the period of the study. 
The nurses at the St Giles Outpatient Department were interviewed as 
a group in the clinic in October, 1982, also the sister was interviewed once 
-136-
more in December, 1983: neither of these in terview sessions were tape recorded 
and the sister always expressed reluctance to participate. In terms of gaining a 
broad assessment of the nurses responses to CORES system this approach was 
adequate, although in retrospect it would have been useful to have gained more 
direct da ta concerning the nurses role in familiarising the junior doctors with 
the organisation and practices of the clinics. The main focus of the study, 
however, was on the clinicians and their use of the computer system. By 
contrast, it was the nursing staff at the renal units who were intended to be 
major routine users of the Renal Computer System, for it was they who were 
principally responsible for the care and training of the patients on dialysis, 
and the recording of the biochemical and haemotological data relating to those 
pa tien ts. It was beyond my time resources, however, to in terview all the renal 
nurses, I therefore compromised by arranging to interview all the senior nurses 
(Ass is tan t Director of Nursing Services, Nursing Officer and Ward Sis tel's) plus 
a selection of nurses from each grade (excluding auxillaries). In the end I 
interviewed very nearly half of the nursing staff on two separate occasions 
(see Table 5.3 below). The other members of the renal units as well as the 
'other disciplines' (e.g. dieticians) were nearly all interviewed twice at the 
about the same time as the consultants (6). In the Renal Computer System 
studies the sequence of 3 interviews over approximately six to seven months 
'broke down'. This was because I was only able to interview the doctors, nurses 
and other staff involved either just prior to implementation, or during the 
implementation period itself (i.e. on one, not two, occasions) and then again 
eight or nine months later. There were two main reasons for this (a) my delay 
in committing myself to using the renal units as the comparative case studies 
and (b) the extended period it took to implemen t the sys tem a t the second 
renal unit. To expand on the first point (a), it was my procrastination over 
several months that delayed the second round of interviews at the first renal 
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TABLE 6,3 
Nl..IMElER AND OCC:UPAT IONAL CATEeOR IES OF STAFF INTERVIEWEO (INCLUOINe 
APPRO X IMATE DATES OF INTERV IEW€;:) (THE RENAL COMPUTER SYSTEM) 
OCCUPATIONAL eROUP FIRST ~INIT SECONe UNIT 
Oor:.; tor. 
(a) 
(0) Junior dc.ctor. 4. 1 1 
Nur ••• 
(0) 
'J 1 (total staff' 24) 
1 (ni.ght .I-.i'ft) 
1+1** 
Oat •• elf Int.-rv:l.w. 
Ca) First ,"'ound c.t' 
:lnt.l"V i.ws Oc tob.,", 1 '983 
(b) May-Jun .. , 1994 Jan-MilkY ~1geS 
i"t.,"'vi.w. ( Intarvi.wtII of doctora the period 
(Not.. : *: c:on.ult...nt .ppOil,t.d dUl-:1ng tt-.... PR1-iod 0" th_ r __ .... rc:h and ... 
r •• ult int.rv:l.w .. d only one. 
** U"_truc:tu ... ·.d :int.,"vi ...... 
unit. During this period I main tained con tact with all the units and visited the 
first unit in December, 1983 in order to talk with the senior consultant as well 
the senior nursing staff, In addition I arranged to sit in on a case meeting to 
find out how they were adapting to the new system but I did not systematically 
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interview the doctors and nurses nor the other occupations until May - June, 
1984. 
The computer system was already installed at the second renal unit 
(Dialysis and Transplant) when I first contacted them in May, 1984. Here I 
adopted the strategy of distinguishing between those staff who had received 
training in the use of the system and those who had not. This divided the 
nurses (other than the senior grades) approKima tely equally into 'trained' and 
'awai Hng training', while all other clinic staff and the 'other disciplines' had 
not received any training at this pOint, except importantly, the unit 
administrator (who had a key role in managing the system). The second round of 
interviews were started eight months later (January, 1985). 
I interviewed the cohorts of junior doctors on the same basis as I had 
done at st Giles (i.e. one month after they joined the unit). The one exception 
here was the senior registrar who was on a three year contract and s/he was 
interviewed twice over a period of nine months. The nephrology consultanTS I 
reserved until near the end of my fieldwork because I was aware from comments 
of various persons and attending meetings (as well as interviewing the person 
supplying the computer technical support) that 
(1) these consultants did not use the system directly themselves 
and 
(11) the consultan t with the responsibility of overseeing its 
ins talla tion was very cd tical as to the f acili ties provided by 
the system and the service provided by the region's computer 
specialis ts. 
I believed it was more useful to interview those more directly involved with 
the day-to-day clinic work processes (1.e. nurses, junior doctors etc.) and left 
the consultants at this second unit for as long as possible in order That there 
would be plenty of time for the politics of regional - professional conflicts to 
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be as fully worked through as possible. The transplant surgeon, and his 
colleague (appointed during the course of the study) were also both interviewed, 
the firs t surgeon a t the same time as the other clinic s ta f f. 
The interviews were designed in order to achieve two basic objectives , 
(a) to monitor developments in the implementation and usage or the 
computer systems, including the responses to the systems; 
(b) to carry out extended interviews over time detailing the 
doctors, nurses, administrator and 'other disciplines' clinic and 
related work. 
To expand on this second point (b), the time lag between each interview 
permit ted the ma t ters raised in the previous in terview (s) to be explored fur ther 
in subsequent interviews (e.g. the role of the medical record in clinic work), it 
also meant that information, and attitudes given or expressed in the interviews 
could be checked against interviews with other respondents (e.g. comparing 
consultants' and junior doctors' descriptions of clinic organisation) and 
observational data (e.g. ward rounds). The strategy was to attempt to identify 
any contradictory evidence or disconfirming instances to the responses given in 
the interviews. If such discrepancies were identified then the task was to 
explain the reason for it. 
The interviews were semi-structured and tape-recorded; only two persons 
declined to be tape recorded and all persons asked for an interview accepted. 
The semi-structured character of the interviews meant that there were a number 
of topics to be covered in all in terviews, the order the topics were taken and 
the time and detail each covered depended on the the particular respondent and 
the prompting from the interviewer. In practice I used a model interview 
schedule <Appendices I-IID for, at least to begin with, I could not guarantee 
that I would be confident enough to extemporize appropriate questions around 
the topics. The responses of the doctors were in line wi th their views there 
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was little attempt on their part to be disingenuous. Their behaviour was 
compatible with stated attitudes. The junior doctors were in a different 
position. Here it was the case that the consultant involvement could have been 
expected to influence the responses of these doctors. What tended to happen was 
that the answers to questions regarding details of adjustment, training, use in 
clinic and so on were given straightforwardedly, but the overall assessment of 
the system would tend to match what was thought of as the consultants 'line'. 
The house staff tended to be the most defensive, the registrars the least. In 
fact this latter group of doctors were particularly informative regarding the 
workings of clinics and what practices and processes were viewed as usual and 
what viewed as unusual. Consultants, by contrast, generally refrained from 
commenting on each others clinical practices. 
An opportunity arose for me to to assess (at least in a 'rule of thumb' 
way> whether my judgement on the deferential bias of junior staff was accurate 
or not. Two consultan ts (in differen t specialties) on separa te occasions asked 
whether I would like to interview both themselves and their junior medical staff 
as a group. I could have refused but thought that the arrangement presented an 
opportunity to assess the relationship that existed between these consultants 
and their junior medical staff. At one interview there were two registrars, one 
SHO as well as the consultant. At the other interview there was just one 
registrar in addition to the consultant. The first group of junior staff were 
officially located at the nearby DGH but they routinely worked at the St Giles 
outpatients clinics. The SHO and more junior of the registrars were clearly 
deferen til'll and they hardly said anything during the course of the in terview. 
The more senior regis trars, however, were willing to express independen t views. 
The consultant involved here did not feel threatened by the expression of 
independen t views and he readily engaged in a dialogue and ban ter with them. 
This was not the case in the second instance, for while the senior registrar 
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was also willing to express independent views regarding the system toe 
consultant clearly felt less secure. In consequence he avoided as far as 
possible discussing in any detail any aspects of the system with this registrar. 
To illustrate, the senior registrar was particularly critical of the secuencing 
of the 'history taking' section of the computer forms <encounter forms). The 
consultant broadly sympathised with the difficulties the registrar was 
reporting, arguing in general terms that his humanistic approach to medicine was 
not readily susceptible to computerisation. During the course of the interview, 
however, it became apparent to the consultant that what the registrar was 
reporting was not a point of fundamental medical philosophy but rather that the 
order of the pages of the forms (encounter form) had become mixed up and pages 
3 and 4 had become pages 5 and 6 (and vice versa). On finally realising this 
the consultant felt his authority was, at least to some extent, undermined by 
his not realising earlier that the cause of the regis trars cd ticisms resulted 
from the inaccurate compilation of the encounter forms and not on any more 
fundamental medical reasons. From then on he adopted a very formal attitude to 
the interview (an earlier interview had been relatively relaxed and informative). 
In the case of the Renal Computer System there was some imperative on the 
part of the consultants to present a positive view of the system. The first unit 
was the official pilot site for the system within the region which meant that 
the consultants at the second unit felt aggrieved at what they saw as the 
region's favouritism. The result was that the consultants at the first unit 
(Haemo) were keen to make the system work well while those at the second unit 
were concerned to demonstrate that their ability to adapt and develop the Renal 
Computer System to their own medical requirements was even better. This sense 
of inter-unit rivalry on part of the second unit was also to be found among the 
nursing staff and shared by the administrator. 
It was also the case that the computer system was for most consultants (5 
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out of 6) peripheral to their day to day work. I~ was either the nurses, or he 
junior medical staff who used the system on a day to day basis. I found in 
consequence tha t with these consultants the interviews tended either ~o :,ecoml? 
more formalised (3 consultants) or concentrated on particular issues ~'t'l" 
concerned the consultant directly even if it was only a minor part of either the 
system or the work of the unit (2 consultants). As mentioned earlier, it was the 
junior doctors and in particular the registrars who were the more informative 
interviewees. Interviews of the junior doctors were organised similarly to those 
conducted at St Giles although the tape recorder malfunctioned on one occas:on 
and the two interviews affected were written up from notes immediately 
afterwards. 
In the case of St Giles I was able to follow developmen ts a t the hospital 
between interviews via attendance of the CORES Steering Group meetings and the 
associated opportunity of discussing developments Dr Old, In the case of the 
Renal Computer System the opportunity of continual involvement did not present 
itself. Instead I had to rely more on multiple and disparate methods of 'tapping' 
the natural history of the renal units and the implementation and usage of the 
computer system. In the first renal unit (Haemo) I relied on informal 
conversations with unit staff, particularly the senior consultant and senior 
nurses. A t the second renal unit (Dialysis and Transplan t) the consultan ts were 
rarely available for informal conversations and here information on computer 
developments and clinic work tended to come from the nursing staff during 
episodes of field observations. Although it was the unit administrator who was 
the most informative respondent having had a background in renal nursing as 
well as being very interested and involved in the introduction of the computer 
system. S/he was a particularly crucial source of information relat.ing to the 
history. overall workings of the unit and the developments relating to the 
C t t I I bl to l'ntervl'ew members of all tne various ompu er sys em. was a so a e 
-143-
occupations that comprised the renal dialysis and transplantation labour process 
at both renal units and this permitted me to corroborate the information 
gathered to a greater extent than had been possible at St Giles. 
Unlike the situation at St Giles (see above) the interviews with the senior 
nurses at both renal units were generally relaxed and informative. These nurses 
were concerned to demons tra te tha t the compu ter sys tem was being implemen ted 
as effectively as possible. This commitment did not appear to lead to any 
evasiveness on their part during the interviews and their responses were in 
line with the observational data collected. The issue of nurse training, for 
example, was a problem at both units (for different reasons), but there was no 
attempt to hide, or misrepresent, the issues. This was also true of the 
registered and enrolled nurses at the second renal unit although not at the 
first unit where during the second round of interviews the nurses responded 
with formality and implicit resistance which was in marked contrast to the first 
round. When interviewing the fourth and last nurse, who had been particularly 
informative and cooperative in the first interview and who was now being terse 
and noncommittal, I asked for an explanation for this interview resistance. The 
reasons, it turned out, were that the computer system had increased their 
workload (with no obvious benefits) and had led to the unit being subjected to 
visits from a great number of people interested in the computer system who 
generally got in the nurses' way. All of this they disliked and, by association, 
my interviewing was seen as part of this general 'interference' in their unit. No 
similar problem occurred a t the second uni t. 
The interviews with the dieticians, social workers and psychologist showed 
little sign of any obvious defensiveness or evasiveness and were for the most 
part very informative particularly in rounding out the details of the renal 
labour process within the wider hospital context. 
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(c) Documen tary in forma tion 
In the cases of two of the sites (St Giles and the Haemo Unit) I was able 
to obtain copies of the minutes for the Steering Group Meetings while at the 
second renal unit I was able to look through the minutes and take notes from 
them, it was not possible to arrange for them to be photocopied. In the case of 
the St Giles study I also had access to the Dr Old's correspondence and other 
documents relevant to the introduction of the CORES system. This documentary 
evidence (minutes and correspondence) was utilised, 
(1) to trace the history of the CORES project from its inception, 
(11) to monitor the organisational and professional politics relating 
to the computer system and its use. 
(iii) as a source of corrobation and triangulation to my own notes in 
terms of comparing my in terpreta tion of the even ts with the 
'official' version contained in the minutes, 
(iv) as a source of the particular technical details of the computer 
system that I needed to know about and was likely to come up in 
an interview or conversation. 
(v) to identify names of relevant individuals involved with computer 
policy or the process of implementation and running of the 
computer system. 
In the case of the renal units I only had access to the implemen ta tion 
committee minutes (the steering group did not keep minutes) and they were used 
to trace the history of the system and to check out the accuracy of points made 
during interviews, usually relating to the chronology of events. Documentary 
eVidence, in short, played a lesser role in the renal case studies than in 
connection with the St Giles study. 
The other important type of documentary evidence were copies of forms 
relating to the work of the clinics. In the case of the outpatients' department 
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the most relevant documentation of this kind were the encounter forms I was 
able to accumulate. In the case of the renal units I found it particularly 
useful to be able to refer to the pa tien ts de ta sheets and diaries (which were 
the raw data for the computer system). The EDTA form I was given by a senior 
nurse was similarly very useful (7); this was not only because it meant I had a 
better understanding what was involved in the completion of this annual return, 
but because the form contained details of the principle diagnoses and similar 
medical information which aided my education in this area. In addition, I 
accumulated copies of examples of the kinds of reports the computer system 
could produce. These served best as reminders of what I had observed or had 
been told about rather than constituting an independent source of evidence. 
Concluding commen ts 
The three strands of observations, interviews and documentary data 
cons ti tu ted the three in terdependen t sources of research da ta. The main source 
of information came from the interviews while the collection and analysis of the 
other two strands was organised primarily in order to both contextualise and 
check the integrity of the information gained from the interviews. This was 
particularly true of the study at St Giles, while in the case of the renal study 
the observational fieldwork did play a slightly more autonomous part in the 
research. The observational fieldnotes constituted an ongoing narrative of 
even ts in the case of the St Giles study. Interviews were transcribed and 
summarised by topics and occupational subgroups at particular stages in the 
fieldwork. The resulting mosaic of responses would then be supplemented by 
reference to the observational fieldnotes. The documents further supported, or 
illustrated, the other evidence. At the renal units the observational fieldwork 
provided the detailed descriptions of the work processes to which the interview 
data related. 
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Having constructed an account (or while constructing an aCCOUD';) ~he data 
sources were checked for counter-examples that would disconfirm the developing 
analysis. The underlying strategy of the comparative studies was to extend tne 
detailing of clinic work and the decision-making and related polt tical processes 
involved in the introduction of the two computer systems <and any research of 
that process) as well as to search out any disconfirming instances that would 
force me to reassess the conclusions arrived at at the earlier study at St 
Giles. In particular I was interested in finding out whether my genera: 
conclusions regarding the role and use of the medical records, within the 
context of the politics of technical change within a professional setting, could 
be sustained in the context of the other two case studies. 
The story of the implementation of the two computer systems at the three 
hospitals is the subject of the next three chapters. The first chapter deals 
with the analysis of the professional politics of medical work and 
computerisation, while the following two deal with the impact of the computer 
systems on, first, the renal units and, second, the clinics in the outpatients' 
department, particularly in terms of the division of labour associated with the 
clinics and the methods of recording medical information and the implications 
these have for medical dominance . 
... 
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NOTES 
1. I la ter learn t from an adminis tra tor tha t the reason f or my being 
refused research access was ber_au"'e the di t f th ~ rec or 0 e compu~"'r 
department was experiencing industrial relations problems. 
2. I interviewed one person, at least, at each company spending at least 
half a day with each. At ICL and IBM I spoke with one 0 ther senior 
marketing officer <in one case, this took the form of a telephone 
conversation). The information gained from these interviews included 
detail of the companies strategies and experience in selling computer 
systems to the NHS. I realised that the talking to me was, at :"''33t 
in part, a marketing exercise nevertheless the information gained was 
very useful; from the in terviews I learn t much abou t the organisa t ion 
of the companies in relation to the healthcare computing market, 
details of the history of the developments of the relationship 
between the NHS the state and ICL and the implications this had for 
the other two companies. 
3. The ESRC also awarded me a project grant for 3 years. Grant No. GOO 
230077 (see Acknowledgemen ts) 
4. The research project concerns patients' adjustments to ESRF and the 
role of the nurse in the context of changes in the 'treatment of 
choice'. 
5. The CORES system was introduced into the eight clinics over a period 
of fifteen months with the a result the interviews of clinicians, 
excepting those carried out pre-implementation, were also spread over 
an equivalent time period. 
6. The psychologist was interviewed only once and that was prior to the 
implementation of the Renal Computer System for it proved imoossible 
for me to arrange a time for the second interview amena21e to the 
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both of 1)S. 
7. EDTA stands for the European Dialysi=- and Transplant Associa';:'or . 
... 
CHAPTER SIX 
THE POLITICS OF INNOVATION AND 
PROFESSIONALISM: THE INTRODUCTION OF 
COMPUTER SYSTEMS INTO HOSPITAL 
CLINICS 
Introduction 
In Part I the the impact of medical information technology was 
discussed in general terms and subordina ted to the discussion of 
professional autonomy and labour process analysis. In this second half of 
the thesis the focus shifts from the general review of computing 
developments, professional autonomy and theoretical analysis to the 
specifics of the case studies. I start with the issue of the organisational 
politics of the computerisation process at the three hospitals. The central 
dilemma for the consultant sponsors of the systems was one of negotiating 
the resource support from the district and regional authorities whilst 
maintaining the support of their colleagues as users of the systems. For 
while the nurses, administrators and clerical staff as well as members of 
'other disciplines' were also involved they played a lesser role in the 
politics of decision-making associated with the introduction of the two 
computer systems. 
The purpose of this chapter is 
decision-making processes wi thin the 
to analyse the politics 01 the 
theoretical model developed in 
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Chapter Three in particular in relation to the distinction institutional and 
organisa tiona] control. This will be done by de tailing the cons train ts and 
choices the doctors introducing the new systems faced in their dealings 
with the health service manage men t (organisa tional con troD and their own 
medical colleagues (institutional controDThe consultant sponsors of both 
the systems studied (Renal Computer System and CORES) had to develop 
strategies and tactics in order, first, to gain support of their consultant 
colleagues and then to ensure that this support was sustained once the 
systems were implemented. At the same time they had to negotiate witn the 
appropriate district and/or regional authorities in order to get the 
systems implemented and the hospital staff using them. It is wit:., these 
processes with which I am particularly concerned in this chapter for they 
enable me to explore the dynamics of the relations between the 
organisational control of management and the institutional control of the 
doctors. Moreover, by focusing on the issues surrounding the 
implementation of the systems at the clinic level I am able to identify in 
some detail the day to day ways (processes) in which the relations between 
the two are sustained. 
The chapter is divided into four parts, 
1. a description and comparison of the two computer systems 
and three case studies, 
2. an accoun t of the specific rela tionship between the 
regional compu ter services and the compu ter oro jects 
within the context of regional computing and information 
policy. 
3. accounts of the politics and decision-making processes 
associated with the introduction of the two computer 
systems. 
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4. a compara tive analysis of of the poli tics 
professionalism in relation to the introduction of clln::.cal 
computer systems. 
Both computer systems studied here were capable of being operated as 
automated medical records systems. It should be noted that the Renal 
Computer System was only ever intended as a supplement to the case-notes, 
whereas the CORES system was designed to replace the case-notes. The 
difference is an important one and contributes to the explanation as to 
why one system was found to be more acceptable to the doctors than the 
other. However, acceptance or rejection of these systems was not solely a 
matter of whether the clinical case-notes were supplemented or replaced, 
but was also found to be related to the strategies and tactics pursued by 
the consultants sponsoring the introduction of the two computer systems. 
1. The case studies and the computer systems 
The case studies fell into two groups : 
(a) two renal units in the midlands which were part of a 
larger regional dialysis and transplant service of five 
units. One of these units was equipped and resourced to 
carry ou t kidney transplan ts ('gra fts ') the 0 ther was no t. 
(b) the outpatients' clinics at a small acute hospital (120 
beds) again in the midlands. There were eight clinics which 
encompassed three surgical and three medical specialties. 
The renal units introduced a clinical data system, which as the name 
suggests automated the system of collating, storing, analysing and 
retrieving clinical data. The system also and importantly possessed the 
facility to present patient data in the form of time-related graphs. The 
outpatient system was known as a medical record system and was designed 
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to replace the pre-existing manual procedure=, for maintaining the medica:" 
records, bo th clinical and adm inis tra t i ve. The sys tem did no t remove the 
need for the medical record files, but replaced the handwritten and ty::>ed 
contents with computer-printed documentation. Unlike the Rena: Computer 
System, there were no graphics facilities available at the time of t:1e 
research. This system will be referred to here by the fictitious acronym 
CORES (to stand for ~omputerised Qutpatient REcord ~ystem). 
There are a number of distinctions to be made between the two 
systems and between the two clinical contexts which are set out in Figure 
6.1. These distinctions summarise the crucial similarities and differences 
between the case studies. An explanation of these similarities an,: 
differences will be undertaken in the following two chapters, but the 
critical distinction which I wish to highlight immediately concerns the 
issue of resourcing. In the official parlance of the health service the 
distinction is that between corporate and non-corporate status. Corporate 
status meant that a system was part of the regional health authorities 
programme of computer development and was consequently heavily subsidised. 
The renal service was funded by the region directly and it was for this 
reason that the renal consultants were able to make a case to the region 
that the Renal Computer System should be adopted as a corporate system, In 
other words the rationale of the corporate systems was not solely in order 
to improve the effectiveness of the organisational control from the 
'centre' as might be supposed, although with the implementation of the 
Griffiths and K5rner recommendations this is certainly an important 
consideration (see discussion below and in Chapter Two). In some cases -
as with the Renal Compu ter Sys tem - corpora te s ta tus of the compu ter 
system resulted from the fact that the renal service was regionally and 
not district coordinated. However, even when the renal consultants ~8d 
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gained corporate status for the system the funding was not one hundred 
percent. There was instead a subsidy of fifty percent of costs of 
implemen ta tion the remaining costs had to be paid for from district and 
trust funds. There was one exception which was the pilot site the Haemo 
Unit - where the subsidy was one hundred percent of the basic system. 
TAE<LE ';;.1 THE COI"'IPUTER ~:;YSTErvl:::; ~;IM ILARIT IE~; AND DIFFERENC.ES 
R_nal CORES 
Sy_t.m Sya1:em 
(1) ·tT •• int.rclduc:ticln 0" tr',. ayet.ro w •• -t:..n_ r_.ult 0" 
d:l.r.ctly 1\'....,01....,.0 (:loct.t:;,r'tiS ... 
(1'1) doc·to' .... COL.lld :lrlpl.4t. CIY" .cc .... dMlot_ di,".ct ~rom 
• c:o'npu·t..'~ ·t.er"m inlk 1 
(v) U-,. wy_talYt ' .... pl • .::: • .:::.1 the c:lil"l:lcal CA •• no·t.._ 
(vi) t.J-1"-" .y_t.m invc;Ilv_d cln. hCI_pi't..hl only 
... 
(Not •• : * th:la r.".",,_ to -tt ... .:11,,1clkl work and not teo th_ administ.rative • 
..::1.,"10.:: .. 1 and .... c, ..... 1:,al":l.l proc ........ ; ** th. other disciplin._ loU ... r. soc:i.l 
work: ~ di.tatic:. and psychology), 
Dr Old also attempted to get the CORES system ascribed corporate 
status. In his case the reasoning was less to do with the resourcing of 
the specific CORES system than with attempting to exploit the 
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organise tional con trol of region to ensure an exoansion of the :oys' em in 
other hospitals and specialties within the region. The s tra tegy, i; ~ t Clad 
been successful, would have guaranteed the long term survival of the CORES 
system. Dr Old failed, for unlike the renal units the work of outpatients' 
clinics were the responsibility of the district health authorities and 
funded out of their resources. 
2. Consultants I compu ter specialis ts and compu ter policy 
The two compu ter sys tems, as I have already indica ted. were 
implemented during or just prior to a period when the computer policy 
wi thin the region was changing. The emergen t policy of the region was one 
of commitment to a major programme of implementing a range of standard 
corporate systems within all districts. These systems were designed, or 
adapted, in order that might be able to support the health service 
informa tion sys tems recommended by the Kl)rner Commit tee and which have 
become mandatory following the implementation of the recommendations of 
the Griffiths Report (see Chapter Two for details>. These large-scale 
changes did not have any major impact in the districts until after both 
the Renal Computer System and the CORES system had been implemented. 
Nevertheless they did influence the decision-making processes involved for 
both systems and were seen to present both opportunities and problems for 
all the participants in the setting up of the Renal and St Giles computer 
projects (i.e. doctors, computer and management services personnel and the 
administration). 
The Renal Computer System 
The Renal Computer System was designated a corporate system. It had 
been identified in the Region's computer and information systems programme 
for 1982-85 as the second highest priority to the implementation of the 
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patient administration system (PAS) throughou~ the region. What this mean:. 
in practice, was that the Renal Computer System was intenceQ :0 be 
installed and operational with very little technical support from t~e 
region's computer services specialists because they were fully employed 
implementing the PAS system. The Renal Computer System was implemented 
with the support of one senior programmer; it was this persons 
responsibility to ensure that the system was satisfactorily implemented 
and tha t all the s ta ff a t the renal units were appropria tely trained. Th:s 
programmer was also the specialist adviser to the steering groups at each 
renal unit and had the responsibility of carrying out any modifications to 
the system requested by these groups. The programmer was directly 
responsible to a project manager who had overall responsibility for the 
provision of the technical support. The main responsibility of this manager 
had been to advise the consultan ts on all technical ma t ters rela t ing to 
the selection and implementation of the computer system. This work 
included, (a) the drawing up of the specifications of the system the renal 
consultants required, (b) organising the call for tenders from computer 
systems suppliers, (c) ensuring that the system selected met the technical 
criteria and (d) provided the facilities laid down in the sys tem 's 
specH ica t ions. 
Soon after the Renal Computer System was installed in the first site 
some of the consultants at other sites began to pressurise the project 
manager to provide more resources and to provide better facilities. Under 
this pressure the relationship between the Regional Renal Consultants 
Computer Advisory Group and and the project manager worsened. This decline 
1n amity between the region's computer specialist - the project manager -
and the renal consultants directly resulted from a change in the 
chairmanship of the Renal Consultants Computer Systems Advisory Group and 
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a coinciden tal with the change in the projec t manager. The new cC:1sul ~an t 
chairperson was critical of the system and wanted additional f'Olcili ':ies 
provided while the new project officer was new to dealing with nosCli tal 
consultants. This aspect of the computerisation process is to be further 
discussed in the third section of this chapter which is concerned with the 
details of the decision processes. The reason for raising the isslJe here 
has been in order to make the point that regional computer specialists 
seriously under-estimated the level of technical support the system needed 
to ensure that it was implemented to the satisfaction of all involved. It 
was not that the system was difficult to implement, it was not, rather it 
was the case that the renal service was the problem for the computer 
specialists. Instead of a uniform service the renal units related to one 
another in an organisationally complex way constituting as they did an 
1ntermeshing of various interests which were dominated by the consultants 
who themselves exhibited conflicting expectations of the computer system. 
The CORES Sys tem 
The CORES system had been implemented earlier than the Renal system 
and was only tangentially affected by the Korner and subsequent Griffiths 
reorganisation during the period of the research. In contrast to the renal 
consultan ts, Dr Old, the consultan t who in troduced the CORES sys tem, was 
active in the politics and practice of introducing computers into the 
health service both regionally (as a member of the clinical speCialist 
subgroup of the Regions Computer and Information Systems Comm:.ttee) and 
at district level (as chairperson of the Information and Computer Systems 
Advisory Committee which he established in 1981> in addition to chairing 
the CORES Steering Group. The role of the distr-ict committee was to acv:!.c:e 
both the District Management Team and the Medical Executive <:ommittee ·~n 
-:omputing facilities that invoh'ed district resources 
First Mee':ing). While, simEJ3.r to the renal case, 
one of the regional computer specialists, at least, always at,te~de(: the 
district committee and the computer steering group, their role being that 
of technical support and advisor of regions policy (see Figure 6.2). The 
district advisory commit tee was subsequently replaced by a cc :nmit tee 
chaired by the then newly appointed information officer as P,3rt o· the 
dis trict 's implemen ta tion of the then new information ~nanagemen t 
structures required as part of the Griffi ths/Ki5rner reorganis<3 tion=, but 
this was not until after the CORES ~;ystem had been accepted as ~he +'>0n 
long term sy~,tem for the St Giles Outpatients' Department, 
F '(,jUh:f:. 1£:',.1 f-I:IWtQh:lr\ah1 ... nd l)i.·t'l"ict C.CIIYINd,tt ... _ Reoloa-t.:ing -to tt-,$o COHE~; 
Siys;. tl"ro 
SYlAt"'I''1~.n Con'lm i. t·t'l3o .... 
<PCt 1 :i.CY·-hlAk :l~'Q bCldy) 
c: 1 in i,.:. lin l ::::~'''''C: illl 1 im t 
(Dr CI1.-.:j \"I1\~n'lI~I"""'I"':-
R.gion*l M'hr~~g~m~n·t S~rvic •• 
D:lvimic", 'C';:.lYlp ...... "t.I5" ... S;.'1 .. vic.fli.) 
Cl i,,:lclI\ 1 c.~:.mput.l'" '.=;\it'l-V iCllli'm 
(EIU'~QI"I,..) and Tecr,,'"'1 ie al ·.::.:.LJI='~'':''\~ t ) 
S;yst.m1iO- Ad ..... i .. o,~y G'~c.up 
(0 .. '" Ll J cI C1- J->-I .1 1-'::'" ,·'_Co,,,._ 
CCIF"E.~-; S~""l- 1)1"::] Group 
(Dr Old C~.~irp.r50n) 
Being a non-corporate computer system CORES had to be wholly ·ur:c!>?c 
out of district funds, but Dr Old adopt,?d the strategy of implemeding the 
system experimentally, which in resource terms meant that the system CGI}:d 
be run off the regions clinical computer bureau service virtua:ly free, 
except for costs of the peripherals, cabling and telephone and e~e,:~:~:ci'y 
use. Similarly, the technical support of the computer services initially 
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came free as part of the experiment. In contrast to the Renal Computer 
System, Dr Old had principally to convince the district, and not the 
regional, authorities to continue to support the system and to provide 
resources for its development. As shall be seen, the system continued to 
be supported by the district but events eventually overtook the CORES 
system: initially the proposal was in line with the region's practice of 
being supportive to local initiatives, but with the growth of 'corporacy' in 
compu ter developmen ts (following the Griffiths Report ,1982) the 
organisational climate for the CORES system became far less favourable and 
computer resources were were increasingly monopolised by the resource 
demands of the corpora te systems. 
3. The organisational volitics and decision-making processes 
Both computer systems - the renal and outpatients (CORES) - were 
introduced as a consequence of the initiative taken by individual 
consultants. These doctors took the leading role in the initial decision to 
introduce systems within the hospitals. However, whereas one was working 
within a single specialty (renal medicine) in association with colleagues 
at other hospitals throughout the region, the other was a physician within 
the multi-specialty setting of an outpatients' department within a single 
hospital. What this meant in practice was that it was less complex for the 
renal consultant to gain the committed support of consultant colleagues, 
given they were of the same specialty and incorporated within the same 
regional service; whereas the physician was unable to maintain the 
commit ted support of his colleagues from different specialties despite 
their working within the same hospital. It was not simply that in one case 
the consultants were all of one specialty and in the other they were not, 
but rather that the consultants in renal medicine and >ransplantation had 
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a stronger - and more centralised - organisational base on which to build 
their institutional control within the hospital service than were the 
consultan ts at St Giles. In the case of the renal service the consul vm t:=. 
had their own regional body, the Regional Renal Medicine and 
Transplantation Committee, which simplified the task of gaining and 
maintaining the commitment of the consultant's colleagues prior to gaining 
the official support of the hospital and district authorities. By contrast, 
the equivalent decision-making body for the St Giles consultants (CORES 
system) was the Hospital Medical Committee (HMO, a 'division' of the 
Medical Executive Committee (MEC), but the influence this body could wield 
was much less than that of the Regional Renal Medicine and Transplantation 
Commit tee, for its decisions were media ted by the MEC as well as the DMT, 
if they were of sufficient import to reach them. The renal consultants 
only had to convince themselves and the regional information and computer 
systems committee for the decision to computerise on the Renal system to 
become a firm policy commitment which no individual district, or hospital, 
was going to disregard ligh tly (see Figure 6,3). The CORES sys tern, by 
contrast, was a small project supported by a coalition of interests, not 
just the consultants, and it had to survive on a year to year basis 
competing with other computing and other priorities within the district. 
Under these circums tances the exercise of ins ti tu tional con trol was to be 
equivocal. 
In the following sections the processes by which the two systems 
came to be selected and implemen ted, and wha t happened subsequen tly, will 
be described. The focus will be on the the politics of the decision 
processes; my intention being to clarify the reasons for the differences 
approaches of the sponsoring consultants. The renal consultants as has 
already been indicated constituted a fairly stable coalition whereas the 
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consultants involved with the CORES system were not. ~ star~ with the case 
of the Renal Computer System. 
Renal Services and compu terisa tion. 
The Renal Computer System was initiated by the senior consultant, Dr 
Earl, at what was to be the 'pilot site' for the system, referred to here 
as the Haemo Uni t. The sys tem was designed primarily to aid the nur:::,es 
who had the responsibility of collecting and collating the clinical data on 
the renal pa tien ts. The sys tem was also designed to aid the clinicians in 
monitoring the well-being of the patients and it was intended that ~he 
system would be used to analyse the aggregate clinical data (a necessary 
facility if the system was to be used for clinical research). The logic of 
the system was that computerisation would save time and effort in 
recording patient data (the input side) and would speed up the accessing 
of the data (output side). Moreover, the system was designed to offer an 
improvement on the manual systems of data presentation particular:y in 
terms of time-related graph. The overall intention, as far as the 
sponsoring consultant was concerned, was that the system should save time 
and effort on part of the nurses and doctors while at the same time 
getting a more accurate and timely patient data record. The Renal Computer 
System constituted a renal patient database including not only clinical but 
also details of diets and summary information on social work or 
psychological counselling. 
Dr Earl's initial idea had been to develop a system 'inhouse' just for 
the Haemo Unit. The inspiration came after trying out the Commodore Pet 
microcomputer of a consultant colleague in another specialty and wondering 
why "we can't do this in the renal unit" <Earl: Interview 1>. He then !-urned 
for technical help and support to the hospital physicist who worked on 
developing systems and programmes for the renal unit. The consultant was 
F l(jUF~E Eo.2 
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not himself knowledgeable about the technical intricacies d C:Jmputers and 
computer systems nor was he involved in the policy making an·: decision 
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taking regarding computing developmen ts regionally or locally (in con tras t 
to Dr Old, the sponsor of the CORES system). Sometime in 1981-82 Dr Earl 
, 
with other members of the Haemo Unit, was invited to see the Renal 
Computer System in operation at a renal unit in another region by the 
senior consultant concerned (Earl: Interview 1>. He was sufficiently 
convinced of the system's usefulness <in comparison with the system they 
were developing 'inhouse') to set about convincing his colleagues - and the 
region - that the region's renal service required such an integrated 
computer system for a number of reasons, including the following three 
which appealed in particular to the consultants, 
(a) to improve the accuracy of the doctors' prognoses and 
consequent management of renal patients, 
(b to provide good facilities for research purposes 
(c) to permit patient data to be networked between the 
region's five renal units. 
The subsequent implementation of the Renal Computer System did see the 
first two issues addressed, the third one, however, was never to be 
seriously developed despite it having a practical appeal to many of the 
consultants; it would have made the communication of patient data between 
units easier, a facility of particular advantage to those renal units 
referring patients for kidney transplantation. Moreover, once a network 
facility was implemented the system would have been capable of 
automatically matching donor kidneys with a compatible recipient from 
among the dialysis patients on the transplant waiting lists at the 
different renal units. However, the consultants at the main transplant unit 
in the region (not the Dialysis and Transplant Unit) refused to cooperate 
because they did not believe that the implementation of the Renal Computer 
System would have been of any great advan tage to them in their work. 
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Whether the reasons for this were en tirely related to their perception oi 
the limitations of the computer system or whether it was concerned more 
to resource constraints was never wholly clear, although both factors were 
relevant. One point was clear, however, and that was that the collegiality 
of the renal consultants had its internal rifts and that not all the renal 
consultants were prepared to support Dr Earl's strategy. 
In addition to any desire simply to improve the renal service there 
were two other considerations of an even more practical kind, 
(a) if Dr Earl could convince his colleagues at the four other 
renal units, the system would be substantially funded by 
the region; 
(b) the demands for renal care and kidney transplan ta tion were 
known to be on the increase <Dowie ,1984. i Williams e tal, 
1984). The renal service was to be expanded (RHA, 
March,1983) to meet this increase in patient numbers and 
this would mean an increase in the clinical de ta to be 
collected, colla ted and monitored. A compu ter sys tem could 
be used to handle this increased data without having to 
increase the number of unit staff. 
Dr Earl's first move was to invite the renal consultant of the 
computerised unit to give a talk on the Renal Computer System to his 
consultant colleagues at one of the Regional Dialysis and Transplantation 
meetings (known as the 'Kidney Club'). Out of this came the initiative to 
set up a Regional Renal Computer System Steering Group (as the initiating 
consultant had intended) composed of renal consultants from all the five 
renal sites in the region plus a regional compu ter spec1alis t, All this 
happened in 1982 (Earl: Interview 1; minutes and internal memorandum). 
The senior nurses and the 'other disciplines' (dietetics, social work and 
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psychology) were also consulted from an early stage but none particioated 
in the decision-making process at the regional level. 
The renal consultants, with help and support from the project 
manager/computer specialist, drew up a list of criteria which any sys~er:: 
had to meet if it were to be considered for acceptance ('Operational 
Requirement', November, 1982). This in fact would have been drawn up by the 
computer specialist for it was this person's responsibility to translate 
the consultants' stated requirements into what computers could reasonably 
be expected to do. The document was probably have been the outcome of 
several meetings and discussions between various individuals but without 
fuller knowledge of the discussions at the Regional Renal Computer System 
Steering Group it is not possible for me to be more definite on the 
matter. What can be ascertained, however, is tha t it was a t the pilo ~ 
site, the Haemo Unit, and not at the Regional Renal Computer System 
Steering Group where the 'Operational Requirement' document was actually 
agreed and approved as the basis against which tenders should be 
submitted. This approval was given by the Haemo Renal Computer Working 
Group in December, 1982 (source: minutes). The reason for this action on 
the part of the Haemo Unit steering group was in order to ensure that the 
system could be ordered and implemented within the time frame within 
which the regional funds were available to pay for the project. In the 
event, and as will be explained in a moment, matters did not initially work 
out as Dr Earl had antiCipated and for a time it looked as if the renal 
consultants were going to have to accept a system they did not want, or 
lose regional funding of the project. It is the case, however, tha t in 
agreeing the criteria lis ted within the 'Opera tional Requiremen t' documen t 
the Haemo Unit steering group pre-empted any prevarication on the part of 
the consultants of the other units. To start with this strategy seemed :0 
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have worked, but as time went on the differences of opinion concerning ~.'le 
Renal Computer System began to surface, The first reports I came across 
concerned the main transplant unit in the region (not the Dialysis and 
Transplant Unit) which was not going to implement the system unless they 
were given substantially extra funds from region to do so (Princess Unit 
fieldnotes, 9th August, 1984, pp5-6j MSC, May, 1985, 130-160). This was 
followed by the consultants at the Dialysis and Transplant Unit complaining 
that the system was very inadequate for what they required, I have already 
touched upon this issue in the methods chapter (Chapter Five) in 
connection with criticisms of my report on the Renal Computer System and 
the matter will be discussed in detail in the next chapter which is 
concerned specifically with the implementation of the system at the renal 
units (Chapter Seven). 
To return to the beginnings of the process of the renal unit 
automation. The companies submitting tenders were asked to offer discounts 
if the system selected for the Haemo Unit proved acceptable to the 
regional authority and the other four renal units. The selection of the 
Renal Computer System, however, did not result so much from the computer 
company offering a system that fitted these criteria but rather the 
criteria reflected the facilities and capacities of the computer system 
that Dr Earl and the hospital physicist had come to most favour - any 
doubts about its limitations had been overtaken by the awareness that none 
of the other systems on offer could do as much. This can be asserted in 
the light of what happened when the contract was put out to tender. 
It was at this time that other systems were brought to the notice of 
the Renal Consultants Computer System Steering Group. As far as I am 
aware there were two contenders besides the Renal Computer System Company 
itself that responded when tenders were invited. One was quickly rejected 
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because of doubts concerning software support. The second system was 
known to the Renal Consultants Computer Systems Steering Group largely 
because "a leading figure in the computer company ... was himself a patient 
on home dialysis." <Earl: Interview 1). The system on offer was rejected 
because it was essentially a business system and was considered to have 
required too much development to be suitable for use in the renal units. 
There was also a third contender, the CORES system, which was proposed 
(rather than tendered) by Dr Old. This system was not seriously considered 
by the steering committee until after the Renal Computer System's company 
had apparently 'gazumped' the renal steering group. What happened was that 
when the companies were invited to submit their tenders, the price quoted 
by the Renal Computer System company was much higher than had been 
anticipated and far beyond the renal group's budget (in fact all three 
companies submit ting tenders quoted prices higher than the £30,000 the 
Region had allocated for the purpose). This new high price was therefore 
not acceptable: the Steering Group simply did not have the resources, and 
the renal consultants had to look for an alternative solution. It was at 
this point that the CORES system was brought to the attention of the Renal 
Consultants Computer Steering Group by Dr Old, who was a member of the 
clinical specialist sub-committee of the Regional Computer and Information 
Systems Committee which was responsible for authorising the regional 
funding of the renal system (see Figure 6.2). 
Dr Old mounted a vigorous campaign to convince the renal consultants 
that CORES was their best option. The renal consultants and in particular 
Dr Earl remained unconvinced, for the CORES system was not custom built 
for handling renal data as was the Renal Computer System. In particular, 
the CORES system lacked any graphics facility and that was the one 
f ilit th 1 It t d th system had to have if it was t.o BC y e rena consu an s agree e 
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improve patient care. The reason for this was that access to graphs would 
enhance the doctors' appreciatian of trends in the patients' haemotological 
and biochemical profiles (for reasons that will be made fully clear in the 
next chapter). Nevertheless, the CORES consultant was insistent and even 
arranged for the system to include a graphics 'package'. Thus the situation 
arose after the tenders had been submitted, where it appeared that the 
renal consultants would be forced to accept a computer system not of their 
choosing because the Renal Computer System was too expensive, and if they 
did not accept the CORES system they would not have any regionally 
supported computer system at all. Dr Earl, as sponsor of the Renal 
Computer System, soon found a way out of this impasse by himself phoning 
up the Managing Director of the Renal Computer System Company in early 
1983, who explained that the price quoted in the tender was a mistake and 
that, given an opportunity, the company would want to submit a revised 
tender quoting a price within the renal group's budget. The reason given 
by the managing director for the 'overpricing' was that he was out of the 
country at the time and those responsible for submitting the tender were 
unaware of the cos t cons train ts on the renal service and the in ten tion of 
the company's management to win the order (sources: Dr Earl, Interview 1 j 
Working Group Minutes). The Regional Renal Computer System Steering Group 
had then to go back to the Regional Clinical Users Sub-Commit tee (see 
Figure 6.3) to get the necessary authority and funds to go ahead. This was 
achieved, but only after much argument and discussion between the 
supporters of the Renal Computer System and Dr Old as the advocate of the 
CORES system. 
I do not know whether the computer company had any knowledge of the 
amoun ts alloca ted to the renal sys tem. Wha t is transparen t, however, was 
that Dr Earl and his COlleagues were committed to introducing the Renal 
-168-
Computer System and would give priority to the company's bid so long as it 
remained within their overall budget. A 'strategic choice' had been made by 
the renal consultants, following the initiative of the senior consultant at 
the Haemo Unit. While it was the case that the selection of the computer 
system was based on technical and economic considerations these were not 
the only ones and it is clear from what has just been described that the 
finel decision to select the Renal Computer System related principally to 
the poli tics of choice. 
In the episode where Dr Old tried to get the renal consul tan ts to 
accept the CORES system instead of the Renal Computer System there are 
some pertinent parallels with Pettigrew's analysis of the role of 
gatekeepers <1974, p. 233). In many respects Dr Old had qualities 
attributed to 'Kenny' <ibid) both had based their careers on the 
development of computer systems within their respective organisations 
(although Dr Old, as a consultant physician, was far less vulnerable than 
Kenny if any of his strategies failed). Similarly, both had based their 
commitment to computerisation in terms of particular computer systems. 
Kenny's commitment was to a particular manufacturer whereas Dr Old was 
committed to a particular medical computer language and systems based 
upon it, of which the CORES system was one major development. Dr Old had 
established his 'gatekeeping' role at both regional and district levels by 
membership of appropriate committees and by establishing new committees 
within the district health authority and other initiatives (below). Yet, 
unlike Kenny, Dr Old was unable to achieve his goal of getting the CORES 
system established as the regional renal computer system <and therefore a 
corpora te system) because Dr Earl had been able to establish a strong 
enough collegiate power-base through the establishment of the Regional 
Renal Consultan ts Compu ter Sys tern Advisory Commit tee to resis t the 
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proposition to introduce the CORES system into the renal service. Moreover 
, 
the Renal Computer System was already in use at renal units in other 
health regions, and professional colleagues in the field of renal medicine 
were working to make the system the national standard (Selwood and Will, 
1985, BJHC). The CORES system lacked the necessary collegia te suppor t of 
the renal consultants and the credibility of being an 'industry standard'. 
One final point is that, though the CORES system would have been 
considerably less expensive to implement and maintain than the renal 
system (see below), the renal consultants remained unanimously supportive 
of the Renal Computer System and were able to present a strong case for 
that system, and thus the great difference in costs between the two 
systems did not become a key issue in the deCiSion-making process. 
The Renal Computer System was finally accepted as the Regional Renal 
Services Computer System in the first quarter of 1983 and was implemented 
at the Haemo Unit (being the pilot site) in October,1983. The pilot site 
was 100% funded while the other units received the then standard 50% 
funding from the region. This was to have ramifications for the different 
units either in terms of the level of clerical and technical support they 
were able to afford or in terms of their commitment to the system. 
The CORES sys tem 
Turning now to the other computer system, CORES. This system was 
introduced into the outpatients' clinics of the small acute hospital 
(referred to here as St Giles) in 1981. It was sponsored by one particular 
consultant, Dr Old. The objective of the system was to replace the 
handwritten case notes with printed, structured reports, flowcharts and 
clinical summaries on patients, and to make available facilities for 
analYSing clinical data on groups of patients in order to facilitate higher 
standards of patient care and to stimulate medical research. Initially the 
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computer system <CORES) was introduced on an overtly experimental basis. 
The hardware and technical support was, as a consequence, made available 
by the regional health authority at a very low cost (details below) while 
the programmes were supplied from the USA completely free of charge. The 
system was introduced into the first outpatients' clinic towards the end of 
1981 but it was not until the following October (1982) that all the 
consultants had been introduced to the system. 
The CORES system was based on a medical computing language known as 
MUMPS <Massachussetts General Hospital !Ltility Multi frogramming ~ystem). 
MUMPS is in fact described as being a 
"combined operating system, high level interpretative 
programming language and da ta base managemen t sys tern" 
<Perfect et a1, January,1979, WMRHA). 
Dr Old had previous knowledge of systems design and programming using 
MUMPS facilities for these were available within the region. As has been 
explained earlier in this chapter he had a long history of research and 
development work with computers in medicine. The origins of his work 
with MUMPS can be traced back to contacts with a research colleague who, 
while visiting the USA in 1969, had made use of a MUMPS-based system 
within the hospital where she was working and was very impressed by it. 
This research colleague considered the sys tem to be superior to any she 
had come across previously in the medical computing research she had been 
engaged in, and it was this message she brought back to her colleagues in 
the UK. La ter, in the mid 'seven ties, the DHSS announced it was to 
introduce the MUMPs system in the NHS on an experimental basis. The 
system, and the resources to run it, was to be awarded to the region that 
demonstrated that it had the most need for it and this was to be measured 
in terms of the number of medical computer projects designed to use the 
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MUMPS system. It was in this context that iJr Old was aSKea, 'Jy his now 
former working colleagues (he had since become a consultant), to design a 
suitable system to be run on MUMPS. The result was the 'Junior Doctors 
Information System' which was, in effect, an electronic guide ~o good 
clinical practice for house officers working on the wards, and doctors of 
tha t grade attached to Dr Old were expected to make use of the sys tem. A 
number of other projects were also developed and together convinced the 
DHSS to award the MUMPs system to this Region. This meant that there We'S 
now a computer centre (bureau) entirely dedicated to supporting 
experimental medical computing projects based on MUMPs. It was staffed 
wi th at least two full- time computer personnel (analys t-progr8mmers), and 
it gave bureau computing support to medical computing projects more or 
less free. This mean t tha t the doctors who have used the sys tem have paid 
very little for the use of the facilities: all the hardware, including the 
peripherals <within an agreed configura tion), the compu t ing processing and 
access to the mini computer came free as well did the technical advice and 
support of the computer specialists (during the CORES project the policy 
regarding charging for the technical advice and support changed but tha t 
comes la ter ). 
Having established the Junior Doctors' Information System, Dr Old 
became in teres ted in developing a new and more ambi tious compu ter ::Jfoject, 
using the CORES system. This system was to be implemented as a medical 
records system for the outpatients' department. It was designed to provide 
a clinical da tabase from data recorded during the medical en co un ter, from 
which case notes, structured reports, summaries and flowcharts could be 
derived either for routine clinic purposes, or for research and mec:cal 
audit. In addition, requests for ad hoc searches could be fairly easily 
dealt with (e.g. what proportion of patients, by what sDecia~ity, were 
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hypertensive) and 'prompts' could be readily prc,grammed into the system, so 
tha t pa tien ts' records would be au toma Ucally 'flagged' if certain 
procedures, drugs or investigations were normally reouired by the 
consultant. The CORES system was modular in design and provic!ed, :n 
addition, full patient administration facilities as well. 
The CORES system was known to Dr Old through the newsletters of ~~e 
MUMPS users group and the medical computing literature. By the middle of 
1981, following correspondence and telephone calls with the CORES systems 
people in the USA, Dr Old was sent - completely free of charge - the 
manual and computer 'tapes' for the CORES system. The reason for thi::: 
magnanimity was tha t the system was supported by the US Governmen t who 
wanted it made available as widely as possible in order that it might be 
fully tested and, if appropriate, become the health industry standard (a~ 
leas t in the USA). 
The selection of the CORES system was not the outcome of corporate 
decisions at regional level as was the case with the Renal Computer 
System. It was instead the result of, 
(a) a consultant's research interest combined with, 
(b) his involvement in the regional politics of :nec!ical 
computing (i.e. lobbying the DHSS for the MUMPs system, 
active involvement on the regions computer committees) and 
(c) there being available the very heavily subsidised computer 
facilities at the MUMPs computer centre. 
However, this prehistory does not explain why the consultant's colleagues 
and the hospital and district administration supported his experiment. To 
take the administration first, at the time <1980-1981> the district lacked 
any regionally supported computer projects and his proposal was relatively 
inexpensive at an estimated cost of about £5,000 per annum (the capital 
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cost was less than £500). The formal decision making process was as 
follows, 
(a) proposal goes to the Hospital Management Team and 
receives support, 
(b) passed to the District Management Team who refer it to 
the District Planning Committee. The proposal is supported 
and funded initially for one year. 
(c) at the same time the proposal is submitted ~o the MUMPS 
steering group which decides what projects are to be 
supported by the MUMPs facilities. The project is to be 
supported and resourced for three years (1981 - 1984) 
subject to an annual review. 
The proposal, despite its relative inexpensiveness, did not Droceed 
unopposed. The Finance Officer was reluctant to agree to the funding of 
the project and initially the funding was only for £2,000 for one year 
(CORES steering group minutes, June, 1981) and then only after the Finance 
Officer had been persuaded informally by the Assistant District 
Administrator (Fieldnotes 5th August, 1981). 
The formal decision-making processes took place between January and 
June, 1981, but had been preceded by the less formal process of gaining 
collegia te support for the project from the other consultants who held 
clinics in the St Giles Outpatients' Department. Only one consultant 
indicated any reticence (and that informally only) and he expre:=sed an 
unwillness to prejudice a colleague's research. The consultation Drocess 
was carried out on an individual basis by writing and talking to each 
consultan t in turn. This process was carried ou t during the second half of 
1980 and the resultant support was formalised through the Hospital Medical 
Committee (Fieldnotes 5th June, 1981>. The submissions to the hospital and 
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district committees therefore were in the name of a~l the consultants 
collectively, although no one a t any time confused this formality with the 
reali ty tha tit was Dr Old's projec t. Wha t his colleagues had done was to 
indica te that they did not object to participa ting in the CORES Droject j 
this arrangement is quite usual in cases were a system is designed to be 
used in several clinics and, as we have seen, the adoption of the Renal 
Computer System followed parallel lines. It is a practical example of 
collegiate control and reciprocal support (Johnson, 1972). Without the 
support of his consultant colleagues Dr Old's project would not have 
happened, yet he was not able to do very much with their support for there 
was to be a fine distinction drawn between not obstructing the project and 
actively supporting it. Details of the how this distinction manifested 
itself in practice are discussed in some detail in Chapter Eight which 
deals with the outcome of the system's implementation. 
Even before the formal decisions to support the CORES project had 
been taken the CORES Steering Commit tee was es tablished with Dr Old in the 
chair. This was in May, 1981. This committee was primarily concerned with 
the technicalities of setting up the system, developing the system's 
facili ties and organising the evalua tion of the project in order to mee!; 
the district managements requirements. The meetings were run along 
participative lines, but always with the objective of getting the system 
implemen ted as soon as was possible. Membership of the comm! t tee was 
between six and nine people including the unit administrator, computer 
personnel, senior nursing officer, management services personnel and the 
medical records officer. 
It should be noted that the one occupational group not mentioned has 
been the medical staff who were to use the system for although they di.c: 
have a representative he never attended any of the meetings. Nevertheless. 
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desoite this lack of active participation the steering committee ;uncti0n~d 
well enough as the ins trument by which the professional dominance of the 
consultants was translated into an organisational, or administrative f'::r~ 
No other doctor needed to be on the committee Dr Old would ac~ on their 
behalf and anyway the consultants were seen by Dr Old to require a "more 
personal treatment, very gentle, very different" than other members of the 
hospital staff (Fieldnotes, 7th September, 1981). To this end Dr Old 
maintained a rigorous gatekeeper role regarding access to his colleagues. 
Only he was to organise and carry ou t the implemen tion of the sys tem for 
the consultants and junior staff. 
Parallelling the events at St Giles was the setting up of the 
Information and Computing Advisory Group which had its first meeting in 
July, 1981 at the nearby District General Hospital. Like the CORES Steering 
Group it too was set up at the instigation of Dr Old, who also chaired the 
meetings. The main role of the commit tee was to develop a coord ina ted 
strategy for computing and information systems in the district, to advise 
both the District Management Team and the Medical Executive Committee and 
to liaise with the Region on these matters (Minutes 10th July, 1981>. This 
the committee did until its demise in 1985 when, following the 
implementation of the KBrner and Griffiths recommendations, it was 
replaced by a committee chaired by the Information Officer - a process 
that was happening in other districts too. The committee, however, a~so 
served as the district's monitoring body for the CORES project, ensuring or 
a t least enhancing, the project's continued acceptability to the dis trict 
authorities. In short, the Information and Computing Advisory Committee 
institutionalised Dr Old's gatekeeping role regarding the CORES system vis 
a vis the District Management Team and because it was the dis trict 's 
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specialist committee on the subject of computer systems, the Regional 
Health Authority. 
4-. The politics of professionalism: comparisons 
The two computer projects <Renal and CORES System) were ~he 
initiatives of individual consultant clinicians. The two systems both 
involved hospital clinicians accepting some changes in the presentation of 
clinical data and information but these changes were intended to be 
improvements on the pre-existing manual/handwritten systems for these 
doctors. In addition, both systems were designed to facilitate the 
monitoring of patients conditions and their treatment as well as oflering 
facilities for research and audit purposes. While both were real- time 
systems the CORES system was designed on the assumption that the 
clinicians would prefer to work from printed outputs ('hardcopy') while the 
Renal Computer System was designed on the assumption that the medical 
user might wish to directly access data and information via a terminal 
keyboard and VDU. The more crucial differences, however, related to 
organisational, rather than technical, factors. The single specialty/multi-
site, regionally funded corporate status of the renal dialysis and 
transplant service was a simpler organisation to be computerised than the 
multi-specialty/single-site, district funded, outpatient department. These 
organisational differences had major implications for the politics of 
implementation. There was a marked contrast between the approaches of the 
two sponsoring consultants. Dr Earl's approach, was based wholly on gaining 
organised collegia te suppor t f or the project and, once tha twas 
established, allowing (or not being able to prevent - see Chapter Seven) 
other consultants taking a leading role in coordinating and con trolling the 
project. Here was a strategy of collegiate solidarity designed to ensure 
-177-
institutional control of the consultants. In cont t DOl' d 
,ras, rca opted a 
strategy that, while it was dependent on collegiate support, was orientated 
more to constructing and maintaining coaH tions within and between the 
district administration and regional computing and systems specialists. 
This approach I have called the strategy of organisational coalitions whic~ 
involved the sponsoring consultant in working within the framework of 
organisa tional control in order to mobilise the resources for the CORES 
project whilst intending to retain the support of his colleagues. These 
strategies, were in part predicated on the different organisational 
realities that confronted the renal units and the outpatients' department. 
These realities, in turn, greatly influenced the chances of the systems 
being implemen ted wi thin the clinics and used by clinicians. In summary 
form one can say that in the case of the Renal Compu ter Sys ~em the 
doctors had a real, tangible, commitment to the system whereas in the case 
of the CORES system they did not. For in the latter case the doctors were 
expected to modify their routines regarding their writing of case notes 
and use of the medical record, while the renal consultants were to directly 
benefit from the system's introduction whether they personally modified 
their methods of working or not <for details see Chapter Seven). 
Whichever strategy was adopted both sponsoring consultants were able 
to rely on the formal support of their consultant colleagues. In general 
terms this was related to the consultants' collegiality, but t~lS could be 
further disaggregated into four sub-categories, 
1. Technological Rationalism: when the doctors believed :~ey 
should not stand in the way of what they perceived as 
progress; 
2. Collegiate Commitment: when doctors believed that, in the 
interests of professionalism, they should always formally 
3. 
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support research projects of colleagues; 
Instrumental Commi tmen t: some consultants saw the 
implementation of the computer systems as being directly 
useful to themselves in carrying out their own 8rojects; 
4. Protectionism: some of the consultants believed that the 
existence of the experimental computer project gave 
additional protection against closure of the hospital (an 
ever-present threat to the small hospital) 
These sub-categories were initially derived from the analyses of the 
transcriptions of the first interviews with the doctors at St Giles 
hospital, but, with the exception of protectionism, these rationales were 
also found to be applicable to the renal service. The strategy of 
collegia te s'olidari ty adopted by Dr Earl ensured that the collegia te and 
instrumental commitments were welded together, ensuring a high-level of 
insti tutional con trol, with the result tha t the introduction of the Renal 
Computer System succeeded in a way that the CORES system did not. In the 
case of the CORES system there were insufficient resources available ';0 
meet the specific instrumental interests of the consultants and this meant 
that the main rationale for supporting the project could only be that of 
collegia te commitmen t, li t tle media ted by other considera tions, and this 
was a rather weak form of institutional control. This meant the degree to 
which Dr Old could rely on the practical support of his colleagues was 
limited; they were prepared no t to oppose his project, but they were to 
find little in CORES system that appealed to them. Against this background 
the s tra tegy adop ted by Dr Old was to build an organisa tional coalition 
with the compu ter specialis ts and the adminis tra tors and this makes sense 
for, unlike Dr Earl, he lacked any cohesive constituency or power base ior 
his strategy. The implications of the adoption of these strate~ies for the 
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day to day use of the two systems are developed and anal!sed in de~ail in 
the following two chapters. 
Conclusions 
In this chapter we have seen how two individual consul tan t3 have 
a t tempted to mobilise the ins ti tu tional con trol available to them in order 
to implement two computer-based medical information system. In t~e case of 
the Renal Computer System Dr Earl was able to adopt a strategy that 
subordinated the organisational control of regional computer policy to hi; 
and his colleagues institutional control, something Dr Old was never able 
to do. This was partly, and importantly, because Dr Old lacked the active 
interest and support of many of his consultant colleagues. Yet these same 
consultants never withdrew their official support for the CORES project 
they simply found ways of not using the system. In consequence the 
clinical faciIi ties of the system were never formally recognised as having 
been rejected by the consultants. 
I have also argued tha t tha t the consultan ts commitmen t to the 
systems implementation were to be categorised according to four 
empirically grounded rationales, these were, 
1. technological rationalism, 
2. collegia te commi tmen t, 
3. instrumental commitment and 
4. protectionism. 
Moreover, these rationales had an important influence on the degree to 
which the sponsoring consultants could mobilise the institutional control 
of the doctors. Dr Earl was able to mobilise stronger colleague suppod 
for the Renal Computer System than was Dr Old with the CORES system 
because he could summon up both collegiate and instrumental commitmen~ to 
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the system, and sustain those commitments to a considerable extent. 
Initially Dr Old was able to draw upon all four rationales to some degree 
but soon after the system was introduced the consultants support was 
reduced to one of collegiate commitment which proved to be insufficient 
for the system's survival as a replacement for the traditional medical 
records. The collegiality of these consultants ensured the system was not 
withdrawn because of their lack of formal support, but it was not real 
enough to have supported the system's general acceptance in the clinics. 
This was related to the practical experiences the consultan ts had with the 
system which are discussed in Chapter Eight. 
The very limited success of the CORES system's implementation was 
also related to the changes in the region's computer policy which moved 
rapidly towards a commi tmen t to developing the corpora te pa t ien t 
administration system - in order to meet the priorities established by the 
Griffiths and Kl:>rner Reports - and away from supporting other independent 
compu ter developmen ts. This trend reflected the grea ter commitmen tat the 
'centre' - the DHSS - to strengthening the states' organisational control 
of the health service. The Renal Computer System also suffered from this 
policy, for despite its own corporate status the system was implemented on 
the assumption of the regional computer specialists that it would be with 
only a minimal level of resource support because of the high priority 
given to the developmen t of the PAS corporate system. Unlike the :lAS 
system the Renal Computer System was not intended to be !)art of the 
developing corporate information system designed to underpin the new 
management structures of the health service of the 'eighties and 'nineties. 
The system's corporate status reflected the consultant's ability to exploit 
i ' 't t' to e~·tend its the arrangemen t ra ther than the reg on s 10 en lOn ., 
organisational control over the service. 
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The implemen ta tion. survival and deve lopmen t of ~he two compu ':er 
sys terns depended less on technical f actors and more on the interplay 
between the politics of institutional and organisational control wi:'1in the 
hospital service. 
t .. 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
INTRODUCING A COMPUTER SYSTEM INTO 
TWO RENAL UNITS: A LABOUR PROCESS 
ANALYSIS 
Introduction 
This chapter is concerned with the introduction of a computer system 
into two hospital renal units. The objective is to elaborate 00, 
(a) the division of labour involved in renal work and the 
role played by patient records, 
(b) the consequences of the introduction of the Renal 
Computer System, and 
(c) the reasons for any variations in impact 0; 
computerisation on the two renal units. 
In the last chapter the concern was to describe and analyse the politics 
of the processes of introducing computer systems into clinic work and '~is 
necessarily ignored examining in any detail the nature of the clinical 
context in which the computer system was intended to opera~e. The 
intention here, and in the next chapter, is to make up this deficiency by 
examining in detail the labour process of clinic work in order to 
(a) understand the role the computer system was intended to 
play in this context and 
(b) the reasons for any limitations in the system and its use. 
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In this chapter the concern is with the Renal Computer System and its 
implementation at two renal units. 
It is the case that patients on renal dialysis regularly undergo 
haemotological and biochemistry investigations which produce a wealth of 
numerical data, as does the routine recording of the patients temperature, 
weight and blood pressure, it is relatively straightforward, technically, 
for this patient data to be computerised (Will and Selwood,1985, p.ll). 
However, my concern is not simply with the process of computer 
implementation in these terms, but with the implications or variations in 
the organisation and control of renal work between the two renal units for 
the ways in which the system came to be used (a point made in Chapter 
Six). The purpose here will be to develop further the labolJr process model 
set out in Chapter Three, in particular with regard to the issue of medical 
dominance vis a vis the other heal thcare profeSSions involved in the 
delivery of hospital healthcare. 
The chapter begins with an account of the organisation of the 
division of labour associated with renal work, particularly as it involves 
the doctors, nurses and patients, but also including consideration of the 
work of the dieticians, social workers and clinical psychologists. This 
provides the necessary background knowledge of work processes and the 
division of labour associa ted with renal units, in order to be able to 
analyse the organisational outcomes and users' responses to the 
introduction and use of the Renal Computer System, which in turn forms the 
subject of the second part of this chapter. 
Renal work and the labour process 
The division of labour associated with the care of patients with 
Chronic End Stage Renal Failure (ESRF) is schema tically rep.-esen ted in 
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Figure 7.1 (below>. This diagram relates the work of each disci;)line ~o the 
stage in a patient's career of renal failure (at the bottom of the diagram) 
and illus tra tes the dominan t role of the doctors <consultan ~s) in 
diagnosing the disease and consequently categorising the patient as in 
need of: 
(a) advise from the dietician, 
(b) dialysis and training in dialysis techniques by the renal 
nursing staff, 
(c) support and guidance of social workers and/or 
psychologists (as recommended by the nursing staff), 
(d) facilities for carrying out renal dialysis in their own 
home to be organised by the home administrator, 
While the renal labour process represented in Figure 7.1 is common to 
all renal units in the region there are nevertheless important difterences 
as between individual units. Thus, only one of the units (Haemo) made 
regular use of a clinical psychologis t j this same uni t was one of two 
which provided only haemo-dialysis facilities while all the other units 
also provided peritoneal dialysis (CAPD)j and one unit provided the renal 
(kidney) transplantation service for three of the other four as well as for 
its own dialysis patients, leaving the remaining centre with independent 
transplant facilities. It was not possible to include all the renal units in 
this study, because the timescale of computerisation was much too long, 
and continued well after the time available for fieldwork had passed. Thus 
the two units that have been included here were those whose 
computerisation programme was completed within the time available for 
study, but the two sites were markedly different in terms of size and 
complexity. This mean t tha t ilIum ina ting comparisons could be m.3,::e of 
-135-
"("HE UhbAN lSAT IelN ANt) CONTROL OF r HF RENAL l ,c.,!::-:ClUR PROCE~;S 
(s:lmpl i., :led)* 
»»»»»»»»»»»»»»> 
( D:f:II,,,,nC' •• :£a) 
R"'-'a ~ c..?l, .. U 1 tant.. .;.. r")d 
M.dicillol ~;ta"" ««««««« 
1««««««« 1 
( OJ .. 't~) 
Nursing 
S .. cre~ri ... _ 
Sot • .,., :>:;,:> >:>. >Hom. Adm in l.n."trator 
,s, TJ'lIrln:J.ng.l 
~»»»»»»»+»»+»>P_YChologi_t 
C.r •• r :-
F!"1I\11il'"lQ 
Kidn.y .. )·:»»»»»»e:~""d Sttlllg\lii' 
Ren~l F~il\.~r~.»»»»»»»»»»»»»Tran.pl.nt 
R.j .... c1:.ed 
TrSlng.pl .... nt 
Not •• 
C:a) 
(b) Th. \,,(:.1. ~:...f 't,t-.,. tl~_'ntat='la.l"lt sUrg_O\""l1iio i-. :ignored. 
(c:) ,..~ ..... :In"t.,''-._..::'t.:f.on 01' tJ-.1Iilo v.rtica.l l::Ln ..... witt-I 'Tt-. ... F"ati.-nt's C ... r ........ ' .. • 
-tt-I_ 1 in •• h.". neo c.thMr tempo\"'a 1 _igni'f i"::8\nc:a. 
(d) Th. +1lIO indicat ... ·tM. vlllit',"'ti...::al 1:\.", .... (I) Cl"'Oa._lliio_ ova,,,, the ho,"i::z:ontal 
their distinctive clinic division of labour and the roles of the doctors within 
them (see also Chapter Six). As already indicated, the Haemo Unit was the 
smaller of the two units studied in terms of space, staff and patients (details 
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presented below). Moreover, it only provided facili~:e'.; for haemo-dialy:=is 
(and follow-up care for patients who had undergone kid~ey orafts). The 
Dialysis and Transplant Unit, by contrast, had the facilities anc the soace 
to bring patients into the unit for investigations, treatment and to stay 
overnight if necessary (the unit had 13 beds). The unit also employed the 
services of a transplant surgeon. In both the renal units the patient data 
was kept in tabular form in the medical record folder, while only the 
Dialysis and Transplant Unit routinely presented the data on graphs (known 
as 'charts') which were filed separately from the medical records, The 
staff in each renal unit adapted to the new computer system differently 
and this related to the pre-existing manual system of data collection, 
collation and presentation as well as, more fundamentally, to the 
under lying medical ra tionales (or ideologies) of the cons u ~ tan ts. In th is 
first part of the chapter it is the different methods of patient related 
data collection and usage that form the primary focus, for they constitute 
the data-bases for the medical management information system within the 
units. This will be followed by a consideration of the differences in 
medical rationales to be found in the two units and the inter-relationship 
these have with the organisation of the collection and retrieval o· paient-
related data. 
End stage renal failure and dialysis treatment 
To understand the control and coordination of the work processes 
associated with the care of chronic end stage renal failure pa tients it is 
necessary to examine the nature of renal work in more detaL, We start 
with the patient: chronic end stage renal failure (ESRF) is of a different 
order from most, if not all, other chronic diseases. The patient can only 
be retur-ned to a self-sustaining condition of reasonable heaIt" E he (~r 
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she has a kidney transplant (1). While waiting for a transplant, or as an 
alternative thereby to transplantation, patients are kept ali'le and well 
through the regular dialysis of their blood by means tha t emula te the 
function of the kidneys. This is necessary because the kidney function of 
these pa tien ts has declined to such an extent that l' + tl . f very 1. e, 1 any, 
waste products are being filtered out of the blood Circulation, so that 
without dialysis urea would accumulate in the blood stream to such an 
extent that a patient would die within one or two weeks (Gallagher, 1976 
p, 64). 
Renal dialysis takes baSically two forms, 
(a) haemo-dialysis 
(b) peri toneal dialysis 
which will now be described in turn. 
(a) Haemo-dialysis 
Haemo-dialysis involves the patient's blood being pumped through an 
artificial kidney whereby, through a process of osmosis and 
filtration, the patients blood is cleansed of urea and its electrolyte 
balance is maintained in an approximation of natural kidney function 
<ibid.). This procedure is normally carried out twice or three times a 
week for 3-6 hours (Haemo fieldnotes Book I, 16th August,1983, pp.5-
6; Dialysis and Transplant fieldnotes, Book I, 18th June, 1984, pp. 
39-40). New patients first have to undergo minor surgery in order 
tha t an artery and a vein in the forearm can be conjoined to form a 
'fistula' large enough to be accessible for connecting (via tubing) to 
the artificial kidney within the haemo dialysis machine. The 'kidney' 
is a filter, typically cylindrical in shape with the blood oassing 
through many fine tubes while the dialysate passes over t'l",se tubes 
and draws off the toxic elements that have accumalated in the blood. 
-188-
The cleansed (dialysed) blood is then returned to the pa tient 's own 
circula tory sys tem. The blood is preven ted from coagu 18 t ing 
('clotting') whilst outside the body of the patient by the automdtic 
addition of the anti-coagulant, heparin. The blood is also warmed to 
maintain it at body temperature. (Fieldnote Book I, Haemo Unit 
16.8.83, pp. 5-7; Dialysis and Transplant fieldnote Book I, 27.7.84. 00. 
60-62). 
(b) Peritoneal dialysis 
Peritoneal dialysis systems exploit the osmotic quality of the 
peritoneum to cleanse the patients blood of toxic material. The most 
common peritoneal technique is that of Continuous Ambula tory 
Peritoneal Dialysis (CAPO). Where the patient has his or "tar abdominal 
cavity loaded with an appropriate quantity of dialysate, and this 
dialysate is changed about every three hours during the patients 
waking life via a plastic tube (TenchofD embedded through the 
abdominal wall (Dialysis and Transplant fieldnote Book I 27 th July, 
1984, pp. 63-65). One variation of this technique is the system where 
the dialysate changes take place automatically throughout the night 
while the patient sleeps - a process known as Continuous Cyclic 
Peritoneal Dialysis (CCPO) <Dialysis and Transplant fieldnote Book I, 
27th July, 1983, p.62). This system had not been used within either 
renal unit previously, in part because it was a more recent 
development than CAPO, but one patient did 'switch' from CAPO to CCP=i 
during the time of the fieldwork (Dialysis and Transplant iieldno~es 
Book 1., 24th July, 1984, p. 40; Book 2, 1st August, 1984. D. 14; 11~'1 
September, 1984, p. 23). 
Renal dialysis is an expensive therapy, costing at 1981 prices -
between an estimated £7.900 and £12,245 a year for each ;catien~ (Wing et 
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a1 quoted in Dowie, 1984, p. 990). However, the difference between home 
haemo-dialysis and CAPD is to be measured in hundreds and not hcusands 
of pounds (£! while, according to Dowie and perhaps surprisingly, (,/·PD is 
the more expensive dialysis system (£8,650 compared with £7,900 for home 
haemo-dialysis) <ibid> (2). The question of costs was not, however, the key 
consideration of the consultants when they decided on the dialys::.s reg:me 
they generally preferred. The senior consultant at the Haemo Unit was very 
committed to haemo-dialysis because it was a tried and teste,:: technicue 
whereas CAPD was a, relatively, new system that had been dogged by 
problems of peritoneal infections (Fieldnotes Book 1, 13th August, 1983, p. 
5 ). By contrast, the consultan ts at the Dialysis and Transolan t Unl t, 
favoured CAPO because it took less time for patients to learn to use (two 
weeks compared to a minimum of six weeks), the dietary restrictions were 
less onerous and the process of dialysis was viewed by them as being more 
'natural' than haemo-dialysis for it exploited the osmotic properties of 
the peritoneum rather than that of an external artificial kidney (Con. DT1, 
Int. 1, May, 1984, 146-192). The preferences of the consultants at the two 
units to the two different types of dialysis regimes (haemo-di.:llysis and 
CAPO) not only had implications for the division of labour within the renal 
units they also reflected an underlying difference in philosophy between 
the senior consultants at the two units. In order to be able to explain 
the differences between the units in any detail, and to identify the 
under lying medical ra tiona1es of the consultan ts it is necessary to 
examine more closely the work of the Haemo and Dialysis and Trans;:;l3n ': 
units. 
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The Haemo Uni t 
Doctors, nurses and patients 
The renal unit was established in 1970 and was physically small 
relative to the other units in the region, the total space available being 
approximately 20 x 30 square metres <including corridors, staff changing 
rooms and store rooms). The unit consists of two wards (containing 
reclining armchairs and not beds) for dialysis and training sufficient for 
8 pa tien ts a t anyone time. During the period of research the pa tien t 
numbers at the unit were as follows (Table 7.1), 
TAE!tLE 7.1: DIALYS:18 F:'A'r ZEN'r NUMEIER:E; (HAEMO UNIT) 
1 •. Ind ... , .. t"· .... inil'Q 
Homet d:l'ltly.1 ... 
LJn:l't p.lt:l ... )~~t. 
Pat:1.nt. on d:ialyw.:1. 
T"C'T"AL 
·'0 
:31 
23;$' 
64 
33 
97 
b.c .. u... u-.. 
p.'ti.nt. lack_a ·tt... n.c ..... , .. y back-up _upport 0", .. _pou •• ; 
":'"ltt-,""p r.l .. tiv. or~ i!aCIU •• C.tt-,.'r p"l'~.on whc. could t-,_lp in c .... Cit 
There were two consultants, one registrar and two house staff. The 
consult an ts were officially described as general physicians with a special 
in teres t in renal medicine (Can. HM 1, In t. 1, Oc tober, 1983, 001-014). This 
meant that they were also involved with patients on the general medical 
wards and at outpatients' clinics. The registrar would be expected by the 
consultants to take a special interest in renal medicine and take 
responsibility for the day to day medical requirements of the renal 
patients but this was not the case with the two house staff. 
The nursing staff were employed full time on the unit on two shifts 
(early end late) (Haemo fieldnotes, Book I, 16th August, 1983, p.6). At the 
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time of the research the nursing complemen twas 14- (see Table for 
details). 
TABLE 7.2: NUF~SIN(3 :?.i;TAF--F' (HAE:MCI UNIT) 
(HiHtfitlmCt 1:1eldno"t,.a, ... Boc.k Tw,=., 21st M.-.y# 19E14. p,32) 
The Nursing Officer had organised the work of the nurses in line wi th the 
criteria of the nursing process (Hunt and Marks-Maran, 1986; Yura and 
Walsh, 1973 cited in Saba and McCormick, 1986, p.117; Walton, 1987; ). In 
the context of this renal unit this meant that each nurse was individually 
responsible for the total nursing care of specific patients. In part this 
was done to increase the work interest for the nurses and thereby improve 
the quality of care to the patients (SN3, Int 1, September, 1983). The 
nurses' main responsibility was to train patients to haemo-di3lyse 
independently at home (3) and the training also involved one other member 
of the patients family, typically the spouse, who would be given some 
training sufficient to act as a 'backup' in case of difficulties or 
emergencies during haemo-dialysis. Dialysis training at this unit was 
judged by all the staff to involve more than patients learning to carry 
out the technicalities of haemo-dialysis; they also had to become 
accustomed to the necessity of living with the discipline and routine of 
haemo-dialysis. The training period, which was often in excess of t:18 six 
weeks, gave time for the patient, and the patients family, to ada?t to t!1e 
regime (Int. SN1, Int.1, September, 1983, Side 2: 001-061>' 
Much of the nursing work, as organised at this unit. was of the kind 
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classified by Strauss et a1 as 'sentimental work' q 982; 19;3'5) anG more 
particular the sub- types, composure and iden tity work. Composure work is 
that of "helping, or enjoining patients to keep their composure" <1985: 
p.l36) while undergoing dialysis and identity work "of gening ." person", 
to face the realities of their physical conditions and prepare them for 
their post-hospital lives" <1985: p.138). The Sentimental work was noc 
carried out solely by the nurses, for other members of the clinic division 
of labour <e.g. social worker and psychologist) also had a direct role to 
play, bu t the nurses took the key role in ensuring the work was carried 
out. 
Alongside the work of dialysis and patient training the nurses had 
the parallel task of recording patient data. The patients' blood pressures, 
temperatures and weights were recorded at the time of each hospital 
dialysis (home patients kept their own records>. In addition, biochemical 
and haemotological profiles were kept on all pa tien ts and blood and urine 
samples were taken, or collected, by the nurses each month. The collation 
of this data was carried out by the senior nurses only (Le. Nursing 
Officer and Sisters). In addition these senior nurses kept the patient data 
on those patients with renal disease but who had not reached end stage 
failure, even though formally this was the responsibility of the doctors 
alone <Nurse 3, Int.1, September, 1983, 224--235; Dr HMC, Int.l, September, 
1983, 56-102). 
The remaining member of the renal unit's staff to be considered here 
is the Home (or Renal> Administrator. The person had the responsibility of 
organising the installation of the haemo-dialysis equipment in the patients 
home, ordering and supplying the necessary supplies (e.g. dia~y~a~e, 
artificial kidneys, etc.>, and organising any maintenance work that might be 
required. The Home Administrator was also responsible for .,he gener.'!: 
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administration of the renal unit <Ad.l, Int.1, September, 1983, Int. 2, June, 
1984). As we shall see (below) the administrator also played an active par~ 
in 'identity work' with patients, or at least the recalcitrant ones who did 
not want to take on the responsibility of dialysing at home <Ad.l, Int.l, 
September, 1983, 019-047; Haemo fieldnotes, 22nd August, 1983, pp. 26-27 re 
case no.27>. In the context of computerisation the home adminis~rator, in 
common with the administrators at the other renal units in the region, was 
to become designated the systems controller. 
The 'Other Disciplines' 
Other staff that were routinely and directly associated wi~h the care 
of haemo-dialysis patients were the dietician, psychologist and social 
worker. They constituted what were referred to by all involved with renal 
work as the 'other disciplines'. Unlike the nurses, however, these people 
were not members of the renal unit but were part of separate specialist 
departments, and thus they were also responsible for other types of 
patients within the hospital. 
The dietician's role in the ESRF division of labour was a particularly 
important one. This was firstly because dietary controls were the means by 
which end stage renal failure was postponed, often by many months and 
secondly, because patients had to remain on a restricted diet in order to 
control the disease, as the artificial 'kidney' within the haemo-dialysis 
machine was less effective than a healthy human kidney and as a result 
was unable to remove toxic elements as effectively as its organic 
counterpart (4). In consequence it was vital for patients, starting months 
before they required dialysis, to avoid certain elements in their diets 
(notably potassium) and to maintain an ideal body weight <Dt 1, Int.l, 
September, 1983, 001-026). 
The role the social worker was fairly limited. Most of her casework 
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concerned patien ts' financial problems, although she would a ;:30 try ."lnd 
deal with "personal problems" as well, "but they are time consuming and I 
don't always have the time to see to them" (Non-Med 4, Int.1, October, 
1983, 008-021>. She would have liked to have adopted a broader role and to 
have included the assessment and counselling of all new pa tien ts. However, 
over time she had found that other work pressures (unspecified) had 
prevented the work being routinely carried out. 
Turning now to the last of the 'other disciplines', the :Jsychol'Jgist 
was, in h is own words, 
"involved in seeing a select number of pa tien ts who appear 
to have psychological problems (in) ... adapting to ~;,~ 
machine ... (or) patient difficulties (with) learning their 
diets" (Psychologist, October, 1983) 
His general approach was to teach the patients relaxation techniques 8S a 
means of coping with dialysis, in particular the requirement to stick large 
syringe-type needles into the forearm (1.e. fistula) twice a week to 
facilitate haemo-dialysis. Patients would be referred to the psychologist 
at the request of the senior nurses, who considered it part of their 
nursing responsibility, in line with the precepts of the nursing !Jrocess, 
to assess all patients in terms of whether they would benefit from the 
therapy available from the psychologist (Nurse 1, lnts 1, October, 1983, 
029-050). 
The case conference 
The work of the individual occupations was coordinated through the 
weekly case conferences held most Monday mornings at 11.00 a.m., to which 
all members of the healthcare team were invited and mostly attended, The 
one regular non-at tender was the psychologist whose official commitment to 
the renal unit was only half a day a week (Pl, Int.l, October, 19S3, 030-
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035). The nurses were represent.ed by the Nursing Officer, w~o cha:rec the 
meeting. and the Sister for the early shif~. The subjects covered a.t 
these mee t ings would include, 
(a) the training of patients. 
(b) matters relating to the installation of a haemo-dialysis machine 
in the pa t ien t 's home. 
(c) any problems (medical or social> relating to the patients' 
chronic ESRF status (5) 
In addition, the opportunity was also taken by those a t tending to use the 
meeting for informing or consulting other members of the heal thcare .eam 
on related topics. It is appropriate to interject that it was this meeting 
tha t the senior consultant chose to use as the means of communic(l ting 
developments relating to the introduction of the Renal Computer System and 
to discuss the arrangements for its implementation. 
At the case conferences virtually all discussions of the ESRF 
pa tien ts and their manage men t s tar ted with an exam ina tion of the 
biochemical and haemotological resul ts and only then would non-medical 
explana tions be considered. Nevertheless. much of the discussions at t'lese 
meetings related to matters not strictly medical, but to problems with 
particular patients lack of progress in training, to patients dietary 
indiscre tion and to problems of ins talling dialysis equipmen t in 
particular patients homes and even on one unique occasion whether a 
pa t ien t should be recommended to marry or no t. The issue here was whe ther 
marriage for this atypical patient would improve her quality of life and in 
consequence her willingness to be a good haemo-dialyser or not. After some 
extensive discussion and subject to a satisfactory social work report on 
the affianced the proposal of marriage had the support of the 'Mond,,)" 
Morning Meeting' (Haamo fieldnotes Book 1, 30th SeDtember, 1983, pp. 5\.1-51, 
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13th December, 1983, p.64). One case that illustrates particularly well the 
way in which the meetings worked to coordinate the contributions of the 
medical, nursing and 'other disciplines' was the 'case of the oven cooked 
chips'. 
A male patient in his twenties whose potassium level was high, which 
clearly indicated that he had not been adherring to his diet, This 
was seen as one sign of his immaturity , "He will have to toe the 
line and grow up" (Registrar, fieldnotes 22nd August, 1983, Book 1, 
p.ll). The nursing sister reported that the patient saw the unit's 
rules relating to dialysis and the dietary restrictions as arbitrary 
and had failed to become sufficiently proficient to carry out haemo-
dialysis at home. There were also other problems for the unit's staff 
relating to the fact that the patient had no one where he lived 
reliable enough for training as the 'back-up' support, but first they 
decided to tackle the problem of recalcitrance. The staff at the 
meeting decided to adopt a two pronged strategy of reward and social 
isolation, if the patient could get his potassium level down to a 
medically tolerable level he would be rewarded with oven cooked chips 
being included in his diet. The refrigerator on the unit was kept 
well stocked, according to the dietician with oven chips, sausages and 
ice cream largely to be utilised as incentives to patients finding 
difficulty in staying within their prescribed diets (p.26). The other 
part of the strategy was that this patient would be socially isolated 
when he was dialysing on the unit until his dietary discipline had 
improved and he had consciously set about learning to dialyse 
effectively on his own. This decision was taken during August (p.26) 
and in the December the notice instructing nursing staff to socially 
exclude this patient unless he was complying to the hOllse rules 
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regarding dialysis was still on the nurses' no~ice bO''lrd, jut a- the 
unit meeting one of the :::isters was able to report ba t he was now 
"very co- opera ti ve" (Fieldnotes, book 1, 13th December, '98< 65 
- ..J, p. , 
case no.5). 
At this unit the concern was with good patient discipline as the means of 
delivering good patient care. Haamo-dialysis was viewec as a procedure 
that the patients had to come to terms with and the medical and nursing 
staff, with the support of the dietician and 'other disciplines', would 
attempt with some success to bring about behaviourial changes in their 
charges (patients) with altruistic, or humanistic, in ten t. This 
preoccupation contrasted with the concerns of those working at the second 
renal unit. 
The Dialysis and Transplant Unit 
The Dialysis and Transplant Unit was designed to incorpors te all 
aspects of ESRF patients nursing and most of their medical care. If ever 
an ESRF patient required hospital treatment, whether related to their renal 
condit ion, or no t , they would be loea ted on the unit. The rena 1 unit 
included a number of individual rooms and small wards (3-4 beds), ::Jlus one 
larger room (ward) with 5-8 beds. In total the unit had 18 beds available 
for inpatients (0 & T fieldnotes, Book 1, 22nd May, 1984, p.g., 18th June, 
1984, p.39), All transplant patients were cared for on the unit, both ?re-
and post-operatively, as were all patients undergoing investigations 
requiring an inpatient stay. 
The unit offered three types of dialysis therapy 
(1) haemo-dialysis 
(2) continuous ambulatory peritoneal dialysis (CAPD) 
(3) continuous cyclic peritoneal dialysis (CCPD) 
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At the time of the research there were a to~al of liS patients (see Table 
7.3 for details. 
TAE:-.LE 7,3: DIAI~_Y''';,IS PATIEf'..jr'.~, <OIALY'E:I:=. ANO TRAN:=;PLANT UN:IT) 
60 ,.. p",ti • .,.,t ..... he. h_,,·mc.-d:laly ... d ,.. ... ho" •• 
1:2 >< r;: ... t:l.nta. """hel r,-.'.iiI;.rrlo-di .. ly •• d on ~. unit*: 
40 >< j::· ..... ti""nt.. CAPO a"t hC'lf.~., 
Eo )0( r.,.~ti.ntu on triil.in:1ng (CAPO) 
1 :K pati4iJll"t-,;;;. on CePD at hom. 
rot;.l 11 Z-" Piiltilliitnt,. on diif,l"o;<;.1_ 
(Nur •• C. I ".i.ldl'1c.1~ .. '\Ii.# F:clclk 2, l€:-1th ...Tun., 1'964,~. 38 ••. lo('ca,{::."t.:::t: N\....Jr ... 0, Int 
:2' I J_nulkl"Y, 1 99£ .. ; AQ.2 .. ) 
CAPO was the therapy most favoured by the consultants (it was the 
'treatment of choice' throughout the region) (Fieldnotes, Book 1, 220<: May. 
1984., p.12j Con. DTl., Int.1, May,1984, 144-192). 
Medical work 
The Dialysis and Transplant Unit had been established in the :" ~e 
six ties by the now professor of nephro logy, and had a larger me,::: ica 1 and 
nursing staff than the Haemo Unit. There were two consultant oe~hrologists 
and one transplant surgeon <later increased to two). In addition, there was 
one senior registrar (on a two year contract) plus one registrar ·300 two 
senior house officers (SHOs) who worked for the consultant :1e:Jhrologists 
for six and four month 'placements' respectively as part of the hospi~al's 
rotation scheme. The consultants also held general medical clinics whic!1 
the registrar and SHOs also assisted. The majority of the doctors work was 
rela ted to renal medicine including 'dialysis' and 'transplan t' pa t ien ts. In 
contrast, the transplan t surgeon was principally employed as a urologis t, 
although kidney transplantation surgery was his particular interest. 
Unfortunately, however, there was an insufficient supply of donor Kidneys 
to keep him fully occupied as a transplan t surgeon (Con. OT3. In t. ". 
September, 1984, 004-010, 212-235). This consultant surgeon had no junior 
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medical staff officially allocated to him for ~is work on the renal uni~ 
but the junior medical staff attached to the consultan~ nephro~og:sts were 
also 'shared' with the transplant surgeon. This transDlant-patient-re~a,:",:: 
work of the junior medical staff involved the Dreparation and more 
particularly aftercare of 'transplan t' pa Hen ts as well as the rr.ain tenance 
of the patients' laboratory and clinical data. 
In marked contrast to the practice a t the Haemo Unit, the day to day 
medical work associa ted wi th this renal uni twas almos t wholly delega ted 
to the senior registrar and the junior medical staff. Cases might be 
brought to the attention of the consultant nephrologists at one of the bi-
weekly ward rounds (see below) but this would happen only when ~he 
pa tien ts concerned were presenting medical problems and even then it would 
be unusual if the consultants took any active involvement in the 
management of the patients involved. 
Nursing work 
Renal dialysis was wholly the responsibility of the nurses ,'j'O. was t '"Ie 
training of the pa tien ts. The unit was headed by an Assis tan t Director of 
NurSing Services (ADNS): this was largely an administrative post which also 
carried responsibilities for the organisation of nursing work throughou~ 
the hospital. The day to day supervision of nursing work was the 
responsibility of the two nursing sisters. The full complement of nursir.g 
staff 28 including the ADNS (see Table 7.4 for details). This was 
considerably larger than tha t of the Haemo Unit which functioned with 9 
nurses - RGNs and ENs - while the difference in patient numbers between 
the two units was less than migh t be an ticipa ted gi ven the re 1a +;::. 'Ie 
nursing staffing levels. The Haemo Unit had 10 dialysis patients being 
trained and 23 who dialysed on the unit (see Table 7.1), whereas the 
Dialysis and Transplant Unit had only about 6 patients undergoing training 
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TAE:tl.F ·7.4: tJtJF ..... -:';IN( .. ) ST?-'IIFF: DIALYS;J::::; AND T"RAN:::;PLANT UNIT 
1 :;< AONS 
:2 :..c Wa.rd Sis."Liirr .. 
24 x Nurs ..... (RGNs. ... nd ENg) 
1 x Au.><11iimr-y 
and a further 12 patients who dialysed at the unit (see Table 7.3). The 
Dialysis and Transplant Unit patients dialysing at home, however, numberec! 
100 as opposed to the Haemo Unit's total of 31, and all these patients 
required routine monitoring and investigation. Moreover, the Dialysis and 
Transplant Unit nurses worked a 24 hour three shift system, as opposed to 
the Haemo's 2 sh if ts early and lates - and this additional shift 
obviously involved the employment of more nurses than if the unit had been 
open on a day/evening basis only. Most dialysis work was carried ou t 
during the day and the nurses on the night shift were chiefly concerned 
with the care of patients awaiting, or recovering from operations or who 
had been 'called in' for investigations (Nurse TIN Int.1, July, 1984, 014-
059). 
In relation to the work of haemo-dialysis and training patients, the 
nurses were organised similarly to the Haemo Unit (i.e. according to the 
principles of the nursing process approach) (SN2, Int.1, July, 1984.012-134 
+ 077). The other regular nursing duties were organised here by the 
sisters on a group basis and in contrast to the Haemo Unit these 
activities were organised either in terms of a 6 months rotation or in 
terms of time of day. The rota tion comprised of, 
1. CAPD patient training. 
2. Clinic work. Nurses acted as receptionists a t the clinics 
and supplied the doctors wi th the medical records and 
laboratory t'esults of patients as they were iooividlJslly 
seen. 
3. 
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Tissue typing. Nurses were responsible lor 
organisa tion of the collee tion and dis::>a tch of :Jlood 
samples to the haemotology laboratory of renal patients as 
well as the en tering of the 'results' on to the char ts and 
in the medical records (Nurse K., Int. 2, 30th Januacy, 
1985, 142-210) 
4. Graph and Ward Rounds. Nurses allocated to these meetings 
were responsible for supplying the doctors with the 
medical records or patients charts (6), 
(SN2, Int.1, 19th July,19;34>' 
The 'time of day' organisation refers to the entry and presentat.ion of 
clinic and labor-a tory data. Each nurse was responsible for the entry oi 
dialysis related data, weight, blood pressure and temperature pre- and 
post- haemo-dialysis or morning and evening in the case of CAPD. However, 
the collation of this data was organised collectively. The sister would 
allocate the duty to a group of nurses on an ad hoc basis every evening 
(SN3, Int.2, March, 1985, 120-142). At the same time the laboratory results 
would also be entered into the medical records, Then, uniquely, within the 
health region the nurses would draw up graphs of all the pa tien t rela tee! 
data, both clinical and laboratory data. These graphs were known as the 
charts and were checked each month at the Graph Round by the s8Clior 
regis trar. It was, however, the responsibility of the SHOs to maintain the 
graphs (Le.the 'charts') for the patients who had undergone tnmsplant 
surgery. This was in part because of the need to closely moni 'or the 
patient during the critical recovery period, but it was equally the case 
that transplant patients were no longer on the dialysiS programme and in 
consequence no longer the formal responsibility of the renal nurses. A 
similar situation existed in relation to patient·s wit:--, renal :6ilure, :cu' 
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not, at least not yet, in end-stage failure, 
line between what were nursing responsibilities and wha ~ were the 
responsibilities of the doctors was not an immutable one, but one subject 
to negotiation <implied as well as explicit) between the doctors and sen:or 
nurses, This is a point to be developed later in relation to the 
introduction of the computer system. 
The Home Administrator 
The home administrator's role was formally very similar to ~nat 
existing at the Haemo Unit, except that there was also CAPD <as well as 
haemo-dialysis) supplies to order and arrange to be delivered to pa t len ts' 
homes, There were, however, important differences of emphasis between t:le 
roles in the two renal units which were related to the coordination and 
control of the division of labour, Whilst the Haemo Unit had one weekly 
meeting to deel with virtually everything, here there were three distinct 
forums (meetings). Two of these were controlled by the doctors while the 
third was the responsibility of the Home Administrator. This last meeUng 
was scheduled bi-monthly and was concerned with the conversion of 
patients' homes to accommodate dialysis equipment and supolies, The 
doctors never attended the home conversions meetings (as they were known) 
and the administretor never attended the medical meetings, a point t'l.3t 
illustrates the division between the medical and non-medical domains 
existing within this unit but not at the Haemo Unit, The home CCDver-=ions 
meetings would involve, in addition to the administrator, the social worker, 
dialYSis technicians, and officers from the works department as well as ~he 
senior nurses, in principle all the d isdplines necessary for coord ina t. ing 
the completion of the modifications to the patients' homes with the' of 
the patients' dialysis training (7). (Ad.l, Int.!, 28th June, 1984,260-276) 
-203-
Renal unit medical meetings 
Turning now to the other routine meetings concerning pat::.e:1~s and 
their wellbeing. The monitoring and review of pa t ien t cases was carr:e'~ 
out at regular meetings organised directly under medical centrol. There 
were two ward rounds every week and one chart review, known as the Graph 
Round, every month. All these meetings were held in the 08 tien ts' ,:,olJnge. 
(a) The Ward Rounds 
Ward rounds were held every Wednesday and Friday morning. It was 
here that decisions regarding those patient cases reGuiring medical 
attention were taken by by the consultants and resulting instructions 
to medical, nursing, dietetic staff were given, The rounds were 
concerned with renal cases generally and ESRF patients except on 
Fridays when transplant patients and the suitability of patients ~or 
inclusion on the (kidney) transplant list would be discussed. It was 
normally only a t one of the ward rounds would the consul tan ts have 
any direct involvement in the management of a dialysis ::.atient (8) 
and only then if there were some medical complica tion (Fieldno tes, 
Book I, 24th July, 1984, pp.52-55; Book II, 11th September, 1984, 
pp.37-39). The ward rounds were in two stages, first, there was the 
case conference and only after decisions had been taken as to 
indi vidual pa tien ts was the ward round 'walked'. This second stage 
was largely a ma t ter of mee ting the pa tien ts and telling them wha' 
had been decided by the medical team <ibid.). The typical proce,i IJre a'; 
the case conference stage would be for an SHO or registrar to 
present details of specific cases with the aid of the c.3Se no<:es and 
occasionally the graphs (supplied by a nurse). One of the consultants 
would commen t on the doctor's chosen course of 09,: '; l,=-r~ 09n,: make 
specific recommenda tions as to the pa tien t's management. T1.e nurses. 
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dietician and social worker sat around the room (not at the table 
where the doctors sat) and would take note of what was required of 
them when the consultants so directed. 
<b) The Graph Round 
The medical condition of the dialysis patients were monitored 
routinely on a monthly basis and this was the central rationale for 
the nurses graphing of the patients' haemotological, biochemical and 
clinical data. The checking of the graphs was carried out by the 
senior registrar, usually with the aid of one of the junior doctors, 
and always wi th the help of three or four nurses. One nurse would 
hand the graph to the doctor for scrutiny, the second, the relevant 
medical record file for possible further examination. The third nurse 
was the sister on duty, who noted down any changes in the patient's 
dialysis regime (Fieldnotes Book II, 11 th September, 1984, pp.30-33j 
Book III, 12th February, 1985, pp.1-7). If the senior registrar was 
satisfied with the patient's condition, as represented by the graph, 
he would endorse the case-notes with the acronym 'GROK', being short 
for 'Graph O.K.' If that was not the case then he would enter details 
of the therapies, investigations (etc) that were to be adopted. The 
meeting was, in fact, an example of medical audit <chart review) (see 
Chapter Four), although no doctor seemed to be aware of this fact 
despite being specifically asked about the subject 
Pa tien t training and counselling 
The work of the dietician at the Dialysis and Transplant Unit was 
slmos t iden tical to tha t carried out a t the Haemo Unit. She made an init ial 
assessment of a patient's dietary requirement several months before the 
patient came onto the dialysis programme. Once on the programme the 
dietician would provide the patient initially with a more or less standard 
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diet (in terms of protein, additives permitted, fluids etc.) which she would 
then modify in light of the patient's experience and the monthly laboratory 
results. The dietician attended all the ward rounds as well as being 
advised of suspected "dietary indiscretions" following the monthly graph 
round <Dt., Int.1, August, 1984-, 011-021). The dietician would ':hen contact 
the patient by telephone, or meet the patient at the clinic in order to 
advise them <Dt., Int.1, August, 1984-,200-217). 
The work of the social worker, however, was organised rat'"Jer 
differently to the the practice on the Haemo Unit. All new ESRF patients 
were interviewed for the purpose of assessing their ability to accommodate 
to dialysis (SW' t Int.l. August, 1984, 016-063). Some of the patients would 
also require further help and advice at different times in their career as 
dialysis patient, which could relate to money problems and social secur1 ty 
entitlements (e.g. disability allowances), or to work, or even to the 
patien t 's ability, psychologically, to cope with dialysis. The Dialysis and 
Transplant social worker was firmly committed to avoiding the limited 
'fire-fighting' role that her colleague at the Haemo Unit had adopted (SW. 
lnt.l. August, 1984-. circa 200). It was not entirely clear why this social 
worker was able to develop a broader role in relation to ESRF patients 
than her colleague at the Haemo Unit although an important part of the 
reason was tha t the senior nurses depended on the services of the social 
worker at this unit (SN2 Int. 2. January, 1985, circa 272) in a way not 
found at the previous unit. At the Haemo Unit, the senior nurses relied on 
the services of the clinical psychologis t rather than the socia::' worker to 
help patients with difficulties coping with being on dialysis (see above). 
Patients who found it difficult to accommodate to haemo-dialysis 
could in principle Change over to CAPO, and vice versa, a~ th0Ugh t~~s 
rarely happened. The consultants ('referred yO tien ts to be counselled (by 
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doctors and nurses) in the alternative technologies and then committing 
themselves at an early stage of their ESRF career. CAPO, as the 'treatment 
of choice', would be the technique recommended when a patient was judged 
(by the doctors, nurses, or social worker) to be likely to have difficulties 
in adjusting to the dialYSis regime, it being the easiest of the dialysis 
systems to learn to use. 
Once a patient had selected the dialysis system there was, unlike at 
the Haemo Unit, little attempt to initiate behaviourial changes in the 
cases of recalcitrant patients beyond giving advice and recommendations. 
There was even some evidence, among the doctors at least, of a certain 
admiration of the independence of recalcitrant patients. Patients who 
failed to haemo-dialyse regularly, or sufficiently long enough, or were 
guilty of dietary indiscretions would only cause themselves discomfort 
(due either to the retention of fluid or the build up of toxic elements in 
the blood stream, or bo th). The probabili ty tha t these pa t ien ts were 
increasing the medical risks to themselves was not seen as sufficien~ 
reason to be interventionist beyond giving advice (Fieldnotes, Book 1, 22nd 
May, 1984, p.12; Con. DT1., Int.i, May, 1984, 144-192). To illustrate and, in 
the process, bring out the contrast to the approach adopted by the Haemo 
Unit staff <in the case of the 'Oven Cooked Chips') here is the case of the 
'Miner and his Beer'. 
There was a patient, a miner, that earned himself a special respect 
among the doctors because of his ability to 'work the (dialysis) 
system'. Unlike most recalcitrant dialysis patients, he did not reject 
the system but utilised the technology of haemo-dialysis to, 
"dialyse right down, then go down the miner's club for six 
pints" (SR., Fieldnotes, 11 th September, 1984, p.26). 
During haemo-dialysis fluid is extracted during the filtration 
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process, however, after a certain point the patient on haemo-dia:ysis 
experiences painful bouts of cramp which :Jatients try to avc:'d. This 
miner, with hedonistic intent, had cieveloped his own technique of 
first dialysing himself until he is "as dryas a bone" <ibid.) this 
meant dialysing for about 6 hours and - presumably - suffering some 
discomfort from cramp. He would then go out f or his social evening 
drinking beer with his ma tes. On re turning he would haemo-d ~a lyse 
once again this time to remove the excess fluids resulting from 
drinking beer <ibid.) 
There are two reasons for including this story here, firs.tly, because it 
indicates the contrast in styles of medical management between ~~e two 
renal units. The Haemo Unit healthcare team would view the patient as 
requiring re-education (see the case of 'oven cooked chips' above), whereas 
the Dialysis and Transplant Unit medical staff did not. As one consultan~ 
put the point, " patients rarely kill themselves because of ill-
discipline" adding, 
"one patient ignores all the rules and dialyses in his 
own bad way - even forgets to dialyse. Seems to suit him 
even if he does feel bad in himself" (Fieldnotes, 22nd May, 
1984, p.13 emphasis added) 
Secondly, the example illus tra tes the dif f eren t approaches ot the 
consultants to the doctor's role in the care if ESRF patients. At the Haemo 
Unit the senior consultan t in terpre ted his responsibility to this ::;.,:1 r ien t 
group broadly, seeing himself responsible, as the head of the renal ~ealt~ 
care team, for the patient's total well-being. Given that there was little 
in the daily life and routine of a patient that renal dialysis does not 
affect, the role of doctor as 'patriarch' was a particularly extensivo? 
By can tras t, the consultants at the Dialysis and Transplan t Unit 
interpreted their role in the care of ESRF ::>a~lents narrowly, ~::':nited to 
supervising their junior medical staff who were res;)onsible for the 
management of ".pecific medica: conditions and pathologies. Anyth::':1E' else 
was the responsibility of other disciplines, or the administra+:;'on, or it 
was not the responsibility of the hospital. Unlike their collea8'.:2s a> he 
Haemo Unit, holism was not their approach to medical care. 
The introduction of the Renal Computer System 
Having described the two renal units and the organisation of the work 
processes, indicating the basic similarities and differences between them, 
it is now possible to address the question as to what were the 
consequences of the introduction of the Renal Computer System into the two 
units in terms of both the organisation of renal work and the responses of 
the medical, nursing and other staff? The use of the system will be 
described as will the responses of each occupa t ional group prior to an 
analysis of the similarities and differences of the implementation ;:lroces'::. 
and its consequences for the two units. 
1. The Haemo Uni t 
This unit was took deli very of the compu ter sys tern towards the end 
of 1983. The system was used principally to display time related oatient 
data in both graph and tabular forms at the weekly case mee>ings. The 
laboratory and related patient data was entered (Le.input), bot;.. for 
dialysis and pre-dialysis patients by the newly apoointed computer clerk. 
This clerk was supervised by the home administrator, now designated as the 
systems controller. Most of the computer-related functions were, however, 
carried out by the computer clerk and the responsibilitie~ of t~e 
controller was limited to administrative functions, with litHe day to day 
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involvement with the system's operation (Ac.. Int. 2, AQ2a, June, _06.;.). Th:s 
was a situation was in marked contrast to that at th D' - , e la~y=cs anc 
Transplant Unit (see below>. Turning now to the occ1J?ational grolJCs for 
whom the Renal Computer System was designed to support. 
The doctors 
Neither of the consultants entered any data onto the system, they did 
however, use the system directly in clinic to review yatient data (system 
output) 
"A t clinic I review each pa t ien t who is com ing on to 
dialysis, or is actually on home dialysis, or has been 
transplanted, because " it is a very convenient way of 
seeing what the current data is and comparing it it wit~ 
previous data" (Doctor HMl, Int.2, May, 1984) 
In the case of the senior consultan t the sys tern was used as an added aid 
for patient education (by showing the patient the appropriate graph, on 
the VDU, particularly if the 'result' are medically unsatisfactory) 
<Pieldnote Book II, 21st May, 1984, p.26). 
"I think (the graphs are) especially valuable because you 
can show the patients their own results on the <VDU) 
screen, while you are interviewing them and they can see 
immediately that you point it out where alterations in 
their treatment or diet, etc., have produced visible 
changes in their blood results I think this has an 
important educational value " <Doctor HMl: Int.2, May, 
1984) 
The consultants were well content with the systems facility to produce 
time-related graphs of the patient data. This they found particularly 
useful in relation to renal patients not yet in ESRF, for the graphs 
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illustrated the decline in the patients kidney fune tion far more c~early 
than tabula ted figures would, 
"Its nice to be able to see, at a glance, a" th -1 e over31 
results and be able to recognise trends and ~~is is 
particularly useful when I'm seeing 'out?a tients I (i.e. renal 
patients not yet in ESRF) where you only get to see ~'1em 
probably once every month ... and you can't remember all 
previous results ... All you do now is press a button and 
see the whole lot (of results) <Doctor HM2, Int. 2, ~'a',r . 
1984-) 
Moreover, the consul tan ts were able to moni tor for medical problem:o. more 
closely than previously and any changes in a pa tient 's condition would 
show up on the graphs as a sharp peak, or dramatic dive in the appropriate 
datum line, 
"It is useful to be able to look at patient::: who are 
having particular problems (S)omebody whose condi tion 
has been changing over the las t week, or so, it is 
particularly valuable. We use it for acute renal fa:~!jr-e 
patients because (their) conditions do change very 
rapidly, it is important to make predictions where possible 
and here the computer has been very valuable." (Doctor 
HM1, Int.2, May, 1984-) 
Only one registrar, among the junior medical staff, made any regular use 
of the Renal Computer System, and he became seen by the nurses as an 
expert who they could turn to for help (Nurse Interviews May, 1984). This 
doctor's in teres t in computers stemmed from his specialising in :nedical 
computing when a student and subsequently buying a microcom'Juter sys~err: 
of his own <Dr D, Int.1, September, 1983, circa 035». He was readily able 
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to design screens and used these skills, on behalf of th~ conslJ~t''lnts, ir, 
order to enter 'interesting' cases onto the system for presentat::'on"t ca~", 
meetings. It is pertinent here to note two points, one, these 'intere'~ting 
cases' related to renal patients not in ESRFj these were the D8tients wi'~, 
which the doctors were medically most interested. The second pOint, was 
that the computer system was being used passively, the data was being 
entered in order that it could be 'presented' rather than so the cata might 
be analysed. The doctors' objective was to make a good impression ')[1 
colleagues and demonstrate that the computer was being used, for research 
related purposes (Con. HM1, Int. 2, May, 1984 circa 090-150). 
Nursing staff 
It was the senior nursing staff who benefited most directly from the 
introduction of the system. Their previous chore of collating and recording 
patient related data was now carried out by the computer clerk. 
Fur thermore, the presen ta t ion of th is da ta on the VDU screen was :" oune to 
be easier to interpret than was previously the case, 
"(B)efore, each patient, as their results came back, I had 
to pick through I was recording everywhere, four or 
five times ... Now at the end of each month, I can literally 
spend half an hour just flicking through ead"1 patien~s 
results on the screen I jus t take notes on wha t I 
have to act on and that's it" <Nurse 3: Int.2, M.ay, 1984) 
The RGNs and ENs, however, found the system of little advantage over the 
previous system. They still had to complete the recording of dialysiS data 
and had little need to access data routinely. 
"We are still doing charts (i.e. dialysis record sheets) and 
everything as before. I thought it would sto:) us 'laving :0 
do the Nursing Cardex. I hoped it would S '00 us from 
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having to do all these char~s 8'18ry day, II (Nurs,e 5: Int.2, 
May,1984) 
There were, in addition, facilities for presenting summarised ~extua: 
information in chronological sequence were also available for ~he nurses. 
These 'events screens', as they were known, were similar to the 0!18S used 
by the registrar for medical meetings (described above). In the case 0' the 
nurses, it was the Nursing Officer and Sisters who at the time of ':'le 
second interviews (April-June, 1984) were responsible for designing these 
'screens' and teaching their s ta ff how to en ter the da ta themse 1 ves, The 
'screens' were thought, by the nurses, to be of no benefit for additional 
time and effort was required in order to enter the informa tion which was 
already entered daily onto the nursing record (referred to as th", 'Carde;,:'). 
The nurses reported that, 
"On the nursing screen we are not putting as much 
information ... (we) write fully in the Nursing Cardex" 
and the reason for this double reporting was that 
"we have got to have the writ ten (record) on a legal 
footing" (Nurse 3: Int.1, May,1984). 
In consequence, the senior nurses believed they had to continue with h", 
handwritten nursing record and saw the need to utilise the 'events s(:reens' 
simply in order to show tha t the sys tern was being fully u t i:ised eve:! 
though it was perceived by the nurses as being of little or no benefit 
(SN1 Int.2, May, 1984., circa 180-230). By contrast, t'1e events screen was 
seen by the nurses and junior medical staff at the Dialysis and Transplant 
Unit as being a very useful facility (see below). 
The 'Other Disciplines' 
In the cases of the social worker, dietician and psychologist it was 
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originally intended by the consultants <In~ernal ~Gcument 'Operational 
Requirements' November, 1982) that tney would maintain files on ~~eir ESRF 
patients. These files were to have contained only limi ~ec in+ormaLc'" 
sufficient to the needs of the renal unit staff (doctors and nurses) 
rather than being the detailed records of 'other disciplines'. In the event 
only the dietician complied with this requirement. The other disciplines 
did not, on the grounds that, 
(a) the off ices of the persons involved were elsewhere in the 
hospital complex without direct computer links 
(b) these disciplines maintained 
adequate for their needs. 
their own record systems 
The Renal Computer Sys tem would have en tailed these disciplines, had they 
complied, maintaining two sets of records, one for the renal unit and the 
other for their own departmental files <ibid.). Furthermore, they would only 
have been able to enter and access information when visiting the renal 
unit. Neither social worker nor psychologist actually refused to use the 
system they simply failed to find the time to be trained (SW Int 2., June, 
1984., circa 070). This non-compliance, however, did not in any seriolls 
sense threa ten the success of the sys tem 's implemen ta t ion as the 
psychology and social work 'screens' would have provided's ta t:c' 
information only, which did not directly affect the clinical cata. The 
purpose was to provide additional information as to whether the patient 
had been referred, or not, for counselling, or was in receipt of certain 
social security allowances and so forth <d. Appendix IV). 
Despite the limitations of the system the dietician did enter the 
dietetic information on patients. Unlike social work and ?~y(hology, 
dietetics was a crucial element of ESRF trea tmen t (see above). The I:!.octors 
and senior nurses found it useful to be able to have access to details of 
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the pa tien ts' diete ~ic regimes when cCLsidering ~heir cases. Moreover, the 
dietician would routinely want to know details of ~~e pa,::.er.ts' 
investigation results in order to identify the diete~ic recuirements of 
patients. Given this centrality of dietetics in the trea ':;[,en: ;Jrocess ,. 
was not surprising that the dietician agreed to routine~f to ';:;e the 
system. The implementation of the computer system did not, however, 
overcome the need for the dietician to keep additional files on the renal 
patients within the Dietetic Department; these files covered a 'case-mix' 
that included patients other than those with ESRF (e.g. diabetic and 
coronary), and to exclude the ESRF patients because they were already on 
the computer system would leave the departmental records incom~le';e. 
Furthermore, the dietetic 'screens' on the Renal Computer System were 
static <cf. Appendix IV) and offered no facilities for calcu~ation and 
analysis while it was hoped by the dietician that a separate computer 
system would be available to the department in the near future bat wou:;'d 
offer just such facilities <Dt Int 2., June, 1984. 
Haemo Uni t implemen ta tion: summary 
The consultan ts liked the new compu ter sys tern, it was useful to them 
in clinic and it gave them ready access to patient data inc~uding graphs. 
The senior nurses also found the system useful for it eased the burden of 
collating the patients' results. The nursing staff generally as well as ':he 
'other disciplines' (with the partial exception of the dietician), however, 
found the system of little or no benefit, 
It was the senior consultant who dominated the whole oro::e:;s of 
implementation (the systems controller played a very small ;:,art) and i: 
was he who was keen to get as much of the system operational as cuickly 
as possible and this meant utilising the 'events screens' for case meeting 
presentation (rather than as an ongoing temporal record) and ;:,ressing for-
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the implemen ta tion of the nurses 'screens' even ~hough the nurses saw t'lis 
as a duplication of effort. 
2. The Dialysis and Transplant Unit 
The computer system was introduced at the Dialysis and Trans:Jccmt 
Unit in the first quarter of 1984, only a few months later than at the 
Haemo Unit. The responses of the doctors and nurses were mark",,:ily 
different to that found at the Haemo Unit. In part this was because of the 
different implications the system had for the work of the c.octors and 
nurses at this unit resulting from the more systematic way in whiCi the 
collation and presentation of patient data had been previously organised 
(described above). This difference, however, reflected an underlying 
difference of approach (rationale) to the organisation and delivery of care 
to ESRF patients which led to there being a dichotomy in responses between 
the consultants and the other unit staff <medical and nursing). The 'other 
disciplines' showed a similar, but not the same, response to those at t'le 
Haemo Unit. 
The person within the unit who had the responsibility as local 
coord ina tor and 'on the spot' technical support was the home adminis tra tor 
in the role of systems controller. 
The Systems Controller 
As was the case at the Haemo Unit the home administrator was given 
the responsibilities of systems controller. Unlike the situation at 
Haemo Unit here the administrator had to take much more of the 
responsibility for the implementation process. The administra~or, :-.. ::>\-,'ever, 
was judged by the nursing staff, in particular, to have been par~icularly 
effective in this role and it was to her they would depend on :or help 
when they needed assistance (Nurses: Int. 2, 1984/85). The ~ime 
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commit men ts involved in carrying out the re:=;Do;-;si':::.~ities 0; sys terr.:o 
controller - while not arduous - conLicted at times wi t~ tho:;::: E '-;.:Jme 
Administrator (Ad, Int. 2, January, 1935, circa 063). These res:)onsibiliUes 
included both the technical tasks of file maintenance and simEar chores 
and the administrative ones of organising whatever temporary computer 
clerical support that could be arranged for there were insufficient 
resources funds to employ a computer clerk on a permanent basis as had 
been the case at the Haemo Unit (Ad, Int. 2, January, 1985, circa 125-175). 
One consequence of this lack of clerical support was that no data relating 
to pre-ESRF (renal) patients was entered onto the system, a situation that 
was to contribute to the consultants negative judgement of the system. 
Nurses and doc tors 
In the absence of a permanen t computer clerk the en try of dialysis 
patient data was carried out by the nursing staff. Nevertheless, the nurses 
found the system a definite improvement on the previous manual system of 
da ta collection (inpu t) for it saved them work, "It '5 easier, a tremendou':o 
improvemen t on the (handwri t ten) graphs" (Nur~e SN2, In t.3 (2), January, 
1985). The benefit of saving time in entering data was appreciated more by 
the nursing sisters, who organised the work of the unit, than the RGNs and 
ENs who did the work of data entry. In addition the nurses also found 
themselves also entering data relating to the transplant patients whereas 
previously the medical staff had been responsible for the collection and 
recording of this data 
"Initially the transplant results were fed in to the 
computer by the doctors, but when the path. 13b. resul ~s 
arrive in the evening ... it is an automatic thing now for 
the nursing staff to put it all on (including 
'transplants') .. " <The doctors) don't put (the ,j<1ta) ,)n the 
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computer at the moment and I can't envisage it being done 
by them, because the change-over (of junior doctors) is so 
great" (Nurse SN2, Int.3(2), January, 1985) 
Even if they did not input data the registrars and hOlJse staff would 
access data themselves (e.g. Dr J. Int.3, Dec., 1984-., 067-080; Dr L. Int.2, 
May, 1985, circa 094), although some would s till rely on a nurse to do it 
for them if one was available (Dr M. Int. 2, December, 1985, circa 074-) 
The junior doctors did come to IJse one facility in particular and 
this was the events screens that the nurses maintained (cf. Events log (1) 
Appendix IV). On these 'screens' were recorded all the medically 
significant events in the patients medical career within 
Typically this would include, 
- diagnOSis 
- date Tenchoff tube fitted (9) , or fistula created 
- infections, treatments (etc). 
the unit. 
The junior medical staff tended to find this fadli ty an invaluable and 
timely source of information, equating to a medical record summary. 
Furthermore, these events screens were much more readily accessible than 
the medical record folders, being available literally at the touch of a 
button. This facility was not used during the clinics and ward rounds 
(when the medical records were readily available), but at other times when 
on the unit. 
"(The events screen) speeded things up, especially in terms 
of extracting someones 'previous renal history' from the 
computer rather than the 'notes' ... If people (patients) 
were coming in the middle of the night that I didn't know 
I would .. go through the events records (screens) to see 
what was going on with them" <Dr L, Int. 2 (1), May,198n 
-218-
The availability of this events screen facility was pointed out to each 
successive generation of junior doctors by the nursing staff, who were de 
facto responsible for showing these doctors how to access and, 
occasionally, input data and information. 
The consultants never made use of the system at all, the medical 
work of the unit, as explained earlier, was delegated to the senior 
registrar. What the consultants had wanted the computer system to be able 
to do was to analyse aggregate data for research and audit purposes. "In 
other words, how many patients have we taken on this year? How many on 
CAPD? How many have died?" (Consultant DTl, Int. 3(2), April, 1985). The 
regional computer staff failed to develop this facility and did not believe 
it was their responsibility to do so, despite it being listed in the 
Operational Requi.rement document (Para. 1.3., November, 1982). Instead they 
concentrated on getting the patient data facilities operational (MSC, May, 
1985., circa 030). Nevertheless, the consultants, with the exception of the 
transplant surgeon, did allow the nurses to replace the hand-drawn charts 
on dialysis patients with the computer produced graphs even though they 
gained no direct benefit from the change. The transplant surgeon, however, 
insisted that the charts relating to transplant patients (which were 
completed by the house staff) continued to be hand-drawn. His reason for 
this conserva t ism was tha t, 
" .. for day to day running I don 't think you need a 
computer, because you have the results on most patients 
either in your head or on the numerical flowcharts which 
are what I mainly use" 
(Consultant DT3: Int.3(2), May,1985) 
And this consul tent did not see why he should therefore change over to 
using a computer generated graph. His rejection of the computer was by no 
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means total and the surgeon, in collaboration w:'~,: the s>?n:':::- registrar, 
planned to develop pre coded medical events screens (using '3 lim: tee: 
vocabulary of medical terms) for research and audit plJr?oses This fac:li+y 
was initially only to include transplant patients, but later it wou~c have 
been extended to include renal patients generally. Progress, however, was 
very slow for, 
"the programming (was) proving a problem beca1Jse its 
complicated to design and also it still ha (d) to be 
writ ten ... " (Consultant DT3, In t 3 (2), May, 1985) 
The major problem here, however, was not really a tec'mi':al one but 
related to resources for as mentioned above the regional computer staff 
were not giving research developments any priority so, in order to get the 
project started, the surgeon had looked elsewhere for technical support, in 
the event a computer student from a distant polytechnic. 
Graph rounds and clinks 
- The graph round 
The Senior Registrar's main use of the Renal Computer System was at 
the monthly Graph Round which he directed. The nurSing staff in attendance 
operated the two VDU/terminals to access the graphs. There had to be ~wo 
VDUs one for weights and B.P. the other for bi()chemisc~-y and 
haemotologlcal results - as the computer's response time was very slow 
(especially when compared to the manual method of unrolling large charts). 
By alternating between the two VDUs the procedure was speeded up, but the 
round still took approximately twice as long as had been the case wi +h the 
hand-drawn charts. Previously the Graph Round occupied one morr.ing a 
month, but following computerisation the meeting had to be spread over two 
half days at least (SR1, Int.2. March, 193'3. circa 012; SNP, ~r.t.3(2), circa 
059; Fieldnotes 12th February, 1985, pp.1-8 esp. 4). Nevert"le~ess, thi~ 
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extra cost in time was more than compensated, ac.:c;ding to toe t'1e seni,x 
registrar and senior nursing staff, by the :=:ystem's ber;efits, describec by 
the senior registrar in the following terms, 
"(Firstly) the computer enables me to look at the pat:.en~s 
in more detail (than was the case previously) because of 
the way the da ta is presen ted by the com?u ter, 
particularly the graphics (Secondly), any results that, 
are pu t down wrongly are more obv ious on the compu ter 
system than they were on the Chart (manual) System ane 
easier to spot, (Thirdly) ... it is less time conslJrnin;:o: for 
the nurses to prepare for the computer for t~e Graph 
Round than it is the char ts All in all I consider (t!l<? 
system) a bonus (for) both the nurses and , .. the patient:= 
providing the doctor doing the Graph 5;tJun,: is 
prepared to take more time to do it It (Doctor E, lnt 3 (2), 
March, 1985) 
This view, however, did not have universal support among the nur:::.es, and 
some argued that 
"although its time-consuming (hand drawing a graph) you 
could see everything there all at once" (Nurse SEN (0, Int. 
3(2), January, 1985) 
while, as another nurse commented, with the computer system 
"its just fiddly going from one screen to another just 
doing one patient, we (have) one screen for the B.P. and 
weight (and) about 3 different for the 'blood' It scr-eens 
(Nurse SEN (3), Int. 3(2), January, 1985), 
Clearly, at least some of the nurses opera t ing the VDUs found the new 
'graph round' procedures more complica ted ("fidd:ylt) and time consuming. 
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- The clinics 
The computer system was also routinely USE": at the clinics for 
dialysis and transplant pat.ients held every week in the NeD~rol':J8Y 
Department. This department was some distance away from the renal unit so 
in order to use the computer system a VDU/terminal had to be taken on a 
trolley to the the nurses office in the department prior tc the c::'nic:: 
along with the medical records files. The major function of the computer 
system during these clinics was as a communications link with the renal 
unit, rather than a means of accessing the systems data-base. The reason 
for this was because laboratory results would be received at the ren,:l.~ 
unit during the course of the clinic where they would be entered on the 
system ('keyed in') by a nurse. The nurses at the Nephrology Department 
clinic would then access the screens for the specific patients at tending 
clinic to find this up-to-date data and then transferred the data, by hJnJ. 
onto the medical record for the doctOl-S' reference. The doctors would 
occasionally look for the patient data on the VDU but mostly relied on the 
medical record file. The dietician, who also regularly at tended these 
clinics would also ask the nurses to access da ta on particular pa t ien ~s at 
these clinics in relation to her own work (Fieldnotes Book II, 3rd January 
1984-, pp. 52-67; Junior doctor interviews including Dr. J., Int. 3(1) 
December, 1984, circa 073; Dr.L., Int.2(1), May, 1985 circa 090; Dr ~I., =nt 
2(1), December, 1985, circa 090; Dt, Int. 2(3), April. 1985, circa 015) 
'Other Disciplines' 
Both the dietician and the social worker were intended to include at 
least some minimum data on the renal computer system (Operational 
ReqUirement, November,1982, para/appendix 3F; cf. APPENDIX IV». Yet. just as 
a t the Haemo Unit, dietetic and social work da ta was never included on the 
sys tem and for the same kinds of reasons, namely, the geographical 
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remoteness of their offices from the renal unit and t:-le need to continue 
separate departmental records. In addition, they too C101G not taile;-, the 
opportunity to be trained in using the system (Dt. Int. 3(2), April, 1985; 
SW. Int. 3(2), March, 1985). In addition, the social worker was seriQusly 
concerned over the issue of confidentiality and was discussing the matter 
with her senior officer and had yet to take a decision over t"le matter 
<Int. SW 2 (3), circa 063). 
While not being prepared - at least for the time being - to en~er 
data onto the system both the dietician and social worker found the output 
facilities of benefit to themselves. The dietician quickly recognised the 
advan tages of asking the nurses to access da ta a t the weekly clinics 
ra ther than personally searching ou t the medical records as had been the 
procedure previously. The social worker found that the system's re?on 
generating facilities particularly helpful in that it permitted the Home 
Administrator to respond more quickly to social work Gueries than 
previously (e.g. sl.lpplying lists of patients being currently traine!} for 
CAPD). 
The computer implementations compared 
cui bono? 
The staffs at the two renal units adjusted differently to the demands 
of the new compu ter sys tern. Mos t of the s ta ff associa ted with t:'1e Haemo 
Unit found little in the way of benefits from the systems implementation. 
Those that did benefit were the senior medical and nursing ~taff. T~e 
senior nurses found the computer system made their tasks of recording, 
retrieving and analysing pa tien t data easier and quicker than previous~y. 
The doctors also directly benefited from the availability of t'1e 5'.'S 'err. 's 
facilities in clinic and on the unit. By contrast, it was the ordinary 
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nurses (and junior doctors.) who benef i tee mos t from ~he implemen ~i3 ~ion of 
the system at the Dialysis and Transplant Unit. Here tne input of da~3 
onto the computer system was experienced as ::'ess onerous t.'Iar. the 
previous manual system of hand-drawing the charts for the consultants. A' 
this unit (Dialysis and Transplant>, however, the consultants became 
increasingly critical of the system and never used the sys~ems outruts 
directly themselves. 
What emerges from a comparison of the two renal units is a para.::»;.: 
whereby the unit in which the consultants were most supportive of 'he 
system had the least support of the unit staff while at the other unit the 
reverse was the case. The explanation of this paradox lies, in part at: 
least, in the difference between the two units pre-existing manual systems 
and the requirements of the computer system relating to data collection 
and retrieval. In the first unit the compu ter sys tem involved the nurses 
(RGNs and ENs) in more work with no obvious benefits, while at the second 
the new system was experienced as saving the nurses time in input t:lr1g 
da ta as well as saving both doctors and nurses time in accessing the 
information (even when taking into account the extra time involved in 
carrying out the monthly Graph Round>. The one common element was ~he 
passive resistance of the 'other- disciplines', for in both units the 
operationalisation of the system's facilities were found to require extra 
work with no obvious benefits in return. 
The value with which the staff endowed the ~enal ComDuter System 
was not only the result of whether it saved them time and effort, it was 
also very much influenced by the consultants' commitment to he system 
which in turn related to their own commitment to particular medical 
rationales. It is this issue of rationales that now recuires further 
explora t ion. 
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Medical rationales 
The two renal units were organised according to differen~ ?rinci?les. 
The explanation for the differences lay in the medical ra 'iona~e:= c': 
consultants to the management of chronic ESRF patients, rather ,han to 
particular structural factors, such as the difference in the size of the 
units (in terms of patients numbers and nursing and medical st,:;ff) or he 
technology employed for dialysis. In the case of the Haemo iJni t 'good 
patient care' was seen by the senior consultant as involving givi,,;:; 
support to the patients in the process of learning sound haemo-<:!i,31ysis 
technique and dietary practices and helping them to adapt to ~heir new 
lives. The priorities of the consultants at the Dialysis and Trans;)lant 
Unit were very different. The consultants did not recogni:=,e it as Dart 0' 
their responsibility to help the pa tien ts adapt to their condition, nor 
particularly to maintain standards of good dialysis and dietary practice, 
these were seen as the responsibilities of others. Instead, they emphasised 
the role of renal medicine (nephrology) as a scientific enterprise. uialysis 
patients were only of interest if they had interesting medical problems, 
otherwise they could be safely left to the nurses and junior medical staff 
to deal with. 
The senior nursing staff had, in turn developed compatible systems of 
nursing organisation to that of the consultants. In the case of the LJdemo 
Unit, the nursing officer, had implemented a version of the nur:=.ing process 
that emphasised the development of strong links between patients 
nursing staff (SN3, Int. 1, September, 1983), the latter ;,aving 
and 
responsibili ty of assessing the patients social and psychological 'pro!:J~ems' 
(SN1, Int.1, September, 1983) which received a great deal of em'J'1asis. 
Moreover, the approach at the case conferences was an inter-disciplinar :" 
one, with each discipline contributing it3 own information and prcfessional 
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opinion on the case being discussed. ThL is not tr) '=.lJE',gest that ,::emocra.:', 
was at work here, rather that the senior consultant exercised a jEnevC~E~t 
paternalism that found its reflection in the nurses approacCl to their role 
in the care and training of ESRF patients. 
While the doctor-nurses relationship at the Haemo Unit was inter-
disciplinery, a t the Dialysis and Transplant Unit it was nor. Nurses were 
delegated the responsibility of dialysing and training patien~s, as well as 
carrying out a number of other tasks indicated earlier, there was neit'1er 
partnership nor pa ternalism only an occupa tional hierarchy. The consultan ts 
made the basic medical decisions on the patients, from inforrr.:ltion 
presented principally by the junior medical staff (under the sU8ervision of 
the senior consultant), the nurses carried out whatever was their duty in 
consequence of the medical decisions. The senior nurses would ask for 
clarifica tion, or advice, bu t tha t was all. In fact, there were no 
institutional arrangements which brought consultants and nurses formally 
toge ther. There was, surpris ing as it seemed to me, li t t Ie an tagon ism 
between the nurses and consultants despite the hierarchical relation'ship 
between them. There were two main reasons for this relative h9rmony, 
firstly, the nurses liked being involved in the work of a departmen~ 
(nephrology) which had gained a reputation for research (e.g. SN2, Int. 
3 (2), January, 1985). Secondly, the work was organised on 8 clear-cut 
monthly cycle culminating with the graph round and this gave a coherence 
and completeness to the nurses work. The graph round was for the nurses 
the major cross-over point be tween doctors and nurses, The nurses carried 
ou t the da ta collect ion and presen ta tion exercise which was then evalua te j 
by the senior registrar as to its accuracy and whether it indicated any 
medical intervention. 
The medical rationales are not to be considered as wholly the 
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outcome of unfettered medical choice for ~he :Jis'0rir::al deve~09mer.~s c.; 
the two renal units were important constraining iniluences upon 'he 
consultants invol'led. In the case of the Haemo Unit, which was es,taalished 
in 1969 as a satellite of another unit which had too many dialysis 
patients for the doctors and nurses to cope with (Consultant HM:, Int. 1.. 
September. 1983), The unit then became fully autonomous the following year 
and the then sole consultant was made the unit's director. The histcrical 
background to the Dialysis and Transplant Unit was very different. The 
status of the consultants here was based on the Nephrology Department and 
not on the renal unit. Renal dialysis developed at this hospital as a 
necessary subSidiary to nephrology. The unit was bequeathed all the renal 
patients the nephrologist·; were unable to cure. The dialysis unit had 
originally been physically part of the Nephrology Department and la ter, in 
the mid 'seventies, the separate renal unit had been built and equip::,ed 
(Ad,1, In t. 1 • June. 1984). 
The medical rationales were embedded in the organisational routine of 
the two renal units. This was most apparent in the case of the systems ':'i 
meetings employed to monitor patients' cases. At the Haemo Unit the 
monitoring of the dialysis and transplant patients was carried out a~ the 
weekly inter-disciplinary case meetings while at the Dialysis 'clOd 
Transplant Unit no such inter-disciplinary meetings were held. Insteac, new 
pa Uen ts and pa tien ts with medical problems were dealt with a t one of the 
weekly ward rounds and old patients were reviewed monthly at the gra::,"! 
round. In neither case was there any direct reference made to the nursing 
staff or 'other disciplines' except to ask for information. Al+hough it is 
worth mentioning that the graph rounds were decidedly convivial aU.3~;s 
compared to the ward rounds which may have related to the senior 
i t ' h t b' in com.~,_letp_ congruence wi·~ the reg s rar sown approac no emg 
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consultan ts. In broad terms the two units can be seen as typifying ~he 
classic dichotomy in medicine. In the Haemo Unit, patient care and 
management was viewed as a humanitarl'an ( d int di an er- sciplinary) 
enterprise while the Dialysis and Transplant Unit had been established 
and developed by the senior consultant on the clear principles of 
scientific medicine, and the treatment of ESRF patients as a multi-
disciplinary enterprise. Here the benefits of treatment and therapy were 
the byproducts of advances in medical research. 
Summary and conclusions 
The division of labour associated with the management of ESRF and 
renal dialysis was a relatively extensive one, routinely including 'other 
disciplines' in addition to doctors and nurses. Moreover, within the units, 
the nurses role was rather different than that to be found on the general 
wards. In part this was because the patients were mainly outpatients 
undergoing training but also because the nurses played a crucial role in 
the collection and collation of patient data. It was this patient data that 
the doctors tend to refer to, rather than the case notes, when seeing 
patients. 
The renal consultants relied on the nurses <and clerks) to en ter the 
data onto the renal computer system. This arrangement was found to be 
generally an improvement among those nurses whose job it had been to 
collate the figures previously. The accessing of patient data was also, on 
the whole, found to be much easier than always having to search out the 
medical record files. Although this was conclusion has to be qualified in 
relation to the graph round where the process took considerably longer 
than the previous manual system. There were variations between the two 
units as to the methods of utilising the system and the doctors' and 
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nurses' responses which related to the different modes of organisation and 
control of the clinic work processes rather than in terms of the 
acceptance or rejection of computerised patient records. This was not to 
be the situation at the outpatients' clinics reported in the following 
chapter . 
... 
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(1) The slJrvival rates on dialysis is now comparable with survival rates 
following transplantation (cf Dowie, 1984, BMJ Vol 228, 315': Marc'!. 
p.990). 
(2) Williams et 81,1984 ("ESRF: coping with demand" Healt'1 'l'rl?nc.", No.1 
Vol.16 Feb) presents a figure of £5,510 for the annual cost of CA~'~l 
(the figures for the other dialYSis therapies are approxima ~ely t~e 
same as Dowies, (op cit.). 
(3) The nursing staff were also responsible for the dialysis of patients 
with acute renal failure. These were patients whose kidneys had 
ceased to function as a result of major shock (trauma). These 
patients were located on wards away from the renal unit and were few 
in number. 
(4) Dialysis patients also had to limit the amount of fluids they could 
drink, for with little facility to urinate the patients had to rely on 
haemo-dialysis to take off any excess fluid (e.g Dt. Int 1, 30~:l 
September, 1983,086-100). 
(5) The cases of both pre-ESRF renal patients and the acute patients 
were also discussed as were transplant patients. 
(6) The Sister who described the rotation scheme did not include the 
Graph and Ward Rounds in her account, bu t this mus t have been an 
oversight for nurses were allocated to the Rounds for a number of 
months at a time. The rotation scheme was designed to cover 2 years 
(SN2 In t. 1, July, 1984) with the nurses spending 6 mon ths on each 
type of work and 3 time 6 months does not equal two years. 
(7) In the case of CAPD this was no t a major exercise, as all t'1a ~ was 
required was adequate storage space for the oatien,:'s bags of 
dialysate. but with haemo-dialysis a whole room had to be c0nver'er:. 
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or i'l por tacabin supplied, to take the haemo-d::'alysis machinery (e.g 
Ad. Int. 1, June, 1984> 
(8) The Tenchoff tube was the plastic tube giving access 1:0 the Ja~ien:= 
abdominal cavity for the purpose of exchanging dialysate ~~e name is 
that of the person who initially developed the procedure <Fieldnotes, 
27th July, 1984, p.64) 
u. 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
CLINIC WORK, CASE NOTES AND 
COMPUTERS. 
Introduction 
In contrast to the the previous chapter, where the concern was with 
the division of labour between doctors, nurses and others within a 
particular specialist unit and related clinics, here the focus will be on 
the work of the clinicians in several specialties and will thus give little 
attention to the work of the nurses, secretaries, clerks and adminis'rators 
who were also involved. The renal clinics were organised on a multi- or 
inter-disciplinary basis, whereas the work carried out wi thin the 
outpatients' clinics was almost wholly the province of the doc·ors. 
Furthermore, whereas the renal computer system provided facilities chat 
supplemen ted the medical record the sys tem to be discussed here was 
designed to replace the medical record. In the renal setting the computer 
system was introduced by the consultants but designed principally, if not 
solely, for use by the nursing staff while the outpatients' (()mputer 
system (CORES) was introduced by a consultant especially for the use of 
other consultants and their junior medical staff (Fieldnotes. 20t': ~>,y, 
1981, Notes of Preliminary Meeting). 
The concerns of this chap tel' are with the dynamics of medical work 
within an outpatients' department, and the consequences for '':1e clinici3ns 
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(particularly in terms of functional autonomy and collegiality) of the 
implementation of a computerised medical records system and their 
subsequent responses to the system. The computer system - referre:: to 
here as the Computerised Outpatients' Records System (CORES) - was 
introduced into the outpatients clinics of a small acute hos!): ta::' in h0 
midlands in 1981 under the leadership of one of the consultants <referred 
to here as Dr Old) and with the initial support and coo?eration of his 
colleagues (see Chapter Six). In connection with the work of the clinicians 
the objective of the system was to replace the handwritten case notes w:th 
printed, structured reports, flowcharts and clinical summaries on patients 
and to make available facilities for analysing clinical da ta on groups of 
pa tien ts in order to facilita te higher standards of pa tien t care and to 
stimulate medical research (internal document, dated December,1980). One 0: 
the primary intentions of Dr Old was to establish a clinical database for 
research and medical audit purposes as well as well as for routine clinic 
use. The system was intended to be an improvement on the traditional 
medical records designed as it was to provide more accessible, more 
accurate and printed (as opposed to hand-written) clinical information 
(Fieldnotes, 20th May, 1981, Notes of Preliminary Meeting). 
The chapter is sequenced as follows, 
1. the organisation of the clinics, including the division of 
labour between the consultants and their junior staff, will 
be described. 
2. an accoun t of the doctors' use of the medical recoI~d will 
be presented, for it is these files that were computerised. 
3. the computer system itself will be described in terms oi 
how it aided or impinged upon the clinic work of 
doctors. 
~he 
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4. the doctors responses to these innova tions will be 
discussed and analysed. 
The Organisation of the Clinics 
The Functions of the Outpatients' Department 
The outpatients' department (OPD) at St Giles acute hospital was not: 
a large one but it did cover a reasonably wide range of medical and 
surgical specialisms, covering general medicine and surgery, rheumatology, 
urology and gynaecology. St Giles functioned for the consultants as a 
sa telli te to the nearby DGH where they also held clinics and they would, 
too varying degrees, use the facilities of St Giles to give themselves 
flexibili ty in their management of patients, for example, moving some 
patients from one hospital to the other for surgery, or a bed, or for 
outpatients' appointments, depending on availability, or preference. As one 
consultant commented, 
liSt Giles does play a useful role at times if only 
because (the DGH) hasn't got enough beds and facilities to 
cope with all the things we're dealing with ... " 
Int.1, 207-218, October,1981> 
As with any other acute hospital the OPD served four basic functions, 
(Con.5, 
(a) a GP diagnostic service where patients are referred for 
specialist diagnosis. Once the diagnosis has been confirmed 
the patient would normally be referred back to the GP for 
trea tmen t, 
(b) the anteroom to the hospital wards and operating theatres. 
Investigations can be organised and carried out without 
the necessity of the patient occupying a hospital bed as 
can the patients initial recovery (Godber, 1975). These 
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patient.s also would DGrmally be GP referrals, 
(c) monitoring the long-term outcome of trea tmen t of 
discharged pa tien ts who hi'we undergone major surge:-y (e.g. 
masectomy), 
(d) The long-term medical treatment of c~lronically ill 
patients. 
Functions and 2 refer predominantly to 'new' patients, while 3 and 4 
relate to 'follow-up' patients. Approximately 25% of patient,~ attending the 
clinics were new patients referred by their GP (Management Services 
Report, p.3, October, 1981>. 
Ou tpB tien ts' Clinic Work 
There were eight consultants who held regularly clinics at thl? St 
Giles hospital, three were physicians, two urologis ts, two gynaecologis ~~ 
and one general surgeon. The consultants normally worked with at least one 
other doctor in the clinics (each seeing patients separately>. Mostly the"e 
other dodors were senior house officers (SHOs) although registrars were 
also employed in the urology and gynaecology clinics. The junior medical 
staff consist of House Officers (HOs), Senior House Officers (SHO".; and 
Registrars, these house staff were allocated to the consultants of a 
specialty for six months, while the arrangements regarding the rl?gistrars 
were more variable. The HO's and SHO's also worked on the wards in the 
hospital while the registrars also worked at the nearby District General 
Hospi tal. 
There were, on average, 120 patients attending the outpatients' 
department each week, of which 25% attended the medical clinics, 171. 
general surgery, 15% urology and 43% gynaecology clinics ('';.3:-:a3ement 
Services Repod, p.3, October ,1981). Outpatients' consu:t.} :iO!lS Idstec 
between an average of 6 and 43 minute" (both times re~ate t.) the same 
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surgical spec iali ty) with an average time of 23 minu tes i or all : ~.i:-dcs 
<ibid. p.ll>. The patients came from three sourC83, a G~' or cons'j:~ant 
referral or following an inpatient stay. New patients :n aE : .... 10' c1:':-.::s 
had their medical history taken and a physical enmina~i0n. There was 
considerable variation in the organisation of the outpa+ients' work C'f 
these doctors as between clinics which reflected both the n'jture Q' the 
specialism and the preferences of the consultants. While the research was 
being undertaken the usual arrangements (by specialism) were as fo:lows, 
(a) Medicine 
There were three consultant physicians, a rheumatologist, a bronchial 
specialist and a general physician. The two specialists shared the services 
of one SHO who would see both new and 'follow up' ::>a tients , although the 
bulk of the work would be with 'follow up' patients. A large proporti0n of 
the workload involved the monitoring and medical care of the long term 
chronically ill. The junior doctor functioned basically as an assis+:ant who 
helped the consultants deal with these 'follow up' patients and ~~ere was 
little emphasis on medical training. 
The other consultant physician was allocated one SHO who worked on 
the outpatients' clinics (as well as on the wards). This junior doctor 
would see new patients only (i.e. new referrals from GPs or froIT'. other 
consultants) to 'clerk' them, arrange any investigations and arrive at a 
preliminary, presumptive diagnosis one week prior to the consultant seeing 
the patient (e.g. Jnr. 1, Int. 2, December, 1981 192-213), This meant that 
there was a training element in this arrangement for it approximated to 
the division of labour found on the wards where the house officers 'clerk' 
new (or readmitted) patients, allocate the patient "0 a diagno:otic 
category, however tentative, and present t~eir findings to the consuPan~= 
at the ward rounds (see also discussion of ware rOl'nc, on renal units in 
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Chapter Seven) (Rees, 1981b, pp. 56-59). 
(b) Urology 
The two consultant urologists shared the senl:'ces of one HO snd one 
SHO, or Registrar (who was based at the nearby DGH). The HO would not be 
employed in the outpatients' clinics (Con.6, Int. 3, Side 2: 026" J1Jne.,19(3). 
The HO would only remained with this specialty for three ;:Jon ths, 
completing his or her six month period at the hospital in General Surgery 
(see below>, When the HO left urology the SHO (or Registrar) would be 
transferred to the second consultant and the first consultan~ would be 
alloca ted the HO who had jus t comple ted 3 months in Genera 1 Surgery, The 
actual division of labour between consultant and junior doctor was 
variable depending on the experience of the junior doctor, but both 
consultants took responsibility for seeing "the majority (of) the new 
patients" (Con. 4, Int. 2, 104, June, 1982). One consultant monitored the 
work of 'his' junior staff by "always get (ting) the (casemotes afterwards 
and check (ing) wha t they have said ... and .. writ (ing) all the doc tors I 
(clinic) letters ... " (Con. 6, Int.1, 037-039, October, 1981), this was a very 
unusual practice (see below); registrars and SHOs expecteG to have to 
write their own clinic letters to the patients' GPs. 
(c) General Surgery 
There W8S only one general surgeon and he shared an HO wi!h the 
urologis t s (a bove), changing over every three mon ths. Unlike the uro logis ts 
this consultant did make use of the house officer for outpatients' clinic 
work. The doctor's main work in the clinic was to see patients recen:ly 
discharged from hospital (following surgery) to check they wel-e recover :ng 
satisfactorily, there were, in addition, a number of patients (~-'ns·)e.:Fied) 
who had undergone major treatment for cancer in the pas~ and whose case:: 
were reviewed annually (,'nr. 27, Int. 3, circa 121.1 , Decembel-, 1983). The 
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consultant would be principally concerned with new ::la'::erts. (J 2 I 
. " nr., nt. 
2, circa 201, April, 1982) 
This outpatients' clinic functioned very much as 6"1 anterooIT'. TC, ':he 
hospital wards and operating theatres. The cons'Jltant. described '::1e typical 
rou tine 1n terms of "... one tends to see cases in black and whPe 
straightforward diagnosis, investigation, to 'come in' for sl..Irgery, or drug 
treatment (chemotherapy)" (Con. 5, Int. 2, 033, April, 1982) and would 
reattend the outpatients' clinic later following their discharge in order to 
ensure that the post-operative recovery was satisfactory. 
(d) Gynaecology 
As with urology and general surgery the gynaecology clinics 
functioned largely as an anteroom to the operating theatres and wards. 
There were two consultant gynaecologists who held outpatients' clinics at 
this hospital. Both were allocated one SHO each for their work at the 
hospital <including 'inpa tien ts ') <Internal Memorandum, 28 th January, 1983). 
Neither consultant would normally make use of this local s!-!u to cover any 
of the outpatients' clinic workload. Instead the consultants would share 
the clinic work with their registrar from the district general ho:=:::i tal 
(DGH). In addition, the consultants would have three medical students with 
them at the clinics (Con. 1, Int. 2, 24-7-268, October, 1982; Con 2, Int. 3, 
078-160, June, 1983), 
The main difference between the two consultan ts organisa t ior: :)1' 
these clinics rela ted to the fact tha t the second consulta:l ~ was ,3;-, 
honorary consultant, being also a senior lecturer in t~e medical school 3t 
the nearby university (Con. 2, Int. 1, 068 (side 2), Se?tem~,er. 1981). This 
doctor also had extensive research and some teaching commit~2r:ts and 
these demands mean t tha t the consultan t was less of ten in a ~ tendance a': 
these clinics thm the other consultant. Instead he would leave the work 
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under the control of a senior registrar witn ~t,e as-=:;"'.ance r ..•. · .• 
- - - _3 reg1~ :-ar 
and/or SHO (811 from the DGH). 
Clinic work and the junior doctors 
The medical specialties employed the junior s~aff'l~loca~~c on the 
hospital rota tion scheme while the surgical specialties (wi t'1 the e:{ception 
of general surgery) tended to rely on the more ~enior of ~he junic:r 
doctors available to them at the nearby DGH. One reason for this was ~-.3t. 
the 'new' patients in the surgical specialties tended to be cancida~es for 
surgery and in consequence the consultants '.Jeliever:: that t:-te;e pat:ont; 
were best seen by the more experienced clinicians in order to limit the 
room for possible errors in diagnoses and treatment. In the case Oi 
medicine, however, the patients were more likely to be suffering ~rom 
chronic illness which required long term trea tmen t, any errors on the ::Jar· 
of junior doctors could normally be corrected by the consultant before any 
serious consequences occurred. Another related cons.ideration was tha~ t'lo? 
surgical specialties saw rather more patients in outpatient;' clinic than 
the medical specialties, 751. of the total number of outpatients were 
attending the surgical clinics (Management Services Repor t, p.3, 
October ,1981), This meant tha t the work was itself more in ~ensi ve than was 
typically the case in the medical clinics. In the surgical special tie:::. i + 
was a general rule that the HOs would only see 'follow up' D.'l~:2nts; this 
meant that the training element of the work was much le~3 than work on 
the wards. Even so, the consultant gynaecologists did use the c~::'nics. in 
order to train medical students, particularly" .. to do the clerki-:.,'" «(0:1 
2 Int 3 080 160 J ne 1983) C:;im1'larly, only one of .~'" mecical clinics , ., - , u, . _ 
was clearly organised with some eductional and training intent (see above), 
here the SHO saw the 'new' patien~s for the purpose of clerki-:2-, diagnosis. 
at least of 8 ~reliminary (presumptive) kind, and ordering any 
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investigations they might believe necessary (Tnr 23, Int.2, 323, May,~9':,3). 
It was, nevertheless, the view of the other physicians that ~;"'.sre was an 
educational content to OPD work, "in general terms (at :east) ... Basica~ly, 
the more the junior staff are involved in the clinic the more ~he ~each:~S 
role" (Con. 3, Int. 3, 153-162, June, 1983) While on~y three o' the 
consultan ts structured the outpatients' work for their junior ~'d T", or 
students, to include specific elements of training <physician and 
gynaecologists) the other consultants would claim that the work containec 
an educational element, in that a consultant could not utilise a junior 
doctor effectively in these clinics without first telling thc?m what ',ley 
wanted them to do. 
The medical record 
Given that the CORES computer system was designed teo replace the 
traditional medical record, including the case notes, it was necessary to 
examine the doctors' methods both of selection and structuring the 
information they wrote in the outpatients' case notes and for using tha': 
information and data. Only by understanding the actual ;)ractices of the 
doctors was it possible to understand and explain their res?on~e:= to using 
the CORES system. 
The case notes were only part of the medical record. In common with 
other NHS hospitals the a typical medical record at St Giles would include, 
(a) letters from the referring GP and/or consultant; 
(b) the patient data entered by the nurses <i.e. height, wSight, 
blood pressure etc,); 
(c) the handwritten case notes relating to any prev~J:Js 
outpatients' visits; 
(d) the labora tory results (biochemis tr-y, ~l3emotolc:::y, e t.:, : 
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which were were written on colour ,:crjed 5_:::;S of oaper; 
(e) copies of the letters sent to t' ·,::e (Jf'=. (or referring 
consultants) concerning the :)atien~ in be 
outpatients' clinic. (clinic letter). 
In addition, the medical records on patients who had s!Jent a Deriod of 
time 8S an inpatient, would include, 
(f) the handwritten case notes relating to the iW),lt:'ent 
stay (5), include details of a full 'clerking' carried out by 
a member of the housestaff 
(g) the handwrit ten opera tion notes in the case of pa t ien t ~ 
who had undergone surgical procedures 
(h) a copy of the discharge summary, a document t'1at gave 
the da te and diagnosis on discharge of the ;::>8 tien t 
(1) any referral letters to members of any 'other di:=.ciplines' 
involved with the care of the patient <e.g. social workers, 
physiotherapists). 
These documents were kept in the standard medical record folder which b,)re 
the patient's identifying number and were filed in the medical recores 
office when not being used by the doctors, nurses, or the medical 
secretaries. The medical records were numbered in common with th", records 
held at the the nearby District General Hospital (DGH). 
Wri ting case no tes 
In principle, a doctor writing case notes would record details o· t~e 
patient's history (basically the presenting complaint of the ::>at:'ent, ~,ast 
medical history, social history, drug history) and physiL-3l examinBlion. At 
which stage he or she would decide on an initial (presumptive) diagnosis, 
or some other equivalent assessment of the :Ja~ient's condit!.on. On the 
basis of this the doctor would order any laboratory or clinical 
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in ves tiga tions s/he believes necessary. recommend medically appropriate 
therapy and write a letter to the patient's general practioner (the clinic 
letter) (Jnr. 9, Int.2, 215-237, April, 1983). Patients returning for further 
visits ('follow up' patients> would typically only warrant brief entries in 
the case notes concerning any changes in the patient's condition or 
treatment. 
There were, however, considerable differences as between the 
principles and practice and many case notes were apparently incomplete, or 
indecipherable. Moreover, there was considerable differences as between the 
methods adopted by consultants and the junior doctors. 
The ra tionales for case no tes 
The over-riding priority for the clinic records, according to the 
Bittner and Garfinkel (1967), concerned the medico-legal responsibilities ,)f 
the clinic (see Chapter Four, p. 84--89, for a fuller discussion>. This 
interpretation of the reasons for incomplete clinic records, however, was 
inadequate for the understanding of the degrees of completeness or 
incompleteness of the case notes pertaining to the outpatients' clinics at 
the St Giles hospital. The concept of the medical record as a therapeutic 
contract, the key to Bittner and Garkinkels' analysis, was not the one that 
impinged to any great extent on the NHS doctors' own understanding of the 
rationale for the existence and maintenance of these clinic records. In 
consequence the major reasons for the cryptic nature of many of the case 
notes were not related to medical defensiveness but, as it tlJrned out, 
pragma tism. 
It was possible to identify four rationales that informed the 
clinicians use of case notes within the outpatients' clinics. These were 
found to be, 
(6) case notes as medico-legal documents, 
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(8) case not8'; as a research resource, an archive of medical 
knowledge, or Be t,~ddl record 
(c) case not8s as an instrum8nt of medical training 
(d) case notes as a decision aid. 
(a) Case notes as lIledico-legal documents: Th8 hosJita~ authorities are 
required to preserve medical records for they are legally owned by ~he 
Secretary of State and not the property of the doctor who mak8s the 
record (Lindop, 1978, para. 7.11) When the case notes ar8 '.::ign8d by t'1e 
doctor they constitute evidence that the medical work referred to in ~n~ 
record has been carried out, or planned for the future. Yet only one of 
the consultants interviewed allowed the legal status affect the way he 
recorded case notes. This consultant would r8cord his criticisms of other 
doctors who had previously seen his patients to, 
"protect myself from litigation because someone has given 
absolutely the wrong treatment" (Con. 2, Int. 3, 278-290, 
June, 1983). 
Although one other consultant did point out, 
"that something may happen (to a patient) and ultimately 
end in the coroners court ... Then (the clinic recorc) needs 
to look reasonably clear" (Con. 3, Int. 3, June, 1983) 
No other consultant, however, expressed concern regarding the possi~Eity 
of litigation. Medico-legal considerations played little part in t~8 way ene 
consultants or the junior medical staff wrote their case netes. 
(b) Case notes as a research resource: In order for the case no':es to oe 
of use as a research resource they would need to be r8corded 
systematically and comprehensively, (in Bittner- and Garfinkels' terr:1. an 
lJcturiBl record). Some hospitals are renowned for the c~:np:eteneS3 of 
their medical records. One famous example from t~e USA is ~:le 
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Massachussetts General Hospital which has ma:'.'1~a.ine:~ deta:~-=d ~e,=orC:s 
since 1821 (Reiser, 197e, pp. 206-202,). On tl;is sic!e of ~:-:.e A~~'m::'c no 
hospital has earned a similar reputation, a~ ~h0ugh Dr Old c:.r: tell me that 
the Hammersmith Hospital, for a time did follow a policy similar :: ~ne 
Massuchusse t ts General Hospital. Indi vidual and groups of consultan ts 
within certain hospitals have implemented, at different times, a :-,o:':c1' of 
comprehensive, detailed records. Where this has occurred, as ~or e~:am:>~e :'r. 
the case of the Department of Surgery at Guy's Hospit.a.l in the mid 
seventies <McColl et aI, 1976, pp. 1342). There was no policy d~ St Gl~es, 
nor at the DGH, regarding the maintenance of detaile<:; and com:>reher,c;ive 
records, a situation which was neither unique nor without consequences. 
There was a pract ica I need for the med ical records <and case no tes) 
to be maintained sufficiently systematically in order they mi2;ht be of 
some use as a research resource. Regis trars were expected (as part of 
their training) to carry out research which would involve them analysin,3, 
retrospectively, the case notes of particular groups of patients. These 
doctors had little anticipation that the case note records would be 
complete, or reliable, and relied far more on any systematically recorded 
numerical data available within the medical record folder, such as 
labora tory results. Bu t even this da ta could be unreliable :,e,:ause it was 
often misplaced or lost (Jnr. 8, Int.1, July, 1982>. 
Case-meetings also caused the registrars to turn to the '::.:lS8 notes 
as a research reSQu['ce. Regis trars, in the surgical specialties, were 
expected to regularly present cases at the weekly case meetings he:.:! at 
the DGH <selected from both the DGH and St Giles ?atients). The urologis~:=. 
for instance, were asked to present cases about every four to six weeks 
<Con.4, Int. 2, 370-392, June, 1982). T:'e objective of t:12S2 meetings was 
primarily educational and the criteria adopted foc selecting a 'case' ;or 
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inclusion was that it should be medically 'interesting', 
"Essentially it is one of student teaching, interesting and 
abnormal cases (which can be) shown well on x-rays " 
<ibid> 
The existence of these meetings did not entail the necessity of doctors 
routinely writing systematic and comprehensive case notes, at least not in 
the outpatients' clinics. 'Interesting' cases invariably involved an 
inpatient stay and the opportunity for a comprehensive 'clerking' to have 
been carried out (Jnr. 19, Int.2, II 104-123, April, 1983). Hence it was 
not necessary for the doctors to ensure that comprehensive records were 
kept just in case they might be required for some unspecified future case 
meeting. If a case showed any signs of being 'interesting' there was 
always enough time for the patient to be brought into hospital for a full 
set of investigations and the documenting of a full and comprehensive 
'history' and 'examination' (see also Chapter Seven, p. 211>. 
Prior to the introduction of the CORES computer system none of the 
doctors ever wrote case notes qua case notes in the outpatients' clinics 
with research in mind (with the exception of Dr Old, whose research 
involved the computerisation of the case notes). The consultants, however, 
ensured that the capture of data for research, or audit, purposes were 
organised prospectively and recorded on documents other than the case 
notes kept separate from the medical records, 
" I have .. a diagnosis index cabinet in which I put all 
Ie t ters and pa tien t records - no t the pa t i en t record - my 
i b t ge t (da ta) from the hospita 1 own cop es . . ecause 0 
(system) takes weeks but I (can) go and ... pick-up gall-
stones (for example) in the last ten years" (Con.5, Int. 1, 
September, 1981) 
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Other consultants also maini;ained their own separate re':;)l-C for researc". 
or audit purposes (Can. 3, Int. 2, Seotemoer, 198"' Con 4 lot 1 --. . 
. " , ., ., ;:,"'::> .• emoer , 
1981; Con. 7, Int. 1, October, 1981>. This practice of m,3'c:1·.a:nmg dual 
systems of clinic records clearly was not an uncommon one. Ie was also 
case, as will be discussed later, that these consultants (as \-'ell as 
junior doctors) would adopt a dUBl system strat<:?Zy in order to CC':k with 
the CORES system. 
(c) Case notes as a means of training and monitoring junior lDedical staff: 
on the wards the house officers were responsitJle for 'clerking' t:1e new 
patients. Much of the junior' doctor's training centred on learning how to 
conduct a history and examination in order that a diagnosis, even il of a 
preliminary (presumptive) kind, can be reached and the pa tient ca tegorised 
(Rees, 1981b, pp. 56-59), In the outpatients' clinics this training elemer,t, 
was not present to anything like the same extent, although clearly from 
what has been said earlier (concerning the organisation of +h.e clinics), 
outpatients' work was seen by some consultants <phys:cia.ns and 
gynaecologists) to contain an element of medical training for a' least 
some housestaff <and students), But for housestaff to have :=.oent 
additional time 'clerking' all new outpatients would have reduced t'1e 
number of patients that could have been seen during a clinic session and 
so the training elemen t in ou tpa t ien ts' work tended to be abou t managing 
the patients, rather than diagnoses and the structured recording in ,he 
case notes of medical information, knowledge and opinion. 
Even without adopting 'clerking' procedures within the clinics, 
case notes might s till have played an educa t 10nal, or training role, if 
consultants examined the entries of the junior doctors, but this again 
':he 
"-:-.e 
not the usual practice. The SHO who 'clerked' the 'new' patients one week 
prior to the consultant physician seeing them wou.:.d seem ~o be 3:1 
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exception, however, none of the SHOs' involved who were interviewed ",':;'~' 
arrangement in this light, largely because the consultant rarely discuss8d 
the case note's in any detail with the junior doc tors concerned (Jnrs, 1, 9. 
12, 23 and 26), The only exceptions, in fact, were the C0nSIJ:~ant 
gynaecologists and one of the urologists. The gynaecologists used c~e 
outpatients' clinics as settings in which to train medical students in the 
art of case note writing, The students' work was also of some "Issistance 
to the consultants for they provided them with a structure,:: report of .9 
patient's history and medical examination, As one of the gynaecologists 
explained, 
" I've got the students to do l:he 'clerking' then I"Je 
just struck out what is wrong in the (CdSE') notes and 
added my comments on the side." (Con ,2 , Int, 3,080-\:'92, 
June, 1983) 
The other consultan t to monitor the casenotes of the junior doctors was 
urologist who did so because he wrote all the clinic letters to the GPs 
following the clinic, 
" I always get the (case) notes after (the clinics) and 
check what they (SHO, or registrar) have said ... And I 
write all the doctors (clinic) letters, I don't leave i~ to 
the junior s ta ff ," 
But this direct monitoring of the junior staff had no educational inten, 
"This is my way of controlling what goes on between :he 
GPs and the junior staff." (Con. 6, Int, 1, 037-04-4, October, 
1981) 
It was a unique method and no other consultant adopted the practice. 
(d) Case notes as a decision aid: the case notes written by junior me,:!ical 
staff did tend to constitute a more complete record than was the case 
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with the consultants, but neither the junior doctors, nor the consultants, 
wrote as they did in the casenotes for medico-legal or research reasons, 
nor was the issue of education and training a key factor influencing the 
practices adopted. Rather, it was the process of clinical decision-making 
that most influenced the doctors' methods of recording casenote. It is this 
aspect of writing casenotes tha t is to be expanded upon in the following 
sub-sec t ions. 
The junior medical staff 
In the outpatients' clinics the junior doctors would typically write 
case notes in relation to 'new' patients similarly to the procedure they 
would adopt on the wards, so a registrar in gynaecology would, 
" ... ask the pa tien t abou t (their presen ting) complain t, 
and then, after that, we go to the menstrual history, 
obstretic history, past medical history and social history 
" (Jnr. 10, Int. 2, 128-162, October, 1982) 
Although, the degree of detail a junior doctor would write up in the case 
notes would vary according to, 
a) the nature of the problem, 
b) the seniority and experience of the junior doctor 
So, for example, a registrar reported that, 
" ... if (a patient) comes in with a lump under their arm, 
you write down "cyst" and that is probably the end of it, 
but if it is more serious then a more comprehensive record 
is made" (Jnr 25, Int.2, 211-233, January, 1984) 
Even so, this doctor would not, 
" write such detailed notes at 'outpatients' as a 
houseman would when they are admitting a patient, I only 
ask questions relevant to the particular problem" <ibid,>. 
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It was, however, the usual method of the house s~af f " ... (to) gc ~",rcugh 
every ... system in the body" «Jnr.23 (SHO), Int, 2,099-108, May, 1983) 
when dealing with new patients. This method of ao::>roach, ",:aIJ3'-'~ 3~ 
medical school" (Jnr. 9, Int. 2, 215-237, April, 1983), was a~8,)rithm:c in 
that it helped ensure that the doctor would not overlook any ::r,=,ortan': 
factors relating to 8. patient's condition, diagnosis, or Drooosed 
management. Registrarship was, according to those interviewed, th", st3~", at 
which clinicians moved from the narrative completeness of the house 
officers to the idiosyncratic brevity of many of the consultants (see 
below), for they would begin to look for ways of abbreviating the:, 
casenotes in a way similar to the consultants, and for the same re8S0n~ 
The consul tan ts 
The consultants (and some registrars), by contrast, never took ful~ Da':ient 
histories. Instead, they focused their attention on patients' presen ting 
complaints as the organising principle. As one consultant explained, 
" phYSicians more than surgeons are lil{\~ly to jo notes 
in 'outpatients' more on the .. , systematic format C,f the 
archetypal clerking of a patient The disci?~ine of 
medicine ... will also make a very much more structured 
primary data recording in the outpatient clinic. I'm afraid 
the majority of surgical clinics .. , are too big to devote 
much time to each patient .. , I go straight into the main 
h k 1 t h i t " (Con. 1 , complain t t en ta e any re evan ... s ory ,,, 
Int.3, 082-100, March,1983) 
The point about the physicians was only moderately accurate, for 01= one 
explained, 
" 
I make notes which are meaningful to me for 
instance on eXBmin8tic!rJ, most people will split it up into 
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sys t8ms, bu t I tend to have t t a s.a ement ~o begin (wi':-; 
how a person looks ... then I go for the rar ticular thinE:: 
that are important ... To get to the guts of the case 
quickly ... " (Con. 7, Int. 2,04-8-079 
The consultants used the case notes to briefly note observations in order 
to help them to arrive a t a conclusion regarding how bes t to manage the 
patient and in the process these notes would form the basis of the elmi: 
letter which would be dictated after the the clinic. 
The only common denominator regarding the consultants case notes wao; 
that it was the writing of them that aided their clinical decision-making 
(decision-aiel) and the contents would be as complete or ot:-len.'ise 
depending on how easily the consultant came to a conclusion regardirlg the 
disposal (diagnosis or other categorisation) of the patient. The case of 
the junior doctors was dif f eren t and as has already been explained they 
wrote case notes, on 'new' patients, in terms of history and examination 
('clerking') just as they would on the wards, for this algorithmic method 
gave them confidence in reaching clinical decisions regarding the patients. 
The consequences 
Whether the case notes were written extensively, as in the case oi 
the housestaff t or, as with the consultants, cryptically, they were rarely 
systematically referred to again. Instead, the doctors would almost always 
refer to the clinic letter for a summary of the ?stient's condition. The 
following registrar's comment was not atypical, 
"I ... rely on the clinic let ter ... If I am looking a t a set 
of 'notes' and want to know exactly what haPDened to ~nat 
patient I will read (the clinic) letter" <Jnr. 16, Int. 2, 
170-178, December, 1982) 
While the clinic le t ter was usually the first point of refE'ienCe it was 
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not, however, the only document referred to. Doctors would al=.o refer to 
investigation results, discharge summaries, operation notes and the 
inpatients' notes (Con. 5, Int. 3, 123-128, July,1983). Similarly, the doctors 
would often read through the previous case notes, and most consultants had 
developed techniques of speeding up this procedure, typically by "the 
actual paragraphing "(Con.7, Int. 2, 023-025, December, 1982) or 
notations and underlining important points (Con. 4, Int.2, 007-056, June, 
1982) and even using coloured paper to distinguish between their own case 
notes and those of of the junior doctors so the la t ter could be ignored, 
for as one consultant commented, 
"Trying to get information out of the body of 'notes' which 
is in somebody elses writing and someone elses 
paragraphing is extremely difficult 
100, November, 1982) 
" (Con. 7, Int. 2, 90-
If the consultant really wanted to know the full details of a patient's 
condition then that patient would be brought into the hospital as an 
'inpatient' for a full medical examination and array of tests. As one 
consultant explained no doubt with iconoclastic intent, 
"Outpatients' clinics are notoriously dangerous places for 
missing out information <in the clinic record). Any patient 
being admitted has to be reassessed on admission ... to 
make sure we al-e doing the right thing ... " (Con. 1, In t.2, 
084-089, October,1982) 
There was little systematic difference between medical and surgical 
specialties on central role of the clinic letter although one consultant, 
commented that surgeon colleagues at the DGH were not commonly renowned 
for the regular writing of clinic letters (Con. 6, Int. 3, 422-424, Tune, 
1983). 
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In contrast to Bittner and Garfinkels' findings the present research 
indicates that the information contained within the clinic record was not 
necessarily sufficient to be read as a therapeu tic con tract. The 
consultants documentation of the history- taking and diagnosis (or other 
categorisation) of patients and their subsequent management within the 
outpatients' clinics was idiosyncratically documented; it was not possible 
for other clinicians to reconstitute with confidence the process from the 
evidence of the case notes. As shall be seen shortly, this common practice 
wes to have major implications with regard to the utilisation of the CORES 
computer system. 
The orgenisation of the computer implementation. 
The CORES computer system was introduced on an overtly experimental 
basis. The programmes were supplied from the USA completely free of 
charge while the hardware and technical support was made available by the 
regional heelth authority virtuelly free of charge. The system was 
introduced into the first outpatients' clinic towards the end of 1981 but 
it W6S not un til the following October (1982) tha t all the consultan ts had 
been introduced to the system. 
The CORES system involved replacing the handwritten case notes by a 
form, known as the encounter form. These encounter forms consisted of 
precoded lists of signs, symptoms, diagnoses, operations, investigations and 
drugs and included a space for narrative <Appendix V). The procedure for 
capturing the clinic data was that the doctors would complete the 
encounter form at the time of seeing the patient in the clinic <medical 
encounter). At the end of the clinic the medical records and encounter 
forms would be collected together by the nurses and passed to one of the 
computer clerks (there were two, part time, female, computer clerks who 
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also had ot~er - general c:erica~ - duties t-:: carry GU~). TC"lE da~a on ',-.e 
forms would then be entered on the CO?ES dS';'3b.3se V:3 ~'le VDU 3r,d 
terminal and the medical record folders pas·.=,e(~ tG the me~:ca~ ·:;ecre~.3r:es 
who required them in order to complete trH" elini.:; let ters and to 
incorpora te the laboratory results as they became availab:e Then prio~ to 
the next clinic, printed, structured reports and summaries of ,he ?at:ents' 
case notes and investigations would be printed and placed wit'l:n the 
medical record folders for use in the clinic (Appendix Vll. In acdition, t>;e 
system could produce flowcharts of the temporal course of the dis83s.,," 
process as well as being able to automatically analyse aggregate data for 
doctors wishing to carry out research or medical audit. The new (CORES) 
system presented patient information in a format that was much more 
systematic and comprehensive than was previously the case. At he same 
time the system demanded the doctors changed the way they re,:'::rced 
patient information and data in the clinic. 
In the beginning 
Each consul tan twas invi ted by Dr Old to design their own e.ncoun ter 
forms, with his help. The actual task of translating the consultants' 
reqUirements into the printed form was carried out by a member of the 
management services depal-tment. In practice one consultant in e.3ch 0,' the 
specialties carried out this work and the others in the same ';8e.:la_ty 
adopted the resultant format. This was not a conscious~y agreed stra~egy, 
bu t a compromise. The consultan ts were generally prepared to ~ ry and use 
the system, but less prepared to be involved in designing the for"'--=., 
" ... we have been variously less committe.~ than Feter CDr 
Old> in setting up a good encounter form ... part:.:_~:Jrly in 
(this) department .... (l) said that it would be impossible 
(for me) to do any of the 'spad,?;,/crk' and that I woulc .:;'::; 
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along with it (only) if Mr (o+her c0nsul~ant) .. agreed '0 
do all the 'spadework' and he did '" " «(on. " It') 027 
. n. <., -
040, October, 1982). 
The consultants were brought on to the system singly and in pairs over a 
period of twelve months. The system was further developed and modified 
during the implementation period, either to attempt to improve '~e 
facilities available or as the result of com men ts and criticisms of ~!-le 
consultants and other users of the 5.ystem. 
Adapting to the system 
The responses of the consultants to lJ5ing the system, changed over 
time. At the outset all the consultants supported the proposal, dlthough 
one had indica ted to Dr Old tha t he was unlikely to be able to use the 
system in his clinic (for reasons that will be explained later) (Con. 7, 
Int. 1,049-060, October,1981>. By July, 1982, however, all the consultmts 
(excepting Dr Old) had decided not to continue to use the system routine~y 
in their clinics. The responses of the junior medical staff, whilst not ~'1e 
same as the consultants, tended to reflect a similar trajectory. 
As explained in Chapter Six <The Politics of Innovation and 
Professionalism) the consultants' commitment to the introduction of the 
computer system was based on one, or more, of the following reasons, 
1. technological ra tionalism, 
2. collegiate commitment, 
3. ins trumen tal commi tmen t, 
4. • pro teet ion ism , 
These reasons for being committed to the system were, however, 
insufficient to maintain the continuing practical inv.)lvement of t'1e 
consultan ts for. as has already been indica ted. the consu ltan ts even': :.1.311y 
rejected the system. There is an important distinction to be made be'we~n 
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the politics of (collegiate) commitmen~ and ~he ?ragmatism of recordi;,~ 
case notes, The junior doctors also stopped using the system as it 
originally intended, but only after the consultants had done so. 
was 
T:'e 
doctors' responses (both consultants and junior staff) to the system can 
be categorised according to a fourfold classification, 
(a) acceptance 
(b) compliance 
(c) resistance 
(d) rejection 
In broad terms, this reflects the stages in a trajectory from (a) to (d) 
which the doctors went through. There was considerable variation between 
the consultan ts in terms of the pace a t which they moved through the 
stages. There were also considerable differences in the manner in which 
the doc tors responded to the sys tem even within the broad ca tegorisa t ions 
of acceptance, compliance, resistance and rejection. In the case of the 
consultants the variations related to two basic factors, 
- the type and degree of commitment (s) <technological, collegia te, 
instrumental, protectionist). 
-the compatibility with previous system of case note recording. 
The junior doctors were never asked to commit themselves to the :::ystem as 
the consultants were; they were, nevertheless, expected by the consultants 
to comply with the demands of the system in terms of capturing the 
clinical information on the encounter forms. In consequence the level of 
commitment of the junior medical staff was not an important factor, but 
the sys tem of case note recording was. Generally, the junior doctors would 
always prefer to revert to using the standard structures for patient 
history taking rather than persevere with the CORES system of completing 
an encounter form, 
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In this section the doctors' re';ponses to t;-.e CORES sT=,tem will. je 
explained in some detail, in order that the the accept:mce-rejection 
trajectory may be described and the varia tion between consultan t5 arc.: 
specialisms and between consultants and junior mecical staff can be 
analysed. 
(a) Acceptance: This refers to the willingness, or at least aCGuiessance, 
of the doctor to using the CORES system in the outpa t::'ents· clinics 
(ra ther than simply accepting the principle of the sys terns 
introduction). Six consultants, in addition to Dr Old, agreed to use 
the system (acceptance) <1 physician, 2 urologists, 2 gynaecologists 
and sl .. u-geon). The remaining consultant officially supported the 
proposal for reasons of collegia te solidBri ty, " ... because of Peter 
Old's interests" but, 
" (1) didn't really have a need for the thing myself 
because I have a system of my own which is not 
computerised but is pretty well streamlined over the 
years" (Con. 7, Int. 1,296-310, October, 1981> 
This consultant's card system had been originally established in 1972 
and contained data on drugs and laboratory tests as well as, a 
clinical scoring system for assessing any improvement or deteriation 
in a pa tien t 's condition. The cards were also divided temporally in 
order that trends could be monitored (Con. 7, Int. 2,019-036), The 
main point for the consultant was that he was not prepared to risk 
the integrity of his clinical data system by taking on the addit:,}nal 
burden of using the CORES system which would duplicate the data 
collected and thereby adding to the workload of the clinicians 
without offering any obvious benefits. The odd thing about this 
rna t ter was tha t the manual card sys, tern was based on numerica~~y ca ta 
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and sufficiently rationalised to be technically very acce:=~:-:~", to 
computerisation yet Dr Old and the CORES Steering Group were unable 
to include this data on the system because the project lilcked the 
resources, only the contents of the medical record could be included. 
Whether a consultant agreed to use the system (acce?tancel, or 
not (rejection) was not, however, simply a response to whet!1er t:"e 
CORES system could be adapted ('customised) to meet the ref;lJir-ements 
of specific consultants. To illustrate, one consultant, a urologist, 
found adaptation extremely difficult yet remained with the project 
throughou t. The problem stemmed largely from the fact tha' the 
encounter form was designed by his colleague, who described himself 
as " .. a technician" (Con.4 , In t .1, 108, Sep tem ber ,1981) and whose 
method of writing of case notes was more focused because "patients 
usually complain of only four or five symptoms ,," (Con.4, Int.2, 056-
060, June,1982). Whereas, this consultant adopted a very different 
perspecti ve on his tory- taking which caused him problems when 
adapting to the demands of the CORES system, 
" .. the pa t ien t is a pa tien t as 8 whole and there is an 
awful lot that is not urological that comes into the 
history-taking section (of the encounter form) and this I 
find very difficult ... " (Con. 6, Int. 2, 060-067, June, 1982) 
This particular consultant literally struggled to complete th'" form~ 
during each clinic and his explanation f 0:- this diligence and 
perseverance was not very clear, for while stating ca~e8orically ~hat 
he would continue to use the system Cnt.2, 379, June, 1982) and that 
he could see the benefits <Int.3, 267, June, 1983), even after using 
the system for over a year he still found that, 
" as regards the day to day (work) in the clinic and 
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afterwards in writing the (clinic) letter I find it 
makes everything that much .. longer and 
complicated" (Con.6. Int.3. 267-274-, June, 1983) 
The paradox here is that this consultant accepted the CORES system 
and routinely attempted to use it despite it clearly being unsuitable 
for his method of recording and retrieving, clinical information. 
While the consultant whose clinical da ta system was technically 
accessible to computerisation decided after only one week noc cO 
continue with the system (Con.7, Int.2, December, 1982). The main 
reason for this latter consultant not actively cooperating with the 
project was tha t he saw it as a threa t to his well es tablished 
sys tem, whereas this was not the case with the urologis t. In 
consequence, he lacked what he considered a creditable excuse for 
withdrawing. In the case of both consultants the issue of collegia te 
soliddri ty was recognised as being of importance, hence the one with 
the 'card system' did go through the motions of trying the system for 
one week before, as Dr Old anticipated, he declined to continue to 
participate, but agreed to the clinical data in the case notes being 
entered onto the CORES database. 
(b) Compliance: The junior doctors, being only temporary members of the 
hospital staff, were not consulted regarding the introduction ()i the 
CORES sys tem they were expected by the consultan ts to comply with 
the requirements of the system. In consequence, it would be more 
accurate to define these doctors' acceptance of the system 85 
compliance. Ten of the twenty-two junior doctor users of the system 
in terviewed by Augus t, 1983, were able to iden tHy pract ica: bene fits 
resulting from the systems introduction (see Table 8.1), 
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T ABI ...... E ~~I > 1 BE::NEFIT~~ FROM l.1:=:,ING CORES SYSTEM 
(,Jun1or m_dic.l _te.,., only) 
li.-t.. 
2 F'r_._ntation 01' l .. bor .. tory r_.u It. improv_d 
'J - U_."ul t'or- rlilP._.rch purpo.e. 
10 TOTAL 
These comments were gleaned from the interview transcripts, they 
relate to answers to the question " Have you noticed any particular 
benefits to the system as yet?". One SHO (a locum) reported that, 
"I prefer to use this (CORES) system because it is easier 
for me, saves time and energy as well" <Jnr. 9, Int. 2, 
060-064, July, 1982) 
But this was an atypical response, often the response was a variation 
on "No nothing very much, except <laboratory) results" (Jnr. 24-, Int. 
2,114-118, May, 1983). In other words, the benefits were largely seen 
as compensations for having to use the system. And for the other 
twelve doctors who were unable to identify any benefits the pithy 
comment of one particular SHO captured the general opinion, 
"When the present system (of writing case notes etc) works 
perfectly well its hard to see benefits " <Jnr. 11, 
November, 1982, side II 022-025). 
A point which needs to be noted is that some doctors who reported no 
benefits may well have overlooked to mention some aspect they found 
an improvement on the manual system because the system as B whole 
was inconvenient to them. Similarly, among those doctors who reported 
benefits were those such as the one quoted a moment ago <Jnr. 24) 
who generally did not like using the system but acknowledged that it 
(c) 
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was not all bad. 
Resistance: In the case of the junior medical ~.taff resistance was 
either overt or covert. The first was vi8wed C!y ur ,j::'c and his 
consultant colleagues as an act of rebellion t~a t was never 
tolerated. Only one junior doctor, an SHO, ever took this course of 
action. This doctor would 'clerk' new patients in the traditional 
narrative format on the encounter form completely ignoring the 
listing of coded signs, symptoms (etc), there being no other paper t.~ 
available in the clinic to write on. The ma t ter was brough t to the 
attention of the CORES Steering Committee by one of the computer 
clerks (Fieldnotes, Book 3, p.23). Dr Old (chairperson) informed the 
consultan t concerned and the junior doctor was admonished 
(Fieldnotes, Book 3, p.23). Later junior doctors would take paper with 
them to clinic so as to be able to covertly 'clerk' 
trans f erring the in forma tion to the encoun t8r- form, 
prior to 
"I tend to clerk the patient on a piece of pacer an~ th8n 
put as much of it as possible as I can (on) the computer 
(form) ... it doesn't take long ... 
Ques tion And the piece of paper, does tha t go in the 
notes? 
"No that goes in the bin, I got the impression that they 
didn't want see my scribing 
125-130, May,1983) 
" <Jnr.23, Int.2, 026-036; 
the reasons for the resistance were, firstly, the doctor felt more in 
command of the medical encounter 'clerking' the patient rather than 
filling in a form, and secondly, the technique of writing patient 
histories and examinations was of far greater use in the longer term 
to the junior doctors. One doctor reF(·rted that "Quite honestly we 
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(housestaff) treat it rather as a joke." bu~ "Because the COflsu~~ants 
are using it we obviously get, on with it" (Jnr '>0 It') 302 
.<.., n"~, -
308 ,April ,1983 ). 
The tactic of writing case notes and then trans;"er-ring t~,e 
in forma t ion to the encoun ter form was the same as tha t adop t eo by 
the consultan t <No.6) discussed in the previous sec tion (8,:cep tance) 
but, in his case, the claim was that it was the only way he C,)l)~,: 
adapt to the system (which he supported ) whereas in the case of the 
junior doctors it was the only means they had of resisting the 
system 
(d) Rejection. The fate of the CORES system was closely related ~o the 
ability of Dr Old and the Steering Group to deliver, wi!.in a 
reasonable period of time, facilities useful to the consultan':s, but 
which were not definable as outpatients' clinic work in any narrow 
sense. Wha t was expected of the sys tem was tha tit would ;)rovide 
computer support for various consultants ?articular research and 
(self) audit systems. As has already been shown in the case of the 
consultant with the 'card system' some consultants maintained a 
separate (dual) record, in addition to that kept in the medical record 
folder, for clinical, research and audit purposes. While no other 
consultant maintained such a sophisticated system, three did maintain 
some form of dual system. These consultants were, initially at least, 
using but not accepting the CORES system as a ,::ini':al in::':-Clation 
system because the information they were most interested in was kept 
separately both frc'm the CORES System and from t'ie me,~:'(al record 
folders, The four examples of dual sys tem, including t'le '(,3rC 3YS tern I 
were, 
(1) a statistical database, held on index cards, on one 
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relatively large group of chronically ill patients dating 
back 15 years, 
(U) a similar, but less complex, set of records on a relatively 
large set of urological patients, 
(111) a detailed record, for research purposes, relating to a 
small group of gynaecological patients, 
(iv) surgical audit records. 
Except for the first case, discussed previously, these consultants 
were the strongest supporters of the CORES system, who, with the 
help of Dr Old, designed the encounter forms for their specialties. 
These were the ins trumen tally commit ted doctors who had an ticipa ted 
that their clinical, research and audit records would be eventually 
transferred onto the CORES system. It was only when it became 
obvious to these particular consultants that the CORES experimental 
programme was not going to be able to provide such faciH ties wi thin 
the resources available that they finally agreed with the other 
consultants to withdraw from the experiment, but in a manner that 
made it appear that the rejection was in fact only a modification to 
the system of data capture (see also Chapter Six, pp.176-181). 
The reason given for the ultimate rejection of the system was 
not because it failed to deliver additional facilities for analysing 
aggregate clinical data, but because the system was contrary to the 
established patterns of recording and retrieving clinical information, 
as one of them said, 
"It gradually dawned on me ... (in) clinic after clinic I 
have to 'skip' the (computer printed) status reports and 
<laboratory) results and go to the (original> investigation 
form ... and .. , my Ie t ter to the GP (clinic 1e t ter). And I 
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really miss writing outpatier; ~s I notes in my ow:,. 
handwriting (and) looking at ~his in my next clinic, this 
to me conveys continuity, somehow sheet after sheet of 
computer data means nothing when it comes tG clinical 
work" (Con.6, Int.3, 028-043, July, 1983) 
This notion of writing and reading case notes being an integral part 
of the clinic process was also reported by the other consultants, one 
argued that the CORES system interfered with his 
"thought process in clinical diagnosis '. the system of 
recording the database (on the encounter form) seem IS) to 
act as a wedge" (Con.l, Int.3, 004-012, March.1983) 
This consultant even when officially part of the CORES programme did 
not complete the encounter forms in any systematic way but relied on 
his SHO to acted as his emanuensis and complete and correc t the 
forms for him after the clinic <Int.2. 248-272, October. 1982), Thi'; 
arrangement started when the encounter forms were being returned by 
the CORES clerks because they could not make sense of them 
"In1 tially (they) came to me, but I threw them on the floor 
and stamped on them and rushed out, so (the) ?oor old 
(SHO) is getting them now" <ibid.). 
While this particular consultant never was able to accommoda te to the 
system and was the first to withdraw <in the first quarter of 1983), 
his argument against the CORES system of capturing clinica: 
information found resonance among the other consu:':.ants ae: the 
quotes of the other consultant (Con.6) indicate. The consultants found 
it inconvenient using the system for reasons relating to the mismdtch 
between what the system was designed to do and what the consultants 
actually wanted to do; they sim?ly did not write case notes in t~e 
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way the CORES system was designed to emula~e, 
The collective reJ'ect.l'on of the syst~m w 1 
'" as more rea than 
apparent, however, for it took the form of a decision of the Hospital 
Medical Committee that the encounter forms would be replaced by the 
traditional form of case notes and tha t the compu ter clerks would 
encode this information, 
"It had appeared that certain consultants did not 
necessarily wish to continue using the system as 
originally designed. After further discussion it was quite 
apparent that support for the system still existed ... (Dt 
was agreed that the future use of the Encounter Form 
would be reviewed and if possible a system designed that 
was perhaps less invasive in terms of the prepare tion of 
patients notes," <HMC Minutes, 15th July,1983) 
This minute encapsulates the ambiguity of the consultants towards 
the project. On the one hand, they have no wish to undermine a 
colleagues research (collegiate solidarity>, while on the other, they 
have no desire generally to continue with the CORES system. The 
project had failed to deliver the computer support that some of the 
consul tants had reason to believe (from Dr Old) would have been made 
available, while the system of data capture and reports was totally 
alien to their own well established methods of recording and 
retrieving clinical information. The compromise arrived at was that 
the consultants agreed to the computer clerks entering the clinical 
data from the case notes onto the CORES database, these consultants 
also agreed to accept some of the printed computer re;)('rts be:ng 
inserted into the medical record file. There i'=, s·)me evidence from 
the interviews of around that time that neither the consultants nor 
the junior staff made any real use of ~hese printouts (except on ~'1e 
OCc8':;;'ons that the medical records folder was missing) preferring to 
refer to their own handwritten records. To illustrate. 
"... It (encoun ter form) is now arranged so tha t I now have 
a blank shee t and I jus t wri te ... wha t I wan t recorded ... 
I have investigations at the back and drugs I just put 
down at the end of my blank sheet - that is ?er:-ectly 
satisfactory ! What I do not like ... is the printout" (Con. 
2. Int. 3. 019-029. June. 1983). 
As will be no ted the da te of this in terview was earlier than the HMC 
minutes and indicates that the compromise had already been tried ou~ 
prior to that meeting in order to keep this consultant withi~ the 
CORES experiment and the subsequent meeting simply excended the 
arrangemen t to a 11 the consultan ts with the same resu 1 t, the CORES 
system appeared to be acceptable to the clinicians whilst in practice 
it had been rejected. 
Pra~matism! case notes and computers 
The CORES computer system, as has been exilainec:, was designed +0 
capture clinical data in a systematic way by means of a preprintec form 
listing the relevant items likely to be discovered. or decided uror.. by a 
doctor when interviewing and examining a patient. As has also been 
explained consul tan ts tended not to record case notes ei ther 
comprehensively, or necessarily systema tically, rather they took notes to 
aid their clinical decision-making ('thought processes') base.: on the 
patient's presenting complaint. The clinical information would then be 
rendered into a systematic record only when. typically. the letter to the 
patient's general practioner (the clinic letted was written. A copy of this 
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letter was filed in the patient's medical r<::-core: 'older 6r:G served as the 
summary of the pa tien t condition and its C IJrren t mana t T" • gem en . ,:llS sys '.e:n, 
with individual variation as between consultants, was t;~-;Y;6ht of as 
adequate by the consultants when compared with what tl-;e CO;:;;=;lter system 
offered. The computer sys tem was e:{?<::-rienced ':>y these doct,~rs as G~:eri~g 
no practical improvements and little in the way of benefi~=. iJn:ike the 
renal system the C0RES system demanded that the doctors chang@d the way 
they recorded pa tien t da ta. The encoun ter forms had been designed to 
capture most eventualities in a way that was easiest to input into t:oe 
computer system. The system's criteria, however, contradictec! with the 
doctors' own method of recording patients histories. Wh@:-ea= the 
traditional techniques allowed for the patient.s to be ques':ioned at. the 
same time as the case notes were being written the CORES system did not. 
The doctors either had to be entirely fluent with the structure of the 
encounter form, as one consultant remarked. 
"I still find it rather bewildering particularly when I am faced 
with a pa t ien t and I find I am looking around for where the 
symptoms are (on the for-m) ... I feel very much like a chinese 
waiter .. , " (Con.2, lnt 2,003-017, October,1982). 
Or, as was more usual with the junior s ta ff, the doctors used the form as 
a checklist, which most found unhelpful, to quote on registrar in 
gynaecology, 
"When a patient sees you for the fir.::.t time, she wan~s t,] 
tell you what is wrong with her and ... you :-18ve ~(o stop 
her and tell her .. I have to fill in this sheet (encoun rer 
82 old lady T 'lSi! her form), so when she is an year . 
when she had her first period ... when her last Der:od was 
about 30 The pa tien t want'.3 to i;€il you her years ago ... 
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problem (presenting complaint)" <Jnr.10, Int.2, 132-162, 
October, 1982) 
In one instance (mentioned also in Chapter Five, p. 1(4), the encoun ter 
form, which was an eight page document, was incorrectly collated. The 
centrefold was reversed with the result that it seemed to be asking for 
the inves tiga tions to be ordered before the physical examina tion had been 
carried ou t with the result tha t one regis trar, in par ticu lar , was very 
confused <Jnr.4, lnt 2 (joint with Con.6) 018-026; 248-275,June,1982) 
Case notes and medical work: further analysis and conclusions 
Earlier in this chapter the rationales for writing case notes was 
discussed in order to clarify what the consequences of implementing the 
CORES system might be. The conclusion reached was that the writing of case 
notes in outpatients' clinics was for the consultants an aid to their 
clinical decision-making and not principally as a therapeu tic record. This 
rationale is commensurate with Bloor's use of the term decision rules in 
his analysis of medical work at a number of adeno-tonsillectomy clinics. 
These rules he defined as being, 
"(T)hose idiosyncratically developed rules of thumb concerning 
those particular symptoms and signs which the specialist feels 
to be typically minimally acceptable criterion for allocating 
(patients) to the various alternative forms of therapeutic 
intervention at his disposal" (Bloor, 1976, p. (5) 
Bloor does not make men tion of the use made of the medical record during 
the medical encounter, but from the evidence from the case study reported 
here it is in the writing down of the case notes that typically aids the 
consultant in deciding on which of "the various alternative forms of 
therapeutic intervention" <ibid> to adopt. In other words, case notes are 
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the consultants 'thought proce'sses' (or .ov:ne of ~:-lem) on paper. These are 
written down, not for posterity but, to a;:.sist the coctor :':1 assessing 
whether the "minimally acceptable criterion" <ibid.) :-lad been reac'-,e::, .:'r 
not. 
Whilst the case notes were not a cDmplete record they did consU tute 
a sufficient record to ensure the consultants ascendancy wi:hin the 
medical encounter (Waitzkin and Stoeckle, 1976, pp 265>. They were ·he 
tangible expression of the consultant's functional autonomy (see Chapter 
Four) and were, in a strict sense, only accessible to his interpretat:.Jn. 
This selective approach gave the consultant greater flexibility within the 
medical encounter. It could be utilised either save time in a busy clinic, 
or reinforce the patients confidence in the doctor and hospital simply 
because the doctor concentrated on the patients own perception of his or 
her complaint. One consultant physician, for example, would include in nis 
case note records, 
" other things that are domestically relevant ~hat 
patients (mention) ". so that next time you can 'say '" you 
went to Blackpool last year' and the patient suddenly 
thinks you're wonderful " and any trea tmen t you give is 
more likely to work .,," (Con. 3, Int. 2, November, 19.'32) 
Unlike 'clerking' proper the medical evidence and the line of reasoning is 
not predetermined, nor are the notes recorded in any consensua'cly agreed 
abbreviated form either. One consultant, was known by his colleagues on 
occasions not to wdte a word on a patients history sheet, other than t:-le 
date and his signature ,Fieldwork Analysis, January, 1982, 1\e;' II:6., No.2). 
But whatever form the case notes too~ the consultant remained the 3rbiter 
of his own medical performance (medical autonomy). 
If a doctor wanted to find out what a colleague had decided 
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regarding a particular patient it was not to ca=.", r,o~es he or she 
would first refer, but to the clinic letter in which all medica~~y relevan~ 
details were usually summarised. Depending on the reasen for the lookir<:; 
into the medical record folder, the clinic letter might deliver up a:': the 
information the doctor might want, or could get in the time available <for 
instance, a junior doctor working in a busy clinic>. If the doctor was not 
satisfied with the information contained in the clinic letter then time, if 
available, might be spent in searching through the file in a general way 
looking for further clues, or answers, to the patients condition, ~herapy 
(etc). But if the doctor was still concerned over the paLents::'n.:ition 
and the scrutiny of the medical record had not produced s.lJfficient 
information the patient would be brought into hospital for a full clinical 
assessment and investigation. 
In the case of junior doctors, as has been explained earlier, case 
notes were written comprehensively and structured according to ~he 
principles of inpatient clerking. Even so, doctors when referring to these 
case notes later usually preferred to look to the clinic let ter because P 
usually delivered up the information they required and it saved time. 
It was because of the incompatibility between the CORES system and 
the doctors me thods of writ ing and accessing case notes tha t the sys tem 
eventually failed. At the level of the clinic the consultant found that the 
system lacked the flexibility of the traditional form of case notes wri+in~ 
th t 1· t nei r,her in the outpatients' clinics with the consequence a 
contributed as a decision aid, nor could it be used as efiectively ~o 
underpin the doctors ascendancy within the medical encoun ter. Furthermore, 
the system's outputs, in the form of reports, summaries 3nc flowchar's. 
were regarded by the consultants as less useful to ''1e2 in c~::'n~c than 
traditional case notes and clinic le 11.:c ,- 0n~y those consultants who 
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anticil>lted being able to utilise the C,)c'::S sys~-?rr: fer their ,)wn ~-'r?:;es 
rather than just as a medical record system (instrumentally committed> 
were able to deal with the a?parent encrc'achment on their L:n,~~ionBl 
au tonomy brough t abou t the introduction of the CORES system. They 
remained committed to using the system more on the grounds of collegialitv 
than practicality until it finally became clear that Dr Old, as the inia+ing 
consultant, would be unable to deliver the desired extra facilHies. Only 
then, after a period of more than two years, was t'1e system was finally 
rejected as a practical clinical information system and acce;)ted as only 'l 
colleague's research project . 
... 
• 
Introduction 
CHAPTER NINE 
CONCLUSIONS 
This is the chapter where I bring together and summarise cite 
preceding eight chapters. Here I shall set out once again, but in summary 
form, the main points to emerge from the substantive chapters relating to 
the implementation of information technology in hospital clinics. I will 
then rela te these to the under lying theore tical argumen ts concerning the 
issues of professional control and autonomy and the applicability of labour 
process analysis to medical work. 
Whereas in the development of the thesis it was appropriate to star~ 
from a general description of the institutional arrangements as well as an 
assessment and development of the theoretical arguments before ~ov:ng on 
to the case studies, it is now possible to focus more directly on ~he 
implications of the case studies. I will therefore start with the 
substantive issue of medical computing and draw out the similarities and 
differences between the case studies, and I will then integrate bese 
findings in to the general theoretical framework. As a preliminary to the 
overview of the case studies, however, I must comment briefly on the more 
general issue of the development of compu ting and computer policies withi" 
the NHS. 
The issue of compu terisa t ion in the health :=:.ervice '"as examined in 
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Chapter Two for two principle reasons, Firstly, in order to be3ule to 
describe the history and current situation relating to hea~::1care:o:nputing 
in general, and medical computing in particular, within the hea~~h service; 
and secondly, in order to identify the primary motives, or rationales, f:., 
the identified developments. It became apparent from ., the exar:n:ilng 
literature and speaking to individuals involved in computer developmen's in 
the hospital service tha t the reasons for these developments had lit t~e or 
nothing to do with enhancing organisa tiona I con trol, or rela ~edly, 
efficiency, but rather reflected the research and development in ~eres ts of 
individuals within the health service including importantly the:.:,mputer 
departments that were set up at particular major hospital sites :0 the 
'sixties. This early, and long lasting, exper-imental stage (DHSS, 1977) was 
sustained by DHSS funding and directly reflected the government.'s desire, 
or willingness, to make available to Britain's vulnerable compu ter indus try 
a captive market. 
In rela tion to the invol vemen t of hospital doctors in this general 
development of health care computing, it was noted that hospital doctors 
proved to be generally unwilling, or unable, to adapt to the ,j..jffiilnds of 
the sys tems available for use in hospi tal clinics. Moreover, even where 
computer systems have been introduced, hospital doctors have been able '0 
choose whether to use them or not. The medical interest in t:'e 
developmen t of specific clinicdl applica tions has been almost wholly 
research orientated rather than concerned with the producn:.n of work-a-
day operational, or information, systems. It was against thl:= general 
background that the introduction of the two computer systems W8:O:· studied. 
The case studies 
The case studies were discussed in Part II ar-;.: comprise(: of three 
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chapters. The first (Chapter Six) dealt with the politics of innc/a:ion and 
professionalism as they applied to the introGuc tion of both ~:1", ~-=[1a~ 
Computer System and the CORES systems, while ,he remaining two chap'ters 
were concerned with the specific processes of im?~ementation of the two 
systems and their outcomes for the organisation and control of clinic work 
processes. Chapter Seven, which was concerned with the introduction of t:,.'" 
Renal Computer System, the focus was on the implications for the clinic 
staff as a whole, and not just the hospital doctors (cliniciarls). In the 
case of the outpatients' medical record system (CORES) (Chapter Eight> the 
focus was on the doctors' work processes and, in particular, on ~:1eir 
methods of recording and referring to case notes and related mecical 
records documen ta tion (e.g. labora tory results). These differences in focus 
between the renal and outpatients' clinics were in part dictated by the 
design of the systems, but they also resulted from my particular concern 
to explore the realities of professional control within differen t set tings 
and in relation to different, but related, types of computer sys~ems. In 
rela tion to the theore tical concerns of the thesis the objective was to 
examine the workings of institutional and functional autonomy and control 
in their clinical context, and I now turn to a summary and as:=es:=.ment of 
the case studies in these terms. 
The poli tics of innova tion and professionalism 
The relative success or failure with which the two computer systems 
were introduced was as much the outcome of the deCision-making and 
rela ted political processes as it was of any intrinsic tecmical merit c,> 
the computer systems. In the case of the Renal Computer System the 
consultant who introduced the system <Dr Earl) adopted a strategy based ,=,n 
what I referred to as collegiate solidarity, while ;:tr Ole! W;-l'= :iltroduced 
the CORES system was constrained by circumst8nces to employ a more 
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pragma tic s tra tegy of orgBnisB tiona1 coa1i tions. T~,e renal uni +;s were 
organised and funded regionally, and this meant ':".a': )r Earl was a:'~e ': 
seek the support of his consultant colleagues at +;he other rena~ u~~ts in 
the region, and then request collec+;ively for reg:·:mal 'unding and 
technical support for the system's implemen+;ati0f, at all the renal units. 
In all respects he was successful in this strategy, for it was facilita~ec 
by the fact that the renal consultants had a long established renal ~'orum 
and they were well used to working together to gain additional resources 
for the renal service. 
In the case of the CORES system, Dr Old had to rely on district-, 
rather than regional funding, although he was able to utilise regional 
technical support. Moreover, he had to coordinate the system'" i;-,~~Qduction 
through a mul ti-disciplinery steering commit tee (which he cha ired), ra ther 
than an influential group of fellow colledgues as in the case of the renal 
consultants. The consequence for the COR~S system was that it was 
generally under-resourced, because it lacked the priori'y t::3 t the ,'enal 
consultants were able to claim for ':'18 Renal Computer S)',otem. "".:'; in turn 
meant that Dr Old was unable to ensure that his consultant colle.33ues go+; 
the additional specialised facilities they had been led by h::'m to eXDed 
when he initially canvassed their support. The result was that +;~e 
consultants' commitment to the system wavered and then within two years 
collapsed. 
While the CORES system was in the process of being intrc'clJced Dr O~iJ 
had to rely on support from administrators and computer per·s.)nne::', with 
whom he developed pragmatic coalitions in order to ensure tha' the system 
was actually introduced and funded, at least minimally. In the e,.:. 
however, the lack of commitment of the other consultants ensurer:; t~a· ~he 
system would be rejected as a routine medic8~ informa~ion system. By 
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contrast, the strategy of collegiate solidarity that the rena::' ccns:~>~~t, 
Dr Earl, had adopted meant that even when colleagues were critica-_: f . o ~;-.e 
system, they would not withdraw their support of it, but wou~d rather 
attempt (successfully as it happens) to take over the consu::'tants' regional 
computer committee, by installing one of their number as chairperson, an,:; 
then vigorously press the regional computer services to extensively ~odify 
the system to meet their requirements, 
Both the computer systems were introduced by individual consultan~s 
and without this sponsorship it is unlikely that the hospital consultants 
would have considered directly using either of the computer-based medical 
information systems. This willingness to accept the proposal of a 
consultant colleague was a component of institutional dutonomy, for both 
systems were intended to have some effed on the clinic work of '.:he 
doctors even though consultants vary greatly in their methods of working, 
On the face of it this support would seem unusual for, on the one ham:, 
the introduction of a computer system would tend to involve some 
standardisation, at least in relation to data-capture and reporting and, on 
the other, hospital consultants organise collectively in order to sust.olin 
their individual right to functional autonomy, that is to practice medicine 
differently from one another. On this basis, my argument ran, the rule:=. of 
collegiality that sustained institutional control ensured the consultants 
were constrained to try to use the systems, but in practice were 
insufficient to ensure they would find either system acceptable. The 
reason that the virtually all the consultants found the sys .. e::ns 
unacceptable related to the fact that they did not provide t;,e faciIi ~::'es 
these doctors particularly wanted (see the next section for details). AS3 
result most of the consultants either stopped or never started llsing the 
systems. This did not become translated into formal rejections of either 
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computer systems but was expressed in term'; of regret (in the ;:a;e o~ ,:he 
CORES system> or criticism (the Renal Com?uter Sys~",~.) that ~he system; 
lacked the necessary levels of re:=·Q1JlCE-S for cc:ern to be uciEsec as the 
consultants wanted. 
Au toma tlon and renal work 
Dialysis work on the renal units was the province of the nurses. C. 
was therefore their responsibility to ensure that the patient data was 
collected and recorded, originally on manually kept re<:ords and 
subsequently on the computer system. Unlike the CORES sys~"':n the renal 
doctors did not have to enter any data onto t~e computer system and could, 
if they wished, rely on the nurs;es or the computer clerk to access the 
data for them. A similar situation existed with relation to the dieticians. 
In the case of the other 'other disciplines' their component of t.:-:e system 
was never implemen ted a t either unit, because (a) it would involve them in 
entering data twice, once onto their own (manual> record system and then 
again onto the computer system, (b) they failed to get themselves trainee 
in how to use the system, and (c) some had reservations regarding the 
issue of confidentiality of data. 
Within these commonalities, however, substantial differences existed 
between the two renal units studied which I have summarised in terms of 
(a) inter-disciplinary and humanistic (Haemo Unit) and (b) multi-
disciplinary and scientific (Dialysis and Transplant), which encapsulated 
the different modes of organisation and ethos that the senior consult8;-;ts 
had engendered within the different units. Medical con~rol was exerte·: 
through two related means. 
(a) The mode in which the consulten ts re,~ Ilired the pa tien t 
date to be recorded and presented. 
(b) the form in which in forma t ion and ins truct ion's wer'? 
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between the medical, nursing and 'ot'ler dlS::.;)~i:1es'. 
In the case of the multi-di5ciplinary-scientific unit :;'nf:.,matL:i1 afie 
instructions were pas'sel; formally through the medium of :raditlonally 
organised ward rounds, which ensured that the consultants were 
organisa tionally ascendant. At the in ter-disciplinary-humanis tic unit 
information, instructions and advice were interchanged at the weekly case 
conferences, chaired by the senior nurse and to which all dis.:iplines were 
invited. Here the medical control of the consultants was maintained 'hrough 
a generalised and benevolent paternalism. The systematic variation of 
organisa tion and ethos between the two units W.OlS not simply the re~'Jlt of 
the consultants' own preferences, although they did playa significant role. 
but were the outcome of the hi:=.tory of the units' origins and cevelopment. 
The multi-disciplindry-scientific unit was situated within a hospit.}~ 
complex in which the consultants had over many years aspired and pressed 
for teaching hospital status, with all the accompanying commitment to 
teaching and original reseal-ch. The renal unit itself was de',Ieloped a3 an 
adjunc t to the nephrology deper tmen t and good pa t ien t care was viewe.::! 
largely as the result of the patients' receiving the most advanced 
tree tmen t. The in ter-disciplinary-humanis tic unit. by can tras t. had been 
originated as a satellite of another unit, and only 1,9ter became 
autonomous within the region's renal service. There was little pre:=;sure on 
the consultants to become competitively scientifk as in the (9Se of the 
other unit - ra thel- the priori ty was on dialysing and caring for ESRF 
patients. Under these circumstances it was not surprising that the cl::.nic 
s ta ff were organised and orien ta ted towards a humanis tic ethos. for 
gave most meaning to what was tel:hnical~y fa.idy routine clinic work. 
bis 
As already suggested, the rationales of the nursing organi"ation 3: 
the two units reflected the general orientations of the con".ultants. In the 
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case of the inter-disciplinary-humanistic (Ea,=ITlc) unit the emphasis wa~ or. 
the training and management of ind:!.virjua~ dialysl~ ?atien~.o, WclerE-'E in the 
other (Dialysis and Transplant) unit nurs:ng work was organi:;e,: on a 
weekly and monthly basis as a support function of the doct;ors' c~inics and 
ward rounds, in part !eular the mon thly 'graph round' when t'1e pa t ienc da ta 
was scrutinised and monitored by the senior registrar. 
It was these systematic differences between the two unit·; bat ~ed 
to the differences in the manner of adaption to the Renal Computer System 
by the staff involved. Only the senior nun.ing staff <i.e. senior nurslng 
officer and the two sisters) at the Haemo Unit found t~le system an 
improvemen t on the previous manual arrangemen ts because, in addi t:!~n to 
the task being automated, the data entry work was carrie': out by 8 
computer clerk with the staff and enrolled nurses enter:!.ng some of the 
patient data collected durirt3 the lat", shifts, weekends am: over holiday 
period~. These staff dnd enrolled nl)t'se'; found t~e demands of enter::.:. 
I;ata onorous b,?,:ause, fit-st,:y, they never had til carr-i' out any of the work 
relat"d to the collation or presentation of patient data before and, 
secondly, the computer system offered no other facilities that directly 
aided them in their work. At the other unit, however, because the nursing 
staff had previously been required routinely to maintain extensive graphs 
<charts) on all dialysis patients, the computer system was found to be of 
great help to them. In contra-distinction the consultants .:It the ts",mc Unit 
found, for the fir~.t time, that they could now have ready access ~,=, up-tc1-
date patient data in both tabular and graph form, via a VDU :O'Te",n w"ic~ 
they found of great benefit when reviewing patient cases w'1",n in clinic, 
on the unit, or at the case conferences. Moreover, they now had, as fy as 
they were concerned, the supporting facilities for car;y::.ng out clinical 
h . t - d th.=> ~y-tem research. By comparison the consultants at the ot er un: :oun _.:> ::> 
-278-
totally inadequate for their research and audit -.~ur.~oses, for they 
wanted 
to be able to carry out stud:!'~s (Xl aggregate g,Q';PS of patients, ar,,j ':0 
compare therapies (etc) rather than perform detailed s.tudies of inc:::'viclJal 
cases. The Renal Computer System's ~imitations in this area res';~ted from 
(a) the nature of its implementation, (b) the ?riorities "or the 
developmen t of it's facilities and (c) the technical support avaEable. 
(a) The Renal Computer Sys;tem had been initially ::.m~lementec 
(piloted) at the Haemo Unit and consequen Uy its 
customised design reflected the requirements of that unit, 
which were different to those of the Dialysis and 
Transplan t Unit; 
(b) The priority for the implementors of the system was on 
ma t ters rela ting to the inpu t of da ta and S8 t t in;;; up the 
ou tpu t forma ts ('screens ') for the various users (nurses, 
'other disciplines' as well as doctors), an(~ thus they were 
concerned only with basic patient, and patient relat.ed, 
information necessary for the general management of these 
patients; 
(c) The regional computer services personnel were not prepared 
to give the development of research facilities the priority 
being demanded by the consultants a t the Dialysis and 
Transplan t Uni t. 
Here was a straight forward 'tried and teste,:!' computer 'package' designed 
almost specifically for use in renal units. It was readily implemented as a 
system for the routine processing of patient data and its presen~ation, 
yet it failed to gain full acceptance (although it has not been rejected) 
The reasons for this lay in the variations in the organisation and control 
of the renal work processes as between units. In the multi-di3ciplinary 
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(Dialysis and Transplant) unit, the con'.:;u: tants were not concerned with how 
the nurses coped with maintaining the patient data bey require, but ~hey 
were concerned with gaining facili tie:= to al'd them ' In carrying out t."'.eir 
research and audit work. In the G ther unit, because of its in fer-
disciplinary organisation, the consultants readily ac.:e?ted, in fact 
advoca ted the in troduction of the Renal Computer Sys tem e\!en though :. t 
was expected mostly to benefit the nursing staff al though the 
consultants did rightly anticipate that the computer's graphics facEities 
would be of great benefit to themselves as well. 
The nurses involvement with the computer system and its in '.roduct1,Jr. 
acted as a crucial counterweight to the doctors' less routine ,}[1.j more 
specialised demands on the sys tern. It was the nurses rela tive willingness 
to accept the new arrangements that ensured the automated system would 
operate reasonably effectively. In the case of the inter-discipl1.narr 
(Haemo) unit, it was the practical :=,upport of the senior nurses that 
ensured the routine patient data was regularly and accurately entered onto 
the system ready for the doctors, or others, to consult. At ~he multi-
disciplinary (Dialysi:=, and Transplant) unit, the system functionec! because 
the nurses wanted it to do so, despite the consultants criticisms of the 
system and unwillingness to use it. Clearly, there were variations between 
the two units in the ways in which the functional autonomy of +he doctors 
related to their dominance within the two settings and the organisational 
space this left for the exercise of the nurses' own autonomy. In the case 
of the inter-disciplinary unit with its predominate:y humanistic ethos the 
senior nurses were dependant on the consultants' active support and 
1 d hi t b l th t throu·.:rh the chang"".:; in ~he nurses ea ers poena ~e em 0 carry 0 
me thods of recot-ding and re trieving clinical da ta. By con tras t, at 
multi-disciplinary unit, it was preciselybec3use the consultant= uid not 
the 
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give direct support and leadership in those work areas with which the 
nurses were concerned that the computer system was effectivelY 
implemented. The nurses did have some impact on the introduction of the 
computer system, either in facilitating or limiting the ease with which the 
system was implemented, and they did so relatively independently of the 
consultants' own preferences. These responses of the nurses were not 
formally stated positions or policies, rather the preferences of the 
nursing staff once they had used the system. If they found the system 
eased the burden of their work, they liked iti if not they did not like it 
and would avoid using it. In the rationalised environment of the multi-
disciplinary unit the experience of computerisation was largely positive 
for the nurses, for all patients had their cases checked routinely, once a 
month, a process that occupied many hours of the nurses time in 
preparation during the month. At the more humanistically-orientated inter-
disciplinary unit cases were dealt with on far more an individual basis; 
patients were not routinely audited but rather discussed by the team on an 
exceptional basis. If anyone of the unit's team was concerned about any 
aspect of a patient's condition, medical, psychological or social, then the 
case would be discussed and a therapy, or other response, agreed. If no 
one identified any problems the patient would not be discussed. This 
arrangement was not technically conducive to computerisation, for it was 
not standardised and there were no previous manual systems for collating 
and presenting this data for review purposes. Under these circumstances 
the staff and enrolled nurses were disappointed in what the Renal Computer 
System offered them. Rather than easing their burden of work it 
intensified it, by creating a demand - for the benefit of others - for 
data which they had not previously collected (although their senior 
colleagues had) required them to learn new skills to do so. 
-281-
CORES and case notes 
Turning now to the outpatients' system (CORES). The purpose of this 
system was rather different to that of the Renal Computer Systemj whereas 
the renal system supplemen ted the medical records, the CORES system was 
designed to replace them. Here my concern was with the work of the 
clinicians. The problem that emerged for the initiator of the system (Dr 
Old) was that CORES was to founder because of insufficient commitment 
from colleagues and the lack of 'fit' between, on the one hand, the 
system's encounter forms (inputs) and reports (outputs> and, on the other, 
the clinicians own methods of recording and retrieving clinicel information 
from the medical records. The consul tan ts varied considerably in the way 
they recorded their case notes, and generally had developed ways of 
abbreviating on the method of full note-taking adopted by the junior 
medical staff. Moreover, this abbreviated method also reflected a common 
approach of the consultan ts to concen tra te on the pa tien t '5 presen ting 
complaint and not to attempt a full 'clerking' of the patient. The CORES 
system could have been customised to meet all these peculiarities, but 
this did not happen. Where there were two or more consultants in a 
speciality one would design a form he believed was suitable for himself, 
which was then adopted by the other consultants who had evolved different 
techniques of writing case notes. Another problem to emerge was that the 
junior medical staff maintained fairly comprehensive and structured clinic 
notes and they found the designs of the encounter forms at variance with 
their usual and preferred approach. 
The central problem for the CORES system was that few consultants 
routinely looked at the clinic notes referring to previous patient visits, 
but ins teed looked at the clinic letter in which the details of the case 
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were summarised (ostensibly for the benefit of the patient's GP). In turn 
this meant that the consultants did not usually write their case notes for 
future reference, but only as a decision aid to facilitate their clinic 
'though t processes', and to remind them wha t to include in the clinic 
letter. The CORES system was not designed to cope with these circumstances 
f or its cen tral ra t ionale was to enSIJre tha t case no tes were easy to read 
(printed) and well structured in order to facilitate future reference. 
The reasons behind these consultants' various approaches to cryptic 
clinic note-taking in outpatients' clinics related to their evaluation of 
the practical role of the case notes. For them these documen ts served, as 
already mentioned, as decision aids which both reflected and in turn helped 
them sustain their functional autonomy within the clinics. Often only they 
alone could interpret their own case notes. Moreover, they used the 
process of writing and referring to them to control the medical en co un ter. 
The junior medical staff had similar objectives, but sought to attain them 
by relying on the 'clerking' format as far as possible, for this ensured 
they carried out all that could be required of them and ensured they did 
not forget to carry out any element of the diagnostic process. For this 
reason a number of junior doctors were only reluctant users of the CORES 
system, but the main reason why the majority of the junior medical staff 
stopped using the system was because the consultants told them to: they 
lacked the authority to take the decision unilaterally. 
In sum, what I have argued here is that the functional autonomy of 
consultants was (a) characterised by a strong individualism sustained 
within the collegiate support of the hospital doctors generally and (b) 
this individualism was embedded in the case notes and the idiosyncratic 
way their were written, a reality which made their direct automation 
impossible. The Renal Computer System avoided these problems because the 
system depen(~~G pr~nc:'?d~l/ on either cler-ica: or nursing st.a:f to ~nt,=r-
Gata on the system and not the doc'ors 
" ,moreover, mos t nur2·es who 
Previously collated the patient data manua':.:::''! ., ound t·_~."_· t t d au ,C'rr'.·j e system 
of data-capture and recall an improvement. The COF;SS '3ystem, by contra3~, 
relied on the c~inicians chan8::'ng their method of re,:ord:r'6 case nc,'es and 
being prepared to use :Jr in ted reports instead of' .. i 
. t~e ?rev ous medica! 
record documents. These changes in methods of working were too great and 
were experienced as undermining their functional autonomy and led to T;".eir 
ultimate rejection of the computer system. 
Labour process analysis and hospital doctors 
I now turn to the que::;,tion of the relevance of labour prc,ces3 
analysis to medical work genet-ally, It ~"" the case tha t, \":--,~re,% sys tems 
designers can expect their syst~ms to be implemented in relation to 
clerical, technical and managerial staffs, this expectation doe~ not hold in 
connection with clinicians. This difference relates to the nature of ·,".e 
con trol and au tonomy doctors collec tively, and consult,m ts w.:ividualIy, 
possess. It was necessat-y, therefore, to clearly set out a Genera! 
theore tical argumen t which could accoun t for the prof ecsi.onal organisa tlon 
of hospital doctors and their particular working arrangements within the 
clinics. Following a critical review of the literature in Cha:)t~r Three, I 
went on to develop an alter-native theoretical model base.: on recent 
developmen ts in labour ;:wocess analysis, In the discussion of the theory -:: 
argued that there was now a broad consensus that the analysis ~ee~s to be 
more complex than the de terminis t ic mode::' Braverman Orlg inally ~res,=n te,::, 
Moreover I the theory require':: elaboration, f :r-stly, ~'J ~,3:,e in t03::0unt 
1 d k as well as tha t of manual anc rou tine professiona an manageri,3! wor -' -
1 i 1 k ~ dl t "e applicable to more than thE :-,:. ~k€" c er ca wor ers an ... , secon y I ,0 -
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sector of industry. 
I went on to argue that within the consensus on such points there 
were now two broad approaches to the theory: one I termed the 
in teg-ra tionis t, the 0 ther the social choice approach. The firs t was engaged 
in a programme of attempting to develop the theory so that non-economic 
factors might be integrated within one unified marxian model of capitalism, 
while the second has as its objective the detailing of the contingencies 
that sbape the particularities of specific labour processes and avoid any 
attempt at macro-model building. My own conclusion was that there are 
linkages to be made between particular labour process analyses and the 
analysis of capitalism, but that these 'linkages' are not predetermined by 
the structure of capitalism but are sustained by specific practices within 
work organisations and social institutions generally and thus are subject 
to change and modification. Furthermore, the conceptual apparatus required 
to adequately analyse work processes is too detailed for any easy 
aggregation to the macro-level, for the conceptual 'magnification' needed 
to analyse particular work processes will be technically inappropriate to 
the analysis of the wider social relations. The conclusion I reached was 
that it was not possible to present a unified model, but that one can 
develop compatible models at the micro and macro levels. 
The primary concern of this thesis, however, has not been wi th the 
revision of labour process theory per se but with the question of its 
applicability to professional work, namely that of hospital doctors, for, 8S 
has been demonstrated above, here was an occupation whose practioners, (a) 
exercised individual autonomy within the framework of collegiate control. 
(b) subordinated the work of other professional occupations to their 
particular authority and, relatedly. (c) enjoyed an influential gate-keeping 
position within the organisation of hospital health care and heavily 
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influenced the kind of innovation that was taken 'J;) withi:: hosc:~als. ~:'ese 
were realities that an unreconstructed labour oroces:; model wo~.~-: :iC,': be 
able to adequately analyse for it would be unable to take into 3C:Y.:::t the 
existence of autonomies rooted in the dual power bases of be cOC'C:S' 
institutional and functional controls. What was needed was .3 micro-le,,.el 
analyses of the work processes involved within a conte:d of ,3 ~c,cal 
collegiality which was in turn a component part of the profession's 
strategies for maintaining their institutional autonomy. The rest Oi 'his 
chapter will be given over to setting out how these different 'levds' of 
professional au tonomies were analysed, in rela tion to the in troduction of 
computer-based medical information systems, and how I saw their :':lter-
relationship and possible integration. 
The nature of clinic work was analysed in order to identify whether 
and by what means hospital doctors maintained their functional :lUtonomy 
and ascendancy within the doctor-patient relationship <medical encounter>. 
Within this specific relationship I was also intrigued to find out detdils 
of how the doctors' utilised the medical record and, in :'31- ticular, case 
notes because these practices were directly affected by t'1e introducion 
of the compu ter- based medical in forma tion sys tems. Moreover, the "Jr'),:es·s 
of recording and retrieving information from the medical record folder W,3S 
found to be particularly pertinent to the structuring of the me::i.::al 
encoun ter and the rela ted division of labour involving nu!"ses, '0'::00', 
disciplines' and so on. Thus, in relation to the medical encoun~oO':-, the 
hospital doctors at St Giles reported their particular ways cf c.ealing wi'h 
patients in their outpatients' clinics (Le. diagnosing, dis;)<Js:ng, treating 
and monitoring) and the role the medical reccrds playec within this 
context. It became clear that the medical record was par'icularly crucial 
8S much for the information it concealed as for what it revea~e{j, :'or tC'\<? 
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doctors would adopt practices whic'1 enhanced their concrQ~ over ':he 
medical encounter wi t'1(1) ~ inc 1Jrring 8:.rcessi?e tirr',8 c::Y:" tra:'", ~s j 'ne 
consultants generally chose a r~lprt~ approach f "'_~ __ dve . ocusing upon ':'1e 
patients' presenting complaints, while ~he junior medica~ sta:' preferrec ':c 
keep to the standard history taking, or 'clerking', model. A particu~3dy 
important point here was that the emphasis was on writing t:,e case notes 
as a deciSion aid rather than reading them; most doctors, mos~ of t~e time, 
were content to consult the summary contained in the cl::nic let ~er, 
operation notes and/or in'le",tigation results. Patients were proce",sed, as 
it were, one encounter at a time, even though their files could be lo~g 
standing ones. 
In the renal units the systems of recording and retrieving pa~ienr. 
data were organised in such ways that the nurses recorded the:a ta 
largely to inform the doctors so that they could monitor the ~.<:I';ien'; and 
consider, if applicable, referring any of them for advice from he "",'1er 
disciplines', This arrangement was most clearcut within the Dialysis 31'ld 
Transplant Unit, but it also existed in a less forma~ised form within the 
other unit studied. The case notes, as a narrative, tended to :>:,3Y a role 
subordinate to the investigation results and the patients' weights and 
blood pressures recorded usua:ly monthly on all patients. The medL3: 
encounter was where the patients' results would be diSC'Jssed wit~ ~he 
pa t ien t in terms of whe ther they were 'good' or 'bad', ani:: .:he cher these 
evaluations related to diligent dL,lysis, or not. Any patien+ c:coosing 
ill-disciplined in relation to either diet or dialysis soon iound ou' 
the unit staff would usually learn of these :ndiscreti,:>n3 
round of blood (haemotological) tes ts were taken, w':ic1j w':\s every '1',:0:: th. 
It resen +e~ infermation as In this respect, the investigation resu s rep, -
medical power, The patient ':dta system, whether manual or autom-3.teC:, was 
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at the core of any renal unii:s' routine i3~;-j it ',J5-= ·~,t wh';~" un'"' . . 
- ... ~ ~'_ll '..<er? :.nnec: 
the doctors' ascendancy both in re~C:i~ion to the :a~ien~='ir,d ;.;ithin 
renal division of labour. 
Functional autonomy, however, was :oslJfficient to '3c,:olJnt "or he 
doctors' responses to the compu ter- baser:: medical :.:-,:" orma ~ :,jI"i sys tems. It 
was necessary also to take into account the collegiali~:- 0: the 
consultants, for it was this that sustained the autonomy of the indl'!ic1J3~ 
consultants, as much as their specialist expertise. In the three case-
studies this was demonstrated by the ways in which the cons1J~tant doctors 
continued to support the use of the computer systems even whe~~ they had 
rejected it for use in their particular clinics, anr:: this \oJ;;S the case for 
both the outpatients' and the renal clinics. 
It was against this background that the question of linkage was also 
addressed and I concluded tha t the theorisa tion of mdndgemen t stra te,3'ies, 
presented by Wilkinson (1983) and more particular~y by Child (19135), was 
particularly pertinent. In contrast to Child, however, I argued that 
management were not the only grouping able to exercise str8·,o~jes tha' 
in fluenced the labour process and tha t occupa t ional groups, including those 
organised as professions, could influence the organis.3tion and control of 
work processes. These strategies were not a~\",:Jys unified and coherent in 
themselves (Child, 1985, p. 108). These circumstances ensure~ ~h5t 
institutional arrangements and structural consequences were no~ r-=adily 
predicated on capitalist dructures even though they would cons'rain ~he 
strategies availaicle at any particular time. At the level of the case 
studies, it was possible to ~how how the institutional contr-:-l of ~he 
consultants' collegiality brought about changes in the c~inic labour 
1 th i t d t · t the computer- oo3:;e;:: medical processes resu tent on e n ro uc lon o. . 
t"or example 1'n terms ,,_ t" the collection, rec,:!-dng and in forma t ion sys tems, 
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presentation of renal patient data (see C~a~~er Se~en). 
It was also pos.=,ible to offer a gl' f t' lffiJse 0 ne ~:Ger Jrocesses 
involved in sustaining institutional autonomy, and to tie it into t~,e 
general issue of the in troduction of informa tion t2cimo~o8), :n to med:c:!.:12, 
I refer here to the discussion of medical audi,: in Cha:;ter ~our W:1ere I 
set out the recent history of the strategies of the organiser':: profession 
in their negotiations with the state concerning the issue of c~ir::'cal 
autonomy. The state wanted to develop an effective means of measuring the 
quality and cost of medical care, while the organised profession wished its 
members to be the sole arbiters of the quality of care without reference 
to costs. The information supposedly s)'s tema tically recorded and fLeG :;) 
the medical record might have played a crucial role had it proved amenable 
to computerisation, for then some basis for assessing medical performance 
might have been established. This was not possible, however, for the 
functional autonomy of the consultants meant they recorded case nO'e~ as 
they thought best for their purpose, which was for patient management an': 
not aggregate statistics. In any case, the consultants outside the teaching 
hospi tals were very suspicious of medical audit even when it was proDosed 
by the organised profession as a defence against state pressure to make 
consultants increasingly accountable for the quality and costs of their 
medical care. My conclusion was that the autonomy and control possessed by 
hospital consultants have been constantly open to renegotiation and were 
not simply 'givens' within the health service. This is not :0 argue t~at, 
the medical profession lacks the hegemonic power implicit in the notion~:­
professional dominance (Freidson,1971 b), for the organisational cC'n trcl (), 
the state and NHS management is itself premissed on the:l'3,:endancy of ',e 
clinicians within the hospital service. Rather, it is the n3~_re9nd desree 
of that ascendancy that is always open to renewed negotiation. 
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In sum, hosnUal doctors can be charac':erised as be~~;r ao~e 
collectively to exercise an institutional control in con~ra-cis ... inct.i,::: ',: 
the organisational control possessed by the state ane NHS managemen:. T~is 
control is formally legitimated by the doctors' membership of :~e orga::isec 
profession (Le. BMA and Royal Colleges) but is sus,,'!ined on a C.3\'-~'J-cay 
basis by the hospital doctors' functional autonomy (Bloor, 1976a). The 
latter refers to the day to day work of the doctors as c~inic:'ans '''at 
puts them in a position of ascendancy, or dominance (?reidson,1970b) within 
the hospital organisation, for it is the clinic work on :'0 tients that is 
the raison d 'etre of the hospital service. All these features r:'; control 
have been made particularly visible in connection with political processes 
through which the computer sys terns were chosen, implemen ted, used and 
rejected. 
f .. 
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APPENDIX I SEVEN SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS FOR DOCTORS 
APPENDIX II FOUR SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS FOR NURSES 
APPENDIX III TWO SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS FOR 'OTHER DISCIPLiNES' 
APPENDIX IV RENAL COMPUTER SYSTEM (EXTRACTS) 
APPENDIX V TWO ENCOUNTER FORMS FOR THE CORES SYSTEM 
(GENERAL MEDICINE AND UROLOGY) 
APPENDIX VI CORES FLOWCHART (GENERAL MEDICINE) 
APPENDDC I: INTERVIEW SCHEDULES 
SEVEN SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW SCHEDULES FOR DOCTORS 
1. DOCTORS FIRST INTERVIEW (CORES SYSfEM) 
Date: 
Time5tart: 
Ask permission to use tape recorder 
Confidentiality 
Check Name and speciality 
1. Have you had experience of computers in hospitals before? (or 
elsewhere) <Details) 
2. Have any particular expectations as to how the proposed computer 
system will affect your work ? 
(Included here could be: 
- research 
- work (organisational> relations with, 
- junior staff 
- laboratory & scientific services 
- radiOlogy 
- adminis tra tion 
- nurses 
- medical secretaries 
Finish 
in addition to more direct changes to the work situation related to 
accessibility and legibility of the casenotes. 
NOTE: not necessary to cover all the points, only on those the 
respondent sees as important. 
(aide memoir) CORES: Encounter Report; Status Report; Flowchart 
(individuals); Report Generator 
APPENDIX I: INTERVIEW SCHEDULES 
3. Will the new system (CORES), in your view have any particular 
implications for your patients? (benefits or disadvantages) Details 
4(a) The CORES system has the facility to (provide) programmes of 
'Quality Assurance' * How do you view this ~ble development? (* By 
automatically reporting any deviations from pre-set rules governing the 
standards of care). 
4<b) More generally, how do you view the prospectof 'Quality 
Assurance' (or medical audit) in medical care? 
(aide memoire) Quality Assurance: Structure (input) - Process - Outcome 
plus, possibly, Social Acceptibility (Mclachan (1976), Shaw (1980) 
5. How would you define good patient care? (particularly relating to your 
own specialty) 
6. Do you think the proposed computer system (CORES) will have more, or 
less, effect on your specialty than on others in this hospital? (Why?) 
7 (a) Would you mind telling me why you supported the proposed 
introduction of the CORES computer package at St Giles hospital 
Outpatients' Department? 
7(b) Is there any reason that would lead you to withdraw your 
support for the (CORES) system? (e.g. disturbance of OPD) 
8. At the risk of being repititious, what do you think will be the major 
implications of the new computer system (CORES) at st Giles' hospital -
or even - more generally? 
9. Have any questions of me? 
Thankyou 
Mike Dent, 22nd September,1981 
APPEND~)'. 
2. OOCTORS' FIRS!" INTERVIEW (RENAL COMPUTER SYSI'£!ID 
Date: 
Time:Start: 
Renal Computer System 
Sociological/Organisational Evaluation 
(a) Permission to use tape recorder 
(b) Confidentiality 
Name: 
Consulantl Registrarl SHOI HO 
Time in post since graduation? 
Finish 
1. Briefly, what does your work (in relation) to the renal unit entail? 
(e.g. inpatient-outpatient; relationship to other work) 
2. Have you had experience of computers in hospitals before? (or 
elsewhere> <Details) 
3. Will the new system, in your view, have any particular implications for 
your patients? (benefits/disadvantages) (cue Medical Audit function) 
4 Have you any particular expectations as to how the proposed computer 
system will affect your work? (cues: nurses/dialysis sheets; lab. 
results; x-rays etc; admin-home admin; med.secs; other doctors; GPs; 
Research) 
5 Any problems envisaged for your own work or more generally? 
6. How would you define good patient care? 
7. To what extent have you been consulted on the question of the 
implementation of the proposed computer system? 
8. When referring to the medical record ... to what do you particularly 
refer .. , and what sequence do you adopt'? {e.g. handwritten clinic notes; 
APPEHJ~) I 
doctors letters; lab. resultsj graphs; x-rays etc; dialysis sheets) 
9. What is the role of casenotes/medical records with regard to the work 
of the renal unit? 
10. Have any questions of me? 
Thankyou 
Mike Den t. 1983 - Haemo: Aug, 1 984-
3. DOCTORS SECOND INTERVIEW: COjlliS SYSTEM 
CORES: Sociological/Organisational Evaluation 
Consultant/registrarlSHO/HO 
Permission to use casette tape recorder? 
Confiden tiali ty 
Check name and specialty 
APPENDIX I 
Date: 
Time: Start 
Finish 
Introduction: This interview focuses on matters relating to the transitional 
period immediately following the implementation of the CORES system in your 
clinic 
PREFACE (Junior doctors not interviewed before only) 
- Have you had any experience of computers in hospitals before? <Details?) 
- Where were you before prior to working at St Giles? 
PART I (All doctors) 
1(a) Would you outline for me your experience of adapting to the CORES 
system? (e~. prior preparations; adjustments to encounter form; use of 
CORES reports as part of casenotes. Surgery vs Medicine?) 
l(b) Have you noticed any particular benefits of the system as yet? 
1 (c) Are there any particular problems that you are finding with any aspect 
of the CORES system? <e.g. Encounter form; Encounterl Status Reports; 
Flow diagrams, etc.) 
2. If you do experience any difficulties with any aspect of the CORES 
System, who do you turn to first for assistance - and why? - And then 
who do you go to next? 
3. Have you found that using the CORES system has led you to modify, in 
APPENDIX I 
any way, the way you deal with patients in t'1e OPD clinic? (If yes: Do 
you think this will be a short- term or a long-- term change? e.g. 
resulting from encounter form design, legibility and availability of 
medical information, etc.) 
~. Are you finding that the other members of the hospital staff are 
adapting to the CORES system, at least as far as it affects you work? 
Details <e.g. Nurses, Medical Records Staff, Clinical Support 
<laboratories, radiology etc.>, Medical Staff (Consultant IJuniors. other 
clinicians, Administration <including admissionsl appointments) 
5. Are you finding the system of the encounter forms being processed by 
the CORES clerks, satisfactory, or not? DetailS? 
6. In light of your experience with the CORES system, so far, are there any 
modifications that you would like to see considered for inclusion in the 
system? 
PART II (Supplementary questions for junior doctors not previously 
interviewed only) 
1 (a) The CORES system has the facility to support programmes of Quality 
Assurance. How do you view this possible development? (. by 
automatically reporting any deviation from preset rules governing the 
standards of care) 
1 <b) More generally, how do you view the prospect of quality assurance (or 
medical audit> in medical care? <Check whether familiar with the term 
and degree of involvement (past and present) 
2. Would you tell me what direction you expect your career to progress? 
<Consultant (specialty?); GP; Community medicine; Other> 
Mike Dent 
18th April, 1982 
Site: 
4-. DOCTORS' SECOND INTERVIEW (RENAL UNITS) 
Date: 
Consultant/Registrar/SHO/HO 
Permission to use cassette tape recorder? 
Confidentiality 
Check name and details 
Preface: (clinicians not previously interviewed) 
Time: Start 
Finish 
APPENDIX I 
- Have you had experience of working with computers in hospitals before? 
<Details) 
- Where were you before coming here (renal medicine)? 
- And how long since you left medical school? 
PART I 
1. Would you outline for me your experince of adapting to the computer 
system? (e.g. prior preparations-especially re junior staff; adjusting to 
the computer outputs, both VDU (especially graphics) and 'hardcopy') 
NB Have there been any modifications made to the system since its 
introduction here? <Details) 
2. Do you use the computer directly to access information/data? - or to 
input data? - or to carry out any other procedures (etc) e.g. 
'programme'; write reports (etc) 
3(a) Are there any particular benefits, for you, (resulting from the 
implementation) of the computer system, as it is currently O?er8ting? 
<Details) 
APPENDIX I 
3<b) What facilities yet to be operationalised do you think will be 
particularly useful to you in your work? <Details) e.g. labora.tory 
results; GP letters ... ) 
4. Are there any particular problems that you are finding with any aspect 
of the system? 
5. If you do experience difficulties with any aspect of the computer 
system, who do you turn to first for assistance? - and nex(? 
6. Has the introduction of the computer system led you to modify the way 
you deal with patients? <e.g. patient management ... ) <Details-beneficf,~ t 
or not for the patient, doctor, other members of the team? <Specify> -
short or long term modifications) 
7. Have you as the result of the introduction of the computer system 
modified the way you record clinical information'? <Decision-aid; 
education; medico-legal; research) 
8. What has been the effect - as far as you can judge - of clinical data 
being processed/input by a clerical officer ... and not by a nursf', or 
doctor? <Details) 
PART II 
Junior Staff Only 
9. When referring to the medical record to what documents do you refer to 
and in what order - and why? 
10. Would you mind telling me what direction you expect - or hope - your 
career to progress? <e.g. hospital consultant; community medicine; GP 
etc) 
~ll Doctors 
h t system for some time 11. Now that you have had experience of t e compu er 
(5-6 months) what is your judgement of its usefulness for renal patient 
management both within this unit and more generally? 
12. Any ques!ions of me? 
Thankyou. 
Mike Dent 25 th April.1984 
Uf 
5. THIRD INTERVIEW; CONSULTANTS (CORES SYSTEM) 
CORES: Sociological/Organisational Evaluation 
Third In terview 
Permission to use cassette tape recorder? 
Confidentiality 
Name and Speciality 
APPENDIX I 
Time: Start 
Finished 
1. Now that you have had experience of the CORES system for some time 
(6/12118months) what is your judgement of it's usefulness in the 
Outpatients' clinic - in your specialty? Details? Long term commitment? 
2. How useful are you finding the various printed reports and flowcharts 
that are available? (reports, status report, flowchart, report generator, 
query language), Which ones do you use? 
3. When referring to casenotes do you tend to look up the printed reports, 
the clinic letter or the handwritten notes? (encounter form?) 
4. If relevant: How far does the modified ('Open Plan') Encounter form meet 
your requirements? 
5. How are (the) junior medical staff in your clinic familiarised with the 
system? (encounter forms, reports ... ) 
6. Has the introduction CORES made doctors work in your outpatient clinic 
more, or less, difficult? 
7. Have there been any implications for the quality of patient care? (e.g. 
follow-ups, drugs, ... ) 
8. What is the role of casenotes in an outpatient clinic? (education, 
research, decision aid, medico-legal> 
APPENDIX I 
9. What would your views be if the CORES system at St Giles was extended, 
(a) to become a linked hospital-GP system? 
(b) to include the inpatients at St Giles? 
(c> to include the DGH Outpatients' clinics? 
10. Any questions of me? 
... 
Thank you 
Mike Dent, June, 1983 
6. THIRD INTERVIEW: JUNIOR DOCTORS (CORES SYSTEM) 
Date: 
Time: Start 
Fill ish 
CORES: Sociological/Organisa tional Evaluation 
Permission to use casette tape recorder? 
Confidentiality 
Check name and specialty 
1. Have you had any experience of computers in hospitals before? Details? 
2(a) Where were you before (working at St Giles)? 
2(b) How long since your left medical school? 
3(a) Would you outline for me your experience of adapting to the CORES 
system? (e.g. prior preparations; adjustments to encounter form; U<;f~ of 
CORES reports as part of casenotes. Surgery vs Medicine? 
3(b) How much of an improvement are the current arrangements than those 
existing prior to July/August, 1983 (relat~) to the CORES system? 
4(a) Would you tell me what CORES facilities you currently use and are 
available to you? (cues. Encounter reports; status reports; 
illvestigation results; flowcharts; QL (research); 'prompts') 
4(b) When referring to the medical record, to what documents do you refer 
and in what order? 
4(c) Has the fact that the casenotes are a source of data for the CORES 
computer system caused you to modify ill any way the way you record 
clinical information? ... or deal with patients in the OP clinic? 
5. What is the role of casenotes in an outpatients' clinic? (education, 
research, decision aid, medico-legal) 
6. The CORES system has is capable of being developed to include a 
APPEND') 
facility of Concurrent Quality Assurance (i.e. a system by which any 
deviations from pre-set consultant rules governing the standards of 
care are brought to the doctors notice). How would you new such a 
development? 
7 More generally. how do you view the prospect of quality assurance (or 
medical audit) in medical care? 
8. Would you tell me what direction you expect your career to progress? 
9. Any questions of me? 
Mike Dent 
June 1983 
... 
Site: 
Consultant/RegistrarlSHO/HO 
Permission to use cassette tape recorder? 
Confidentiality 
Check name and details 
Preface: doctors not previously interviewed 
1. What does your work with regard to the Renal Unit entail? 
APPENDIX I 
U0te: 
Time: Start 
Finish 
2(a) Have you had experience of work~ with computers in hospitals before? 
<Details) 
(b) Where were you before coming here <hospital? specialty?) 
(c) How long since you left medical school? 
PART ~ 
All doctors 
3(a) Would you outline for me your experince of adapt~ to the computer 
system? <e.g. prior preparations especially re junior staff; ad,;usting to 
the using VDU etc 
3 (b) Have there been any modiflca tions made to the sys tem since you have 
been here? <Details) 
Doctors not previously interviewed 
3(c) Do you use the computer directly to access information/data? -or to 
input data? - or to carry out any other procedures (etc) e.g. 
'programme'; write reports <etc> 
3 (d) Are there any facilities still to be operationalisec' that :-rn!! think 
will be particularly useful for renal work? <Details e.g. laboratory 
APPENDIX I 
results; GP letters etc.) 
4(0) Have you experienced any problems using the system? 
4(b) If you do experience difficulties with any aspect of the computer 
system, who do you turn to first for assistance? - and next? 
All doctors 
5. Now you have had experience of the computer system for some time <5-6 
months?) what is your judgement as to its usefulness for renal patient 
management both within this unit and more generally? (benefits-
problems) 
6(a) Has the introduction of the computer system led you to modify the way 
you deal with patients? (e.g. patient management, treatment pl6llS) 
6(b) Has the routine use of the computer system had any direct implications 
for your patients? 
PART II 
Doctors not previously interviewed 
6 (c) How would you define good patient care? 
6(d) Role/experience of medical audit? 
7. Has the existence of the computer system caused you to modify the way 
you use the medical record/clinic notes? <Details?-recording/retrieving 
data - decision aid; educationj medico-legal; research) 
Junior staff only 
8. Would you tell me in what direction you anticipate your career 
developing? <hospital consultant; community medicine; GP., etc). 
9. Any questions of me? 
Thankyou, 
!t!.ike Dent 
25th April, modified 17th December, 1984 
APPENDIX II 
Nurses 
FOUR SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW SCHEDULES FOR NURSES 
1. NURSES FIRST INTERVIEW <CORES SYSTEM) 
GROUP INTERVIEW 
St Giles Hospital 
Objectives 
Date: 
(a) Find out whether (etc) the nurses are as unaffected by CORES as has 
been assumed by Dr Old and others 
(b) At least some nurses have expressed doubts about the systeas 
effectiveness as it concerns the running of the OPD. Find out details. 
Explain purpose of interview. 
NB All information non-attributable. Concern with the clinicians 
1. Name and position of nurses (and length of ttme at the hospital?) 
2. Any previous experience of a computer system? (details) 
3(a) In what ways has the CORES system affected the running of the OPD as 
it concerns yourselves? (and between specialties) 
3(b) Consultation/training? 
4. Are there any ways in which the CORES system - as it concerns your 
work - migh t be improved? 
5. Have your any questions of me? 
Mike Dent, October,1982 
••• 
APPENDIX II 
2. SENIOR NURSES SECOND INTERVIEW (CORES SYSfEM) 
CORES Evaluation: Nursing Staff 
Permission to use cassette tape recorder 
Confiden tiali ty 
Name/posi tion 
1. Have you had experience of computers in hospitals? <Details) 
Time: Start 
Finish 
Date: 
2. In what ways does the CORES system affect your work? (cues: 
availability of medical records; front sheet information; investigation 
results) 
3(a) Now that you have had experience of the CORES system for some time, 
what in your view has been its long-term impact on the running of the 
outpatients' clinics? <Cues: between specialties; pre-computer ... ) 
3(b) What modifications, if any, would you like to see introduced, or 
extended? <Cues: access to CORES when office closed) 
4. How far do you think that the views and requirements of nursing staff 
have been included in the design; of the CORES system at St Giles? <Any 
changes since the appointment of the new Director of Nursing?) Details 
5. Have any questions of me? 
Mike Dent, 26th November, 1983 
* .. 
Date: 
Time Start 
Time Finish 
3. FIRST NURSE INTERVIEW (RENAL UNITS) 
Permission to use tape recorder 
Confidentiality 
Name 
Rank 
Length (of time) in nursing/renal unit? 
APPE.'ID IX II 
Renal Unit 
First Interview 
1. Briefly, what does your work on the renal unit entail? <including 
proportion of time, nursing records, case/patient reviews) 
2. Have you had experience of computers in hospitals before? (Details) 
3.(a) Have you any particular expectations as to how the proposed computer 
system will affect your work ? (benefits/disadvantages) <cues: dialysis 
running sheets; graphs; lab.results; Xraysj Admin <incI home 
administrator); medical secretaries; doctors (consultants/ registrars/ 
juniors); GPSj Sister/Nurses) 
3(b> Any problems envisaged for your work, or more generally? 
4. Would you mind telling me to what extent you have been consul tee on the 
question of the implementation of the proposed system? 
5. Will the proposed system, in your view, have any particular implications 
for your patients? (benefits/disadvantages) (details), 
Have any questions of me? Time Finished: 
Mike Dent, 1983 
"f 
Site. 
4-. NURSES SECOND IN":fRV~W 
RENAL COMPUTER SYSTEM 
Sociological/Organisational Evaluation 
Nursg: Grade 
Permission to use casette tape recorder? 
Con fiden tia1i ty 
Check name (etc) 
Preface: nurses not previously interviewed 
-How long have you been working in this Renal Unit? 
- Where were you before coming here? 
-Do you intend to stay in renal nursing? 
PART I 
APP~DIX II 
Date: 
Time: Start 
Finish 
1(a) Would you outline for me your experience of adapting to the new 
computer system? (e.g. preparations/training; adjustments to computer 
requirements (formats); getting used to the outputs, including the VDU 
1 (b) Have there been any modifications made to the system since its 
introduction here? (details, especially nurse/doctor d.o.!.) 
2(a)In what ways has the introduction of the computer system meant you 
chang~ the way you record patient/dialysis data for the medical 
record - or the nursing record? (details) 
2 (b) Is the data on the computer system more - or less - reliable and up 
to date than the manual system 
2(c) Do you ever input or access data from the system direct (via VDUs)? 
- for nursing purposes 
- for doctors (e.g. graph meetings? renal? transplants?) 
APPENDIX II 
- other 
<details - including reports! letters etc) 
3<a) Are there any particular benefits for you as a result of the intro-
duction of the computer system? <details) 
3 <b) What facilities, yet to be made available, do you think will be parti-
cularly useful to you in your work? (details) 
4. Are you finding any particular problems concerning the computer system? 
(details) 
PART II 
~ainly Sister(s) 
5. If you do experience any difficulties with any aspect of the computer 
system who do you turn to first for assistance? 
And next? 
6. Has the introduction of the computer system had any djrect influence on 
the quality of patient care and training? (e.g. more time to talk with 
patients; home visits ... ) <details: beneficial, or not, for patient, 
nurses, doctors and other members of the team; short, or long, term 
influence> 
7. HaeDlo Unit 
What has been the effect - as far as you can judge - of data being 
processed! input by a clerical officer <stoker> and not by a nurse or 
doctor? 
Dialysis and TransplBn t Uni t 
In so far as it affects your work, are you finding that other - non-
nursing members of hospital staff are adapting well to this computer? 
(cue: administrative and clerical; medicAl staff - consultants! 
registrars! SHO; clinical labs. etc. 
APPENDlX II 
8. Now that the system has been running for some time <5-6 months) what 
is your judgement of its usefulness for the Renal Unit, the :>aUents 
and staff <particularly nurses)? 
9. Any questions of me? 
Thankyou 
¥l!le Dent 
25 th April, 1984 
APPEND'Y III 
Site 
I~Q SEMI-SfR!1CTURED INTERVIEW SCHE.Q!1LES FOR '9JJ'';9 DISCIPLINES' 
1. FIRSf INTERY::':II/ (RENAL COMPUTER SYSJ':::~) 
Date: 
Tiae Start 
Time Fil1ish 
(a) Permission to use tape recorder 
<b) Confidentiality 
Name/Role 
1. Briefly, what does your work on the renal unit entail? (including, how 
long in present post) 
2. Have you had experience of computers in hospitals before? 
3. Have you any particular expectations as to how the proposed computer 
system will affect your work? (benefits/disadvantages) 
~. To what extent you have been consulted on the question of the 
implementation of the proposed system? <details of the steering 
committee work) 
5. Have any questions of me? 
Mike Dent. 1983 
••• 
A?PF'I')IX ill 
2. 'OTHER DISCIPLINES' SECOND INTERVIEW <RENAL COMPUTER SYSTEM) 
Sociological/Organisa tional Evalua tion 
Name/Posi tion 
Permission to use cassette tape recorder? 
Confidentiali ty 
iW:'r'" UNIT 
Date: 
Time: Start 
Finish 
1. Has your work in relation to the renal unit been affected at 8~~ by the 
introduction of the renal computer system? 
If 'no' - double check. (Cues: medical records; running sheets; lab. 
results; admin. files) 
If 'yes' - details 
As relevant 
2(a) Would you outline for me your experience of adapting to the 
requirements of the new computer system? (e.g. relevance of preparations 
/trainiQgi adjustment to the computer outputs includiQg screens/formats 
2 (b) Have there been any modificB tions made to the sys tern since its in tra-
duction here? (especially if it results from your experience with the 
system) 
3. Do you use the computer directly to input, or access, data (via VDU)? (or 
for any other purpose e.g. 'programme'> 
4-(a) Are there any particular benefits, for you, as a result of the intro-
duction of the computer system? <Details) 
4-(b) Are there any facilities yet to come into operation that you think will 
be particularly useful? <Details) e.g. laboratory results; GP letters ... ) 
APPEND~A 
5. Haemo Uni t 
Are there any particular problems that you are find~ as a result of 
the introduction of the computer system? (details) 
Dialysis and Transplan t 
In so far as it affects your work, are you find~ others are adapt~ 
well to this computer system? (cues: nurses; medical staff -
consultants/ registrars/ SHO; clinical labs; clerical etc). 
6. Now that the computer has been running for some time (5-6 months) what 
is your judgement (or impression) of it's usefulness? 
7. Any questions of me? 
... 
Thankyou, Mike Dent 
June,1984 
APPEND I f. I V 
RENAL COMPUTER SYSTEM (EXTRACTS) 
--------------------------------~----------
--------------------------
PATIENT IDENTIFICATION 
Surname SMITH UNIT No. D. o. B. 23.11. 4-8 
Forenames Joan Susan Ti tle Status HD 
Address 3, Queens Terrace, 
Rummidge, 
Religion C.E. 
Post Code Marital Status M Sex F. 
Telephone Nos. Blood Group A+ 
Home Rummidge 537591 
Work Renal Physician P. Dutton 
Date in Computer Renal Surgeon 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Retrieval Identity 
Function: 
17.01. 85 Patient 10 GP & NoK Dial. Ad 
SMITH Joan Susan 
General Practitioner 
Name Dr N.K.N.Choundry 
Key Refs Diagnosis 
Occupation Last Menu 
23.11.48 100357 HD 23773 
G.P. AND NEXT OF KIN 
Next of Kin 
Name 
Address Church Fields Health Ctr. Relation 
Mr. Smi th 
David 
Husband 
Rummidge Address 3,Queens Terrace 
Rummidge 
Post code 
Telephone 
Postcode 
Telephone 
---------------------------------------
------------------------------------
Retrieval Identity 
Function: 
17.01. 85 Patient 10 GP & NoK Dial. Ad 
SMITH Joan Susan 
Key Refs Diagnosis 
Occupation Last Menu 
23.11.48 100357 HD 23773 
-----------------------------------------------------
----------------------
Identification Nos: 
EDTA Number 100357 
UKTS Code No. 
RHA Renal No. 45678 
KEY REFERENCES 
Date of First: 
Contact 
Dialysis 
CAPD 
Home Dialysis 
11.10.71 
10.11.84 
Referring: 
Consultant 
Source 
Type 
Unit No. 
Speciali ty 
APPENDIX IV 
Transplant List 
TranS9!ant 
----------------------------------------------
------------------------ -
Retrieval Identity 
Function: 
SMITH Joan Susan 
17.01. 85 Patient ID GP & NoK 
Key Refs Diagnosis 
Occupation Last Menu 
23.11. 4·8 100357 HD 
Dial. Ac 
23773 
---------~------------ ---- --------------------
----------------------------
PRINCIPAL DIAGNOSIS 
Date Diagnosis 
Pyelonephritis 
Retrieval Identity 
Function: 
17.01.85 
SMITH Joan Susan 
EDTA Diagnosis code 10 
Patient ID GP & NoK Dial. Ad 
Key Refs Diagnosis 
Occupation Last Menu 
23.11.~8 100357 HD 23773 
OCCUPATION OF PATIENT 
Employer: Name 
Address 
Postcode 
Telephone 
NO DETAILS ENTERED ON THIS SCREEN 
Industry Type 
Patient: Occupation 
Working capacity 
Employment status 
-------- -----------
--------------------------------------------------------
Retrieval Identity 
Function: 
SMITH Joan Susan 
17.01.85 Patient ID GP & NoK 
Key Refs Diagnosis 
Occupation Last Menu 
23.11.48 100357 HD 
--------------
Dial. Ad 
23773 
-------------
-----------------------------
----------------
HAEMODIALYSIS PROGRAMME 
Dialyser 
Make Travenol Hours/Session 3.5 
Model 12. 11 Sessions/week 3 
APPENDIX IV 
Heparin 3,000 Needles 
Mls/hr 1.5 Gauge 
Make 
----~----------------------
----------------------
--------------------------Retrieval Identity 
Function: 
SMITH Joan Susan 
17.01. 85 Programme 
Dialysis 
Access 1 
Post OP 
Last Menu 
Access 2 
23. 11.~8 100357 HD 23773 
-------------------------------------------
-----------------------------
ACCESS (1) 
Type Start Stop Type Start Stop 
1. A/V Fistula LA 11.10.71 23.05.72 ~. Refashioning 
2. Bovine LA 12.08.79 5. Shunt 
3. Gortex 6. Resit i ng 
---------------_._----------------------------------------------------------
Retrieval Identity 
Function: 
SMITH Joan Susan 
7. Umbili cal 
8. Femoral Cath 
9. Tenckhoff 
Retrieval Identity 
Function: 
SMITH Joan Susan 
17.01. 85 Programme 
Dialysis 
Access 1 
Post OP 
Access 2 
Last Menu 
23.11.~8 100357 HD 23773 
ACCESS (2) 
17.01. 85 
10. Int. Jugular 
11. Sub-clavian 
12. Transplant 
Programme 
Dialysis 
Access 1 
Post OP 
Access 2 
Last Menu 
23.11.~8 100357 HD 23773 
----------------------
------------------------------------------
-----------
HAEMODIALYSIS EQUIPMENT 
Type Number Date 
Machine 
Day 3 
Single Needle 
Duration (hrs) 3.5 
Service Hours 
Path lab results Na K ea 
Softener 
R. O. Unit 
APPE"i~l1X IV 
Last Visit - Date 
- By 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Retrieval Identity 
Function: 
17.01. 85 Programme 
Dialysis 
Access 1 
Post OP 
Access 2 
SMITH Joan Sus6n 
L6st Menu 
23.11.tS 100357 HD 23773 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
C6theter Insertion 
CAPD REGIME - POST OP 
Tr6venol Dy16de 
0.5 Litre 
1. 0 Litre 
1. 5 Litre 
Le6k6ge 
Dr6in6ge 
Overflow 
Le6kage 
Drain6ge 
Overflow 
Leakage 
Dr6in6ge 
Overflow 
2.0 Litre 
2.5 Litre 
3.0 Litre 
Home D6te 
Leakage 
Drainage 
Overflow 
Leakage 
Dr6inage 
Overflow 
Leakage 
Drainage 
Overflow 
Retriev6l Identity 
Function: 
17.01. 85 Programme 
Dialysis 
Access 1 
Post OP 
Access 2 
SMITH 
D6te 
10.11.84 
14.03.80 
14.09.80 
03.08.79 
03.08.79 
2t.07.79 
U.07.79 
12.03.79 
12.03.79 
05.11.78 
05.11. 78 
07.08.72 
18.06.72 
17.06.72 
11.10.71 
J06n Sus6n 
L6st Menu 
23.11.tS 100357 HD 23773 
TIMELINE - CHANGE OF STATUS 
Event 
Home di6lysis 
Hospit61 h6emodialysis 
Patient transferred to Ren6l Unit from Princess Hospital 
Hospital h6emodi6lysis 
Tr6nsplant ce6sed to function 6dequately to sustain life 
Transp16ntation 6t Princess Hospital 
Patient transferred to Princess Hospital 
Hospital haemodialysis 
Transplant ceased to function 6dequately to sustain life 
Transplanted kidney functioning ok 
Patient tr6nsferred to 'Ren6l Unit' from Princess 
Transplanted kidney functioning ok 
Transp16nt6tion at Princess hospital 
P6tient tr6nsferred to Princess Hospit6l 
Hospital Dialysis 
--------
-------
-------- --
Retriev6l Identity 
Function: 
17.01.85 Events EDTA Transfer 
None 
APPENDIX Ii 
SMITH Joan Susan 23.11.~8 100357 HD 23773 
------- -----------------------
---------------------
--------
------------
EDTA number 100357 
Sex F 
Date of birth 23.11.~8 
Diagnosis 10 
Transferred: 
from 22AE 
to 
Date of death 
Cause of death 
Transplant func? 
date 
date 
E.D.T.A. 1985 
HD frequency 
HD duration 
HD type 
Reuses 
12.03.79 CAPD: 
Peritonitus 
PTX N 
Transplants 1 2 3 4 5 Mali gnanc i es 
First primary 
Second prilll6ry 
Third primary 
source 1 
CyA 
failure 2 
Creatinine end 85 
3 
11 
552 
0 
date 
Site 
00 
Date 
--_.------------------------------------------------------------------------
Retrieval Identity 
Function: 
17.01. 85 Events EDTA Transfer 
SMITH Joan Susan 
None 
23.11.~8 100357 HD 23773 
E.D.T.A. 1985 
CONTAINS CODE OF DIALYSIS UNIT - LEFT BLANK 
Retrieval Identity 
Function: 
17.01. 85 Events EDT A Transfer 
SMITH Joan Susan 
None 
23.11.48 100357 HD 23773 
EVENT Loo (1) 
Event Details 
First dialysis at the Renal Unit 
To Princess Hospital for cadaver transplant 
Referred to Dr xxx for follow up 
Date 
11.10.71 
18.06.72 
05.11. 78 
12.07.79 Dialysis attempted without success. T/F to Princess Hospital for 
assessment of fistula 
03.08.79 
10.11.84 
Recommenced dialysis at Renal Unit 
Commenced home dialysis 
----------
-----------------
------------------------------------------------
Update - Episodes 1 
Function: 
SMITH Joan Susan 
17.01. 85 Events 1 Events 2 
Nursing 1 Nursing 2 
Clinic/OPl Clinic OIP 
23.l1.~8 100357 HD 
Events 3 
Nursing 3 
2 Next Menu 
23773 
------------------------
---------------------------------------------------
Review by Doctor (1) 
Date Comments 
First review home dialysis - very well. 
--------------------------------------
--------------------------------
Update -- Episodes 
Function: 
SMITH Joan Susan 
17.01.85 Events 1 Events 2 
Nursing 1 Nursing 2 
Clinic/OPl Clinic O/P 
23.11.48 100357 HD 
Events 3 
Nursing 3 
2 Next Menu 
23773 
-----------------------------------------
----------------------------------
Family 
Accomadation 
Employment 
Leisure Acts 
Benefi ts 
ReI 
Domestic Support 
Notes 
SOCIAL REPORT 
Name Address 
Update - Episodes 2 17.01.85 Social Wk Drugs 1 
Function: 
No data avaiable 
SMITH Joan Susan 
Date Drug 
Started 
Ferrograd folic 
23.10.85 Alucaps 
Admin Dietician 
Last Menu 
23.11.48 100357 HD 
DRUGS SCREEN (1) 
Dose Freq Date 
stopped 
1 od 
2 tds 
D.o.B. Occ/Sch 
Drugs 2 
X-Ray 
Next Menu 
23773 
-----------------------------------------
-----------------------------
Update - Episodes 2 
Function: 
SMITH Joan Susan 
17.01. 85 Social Wk 
Admin 
23.11.48 
Drugs 1 
Dietician 
Last Menu 
100357 HD 
Drugs 2 
X-Ray 
Next Menu 
23773 
----------
-----------------------------------------------
-------------------
Dietary Allowances 
Protein (g/24hr) 
Potassium (mmol) 
Sodium (mmol) 
Calories 
Fluid (ml) 
Dietary Supplements 
DIETICIAN 
Advice to Patient 
APPENDIX IV 
Notes 
Date of last update 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Update - Episodes 2 17.01.85 
Function: 
No data available 
SMITH Joan Susan 
Social WIt 
Admin 
23.11. 48 
Drugs 1 
Dietician 
Last Menu 
100357 HD 
Drugs 2 
X-Ray 
Next Menu 
23773 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
X-RAY 
Date X-Ray Comments 
17 . 09. 81 CXR & 
since 
18.03.83 CRX & 
Hands: Heart enlarged with considerable 
December 1980. Hands show slightly poor 
Hands: Lung field appear clear. Cardiac 
increase in CT ratio 
bone density. 
enlargement as 
before. 
25.08.83 CRX & Hands: Lung fields appear clear. Slight increase in heart 
size. No bone abnormality seen in the hands. 
12.02.84 CRX & Hands: Lungs clear, cardiac outline within normal limits. 
Heart has decreased in size. No significant bony changes in 
fingers. 
Update - Episodes 2 
Function: 
SMITH Joan Susan 
17.01. 85 Social WIt 
Admin 
23.11. 4-8 
Drugs 1 
Dietician 
Last Menu 
100357 KD 
PSYCHOLOGIST 
Presenting Problem 
Date 
Treatment-Type 
-Duration 
Notes 
Re Referral 
Date 
Treatment-Type 
-Duration 
Notes 
--------
---------
------------
-------------------------------
Update - Episodes 3 
Function: 
No data available 
17.01.85 
SMITH Joan Susan 
------------------------
----------
Date of Death 
Death 
23.11. 4-8 
Psychology 
Last Menu 
100357 HD 
-------
-------
------------
DEATH 
Drugs 2 
X-Ray 
Next Menu 
23773 
---------------
Problems 
None 
23773 
-------
--------
APPENDIX IV 
Status <nITIH) 
Cause of death EDTA code 
Transplanted kidney functioning at time of death (YIN) 
Necropsy <YIN) 
Report 
Update - Episodes 3 17.01.85 
Function: 
No data available 
SMITH Joan Susan 
Death 
23.11.4.8 
Psychology 
Last Menu 
100357 HD 
Problems 
None 
23773 
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